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IN THE SQQ~EME
COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC )
PetitionerIAppellant
)
Supreme Court Case 35730
v.

.

Kootenai Co. Case CV08- 163
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
ELMER R. CURRIE; RICHARD A.
PIAZZA and TODD TONDEE
Respondents
And

)
)
)

1
1
)

)

NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH; NORBERT and BEVERLY
TWILLMAN; SUSAN MELKA;
BILL and SILVIA LAMPARD; DAVID
and BARBARA WARDSWORTH and
HEATHER BOWLBY
Intervenors/Respondents

1
)
)

)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Kootenai.
HONORABLE JOHN PATRICK LUSTER PRESIDING
District Judge
Attomev for Petitioner/Ap~ellant

Attorney for Respondents

Kristen Thompson

Patrick M. Braden
Kootenai County Legal Services
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16

78 S W Fifth Ave. Ste 150
Meridian, ID 83642

Attomev for IntervenorsIRespondents
Scott W. Reed
PO Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

-

Date: 1/2/2009

icial District Court Kootenai Count

Time: 10:51 AM

User: MCCORD

ROA Report
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Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, eta1

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie
Brodie
Date

Code

User

Judge
-

-

-

- -

VlCTORlN

New Case Filed - All Other Cases

John P. Luster

VlCTORlN

Filing: R1C - Appeals And Transfers Magistrate
To District Other Cv/sp Appeals Paid by: Glen
Walker Receipt number: 071 1836 Dated:
9/1/2006 Amount: $53.00 (Check)

John P. Luster

NOTC

JSHAFFER

Notice of Estimate of Transcript and Agency
Record

John P. Luster

NOTC

BOOTH

Notice of Settlement and Filing of Agency Record John P. Luster
and Transcript

NOTC

BOOTH

Notice of Settlement and filing of Agency Record John P. Luster
and Transcript

MOTN

VlCTORlN

Motion for Extension to Lodge Agency Record
and Transcript and Request for Hearing

John P. Luster

STlP

MCCOY

Stipulation for Extension to Lodge Agency
Record and Transcript

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order Granting Extension to Lodge Agency
Record and Transcript

John P. Luster

NOTC

REMPFER

Notice of lodging of transcript and agency record John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 02/09/2007 John P. Luster
08:OO AM)

ORDR

BOOTH

Order Setting Briefing schedule on Petition for
Judicial Review and Notice of Hearing

John P. Luster

Stipulation for Extension to Settle Record and
Transcript

John P. Luster

NCOT

STlP
MOTN

WATKINS

Motion For Order For Mediation and Request For John P. Luster
Hearing

MOTN

WATKINS

Motion For Extension To Settle Record and
Transcript and Request For Hearing

John P. Luster

ORDR

WATKINS

Order Granting Motion For Extension To Settle
Record and Transcript

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

John P. Luster

NOHG

VlCTORlN

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/2006 03:30
PM)
Notice Of Hearing

NOTC

REMPFER

FILE

JANUSCH

John P. Luster

Notice of settlement and filing of agency record
and transcript on appeal

John P. Luster

New File Created

John P. Luster

******* FILE 2***************************************

Box with Trancripts filed 11113/06***********
HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Judicial Review held on
02/09/2007 08:OO AM: Hearing Vacated

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 03/28/2007 John P. Luster
03:30 PM)

ORDR

BOOTH

John P. Luster
Amended Order Setting Briefing Schedule on
Petition for Judicial Review and Notice of Hearing

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on
03/28/2007 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated

John P. Luster

John P. Luster

-
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Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie
Brodie
Date

Code

User

Judge

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 03/02/2007 John P. Luster
08:OO AM)

BOOTH

Amended Notice of Hearing

John P. Luster

BRlE

SRIGGS

Appellant's Brief

John P. Luster

HELD

WATKINS

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/12/2006
03:30 PM: Motion Held for mediation

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order granting motion for mediation

John P. Luster

FlLE

JANUSCH

New File Created

John P. Luster

BRlE

SRIGGS

Respondent's Brief

John P. Luster

MOTN

ZLATI C H

Motion for stay of appeal

John P. Luster

STlP

ZLATlCH

Stipulation to stay appeal

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on
03/02/2007 08:OO AM: Hearing Vacated

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

AFFD

MCCOY

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/21/2007 03:OO
John P. Luster
PM)
Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall in Support of Motion for John P. Luster
Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show Cause and
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement

AFFD

MCCOY

Supplemental Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall

John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion for Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show
Cause

John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order denying ex parte application

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/21/2007
03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated to enforce post
settlement agreement

John P. Luster

STlP

MCCORD

Stipulation

John P. Luster

AFFD

MCCORD

Affidavit of Summer Skalak

John P. Luster

AFFD

MCCORD

Affidavit of Robin Eldridge

John P. Luster

PETN

MCCORD

emergency Petition for writ of
mandamus/prohibition

John P. Luster

MlSC

HULL

Repondent's Objection to Petitioner's Emergency John P. Luster
Petition for Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition and
Motion to Dismiss Same

MlSC

HULL

Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Objection to
Emergency Petition For Writ of
MandamusIProhibition

John P. Luster

FlLE

MCCORD

New File Created

John P. Luster

SUBC

MCCOY

Notice of Substitution Of Counsel - Patrick
Braden in for John Cafferty

John P. Luster

--

..........................

FILE 3*******************

****************** file

-

-

-
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Case: CV-2006-0006587 Current Judge: John P. Luster

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, etal.
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, Gus Johnson, Elmer R Currie, Katie
Brodie
Date

Code

User

MOTN

WATKINS

Motion For Stay Of Appeal

John P. Luster

STlP

WATKINS

Stipulation To Stay Appeal

John P. Luster

ORDR

BARKER

Order Granting Motion To Stay Appeal

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/22/2008 08:OO
AM) to enforce mediation agreement

John P. Luster

NOHG

LSMITH

Amended Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOAP

PARKER

Notice Of Appearance/Kristen R Thompson for
Plaintiff Kirk-Hughes Development LLC

John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCORD

Motion to consolidate

John P. Luster

STlP

MCCORD

Stipulation to consolidate

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order to consolidate - into CV08-163

John P. Luster

NOTE

BOOTH

NO FURTHER PLEADINGS TO BE FILED IN
THIS FILE - USE CV08-163

John P. Luster

INMAN

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
0512212008 03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held +
MTN TO WITHDRAW BY KC WALL AND MTN
LIMITED ADMISSIONS ROBERT FRElLlCH

John P. Luster

MEYER

Reviewed And Retained - File in Judge Luster's
office for review

John P. Luster

REVR

Judge

-
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Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

1/9/2008

NCOC

MCCORD

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Lansing L. Haynes

MCCORD

Filing: R2 - Appeals And Transfers For Judicial
Review To The District Court Paid by: Kristen
Thompson Receipt number: 0777491 Dated:
1/9/2008 Amount: $78.00 (Combination) For:
[NONEl

Lansing L. Haynes

SUM1

KSMITH

Summons Issued

Lansing L. Haynes

MOTN

BAXLEY

Motion for Extension of Tie for Preparation of
Agency Record and Transcript

Lansing L. Haynes

AFFD

BAXLEY

Affidavit of Sandi Gilbertson in Support of Motion Lansing L. Haynes
for Extension of Time for Preparation of Agency
Record and Transcript

MOTN

MCCORD

Motion to consolidate

Lansing L. Haynes

STlP

MCCORD

Stipulation to consolidate

Lansing L. Haynes

ORDR

BOOTH

Order to Consolidate - with CV06-6587 - ALL
FILING IN THIS CASE

John P. Luster

ADMR

BOOTH

Administrative assignment of Judge

John P. Luster

BOOTH

Order Assigning Judge on Disqualification
Without Cause

John P. Luster

BOOTH

Order Assigning Judge on Disqualification
Without Cause - John Patrick Luster

John P.Luster

111612008

112412008
1/29/2008

Judge

113112008

BRIE

MCCORD

Appellant's Brief in support of motion to enforce
mediation agreement

John P. Luster

2/1/2008

FILE

MCCORD

New File Created
****************** FlLE 2
EXPANDO********************

John P. Luster

expando contains appellant's supplemental brief
BRIE

MCCORD

appellant's supplemental Brief in support of
motion to enforce mediation

John P. Luster

2/8/2008

NLTR

LUNNEN

Notice of Lodging Of Agency Record And
Transcript

John P. Luster

211412008

MEMO

BAXLEY

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce John P. Luster
Mediation Agreement

AFFD

BAXLEY

Affidavit of Elmer R Currie In Opposition to
Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement

John P. Luster

2/20/2008

MlSC

MCCORD

appellant's reply to resp's memorandum in
opposition to motion to enforce mediation
agreement

John P. Luster

2/25/2008

NOTC

LUNNEN

Notice Of Settlement And Filing Of Agency
Record And Transcript

John P. Luster

2/26/2008

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider
05/21/2008 03:OO PM)

John P. Luster

2/27/2008

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 05/22/2008 John P. Luster
03:OO PM)

3/4/2008

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Review 06/04/2008 John P. Luster
03:OO PM)

1

-
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Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

3/4/2008

ORDR

BOOTH

Order denying appellant's motion to enforce
mediation agreement

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order setting briefing schedule on peittion for
judicial review and notice of hearing

John P. Luster

MCCOY

Filing: J5 - Special Motions Petition For
lntervention Paid by: Scott Reed Receipt
number: 0787692 Dated: 3/21/2008 Amount:
$61.OO (Check) For: [NONE]

John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCOY

Motion to Intervene as of Right, Motion for
Permissive lntervention - Scott Reed OBO
Applicant

John P. Luster

MEMS

MCCOY

Memorandum In Support Of Motion to lntervene
as of Right, Motion for Permissive lntervention

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene
04/21/2008 03:OO PM)

John P. Luster

AFFD

THOMPSON

Affidavit of Beverly Twillmann in support of
motion to intervene as of right and of motion for
permisssive intervention

John P. Luster

3/25/2008

NOTH

PARKER

Notice Of Hearing on Motion to lntervene as of
John P. Luster
Right of Motion for Permissive lntevention of
Applicants Neighbor's for Responsible Growth, et
al

4/1/2008

TRAN

BOOTH

Transcript Filed - 212218 proceeding - Reporter
Anne MacManus

John P. Luster

4/2/2008

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on
04/21/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene
0511312008 03:OO PM)

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Intervene
04/21/2008 03:OO PM)

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on
05/13/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated

John P. Luster

4/3/2008

MlSC

MCCOY

Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief

John P. Luster

4/4/2008

MlSC

BAXLEY

Appellant's Opposition To Motion To lntervene As John P. Luster
Of Right, Motion For Permissive lntervention

411 112008

MlSC

THOMPSON

Brief Of Intervenors In Support Of Motion To
lntervene

John P. Luster

411512008

ABRF

THOMPSON

Appellant's Brief

John P. Luster

411612008

NOTC

KSMITH

Notice of Hearing 06/04/2008 @ 3:00

John P. Luster

KSMITH

Objection to Reply Brief of Appelant and Motion
to Strike

John P. Luster

KSMITH

Memorandum In Support Of Objection to Reply
Brief of Appellant and Motion to Strike

John P. Luster

3/24/2008

MEMS

Judae

Date: 11212009

-
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".'"

Time: 01 :35 PM
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Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

4/21I2008

DCHH

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion to Intervene held on
John P. Luster
04/21/2008 03:OO PM: District Court Hearing Hel
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

4/22/2008

MOTN

PARKER

Appellant's Motion Requesting Reconsideration John P. Luster
of Order and, in the Alernative, Certification of the
Court's Decision

NOTH

PARKER

Notice Of Hearing

MOTN

PARKER

Appellant's Motion for Appeal of Commissioners' John P. Luster
Decision on PUD Application 054-05

NOTH

PARKER

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOTC

BOOTH

Notice Of Hearing - Motion to Reconsider

John P. Luster

ANHR

VICTORIN

Amended Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

MlSC

SHEDLOCK

Appellant's Opposition To County's Objection To John P. Luster
Reply Brief & To County's Motion To Strike Brief

AFlS

MCCORD

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw

John P. Luster

MNWD

MCCORD

Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Attorney as
appellant

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order denying appellant's motion to enforce
mediation agreement

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order granting intervention

John P. Luster

NOTC

BOOTH

Notice of Hearing 512118 - KC Wall Motion to
Withdraw

John P. ~ " s t e r

511212008

BRIE

SHEDLOCK

Brief Of Respondents

John P. Luster

511312008

BRIE

BAXLEY

Brief of Intervenors/Respondents

John P. Luster

511512008

MEMO

BAXLEY

Memorandum In Opposition To Appellant's
Motion Requesting Reconsideration and In The
Alternative Certification of the Court's Decision

John P. Luster

NOTC

BAXLEY

Notice RE Opposition to Appellant's Motion For
Appeal Of Commissioners' Decision and PUD
Application 054-05

John P. Luster

MOTN

PARKER

Motion for Limited Admission

John P. Luster

MlSC

PARKER

Consent to be Local Counsel

John P. Luster

MOTN

BOOTH

Motion for limited Admission - Freilich

John P. Luster

MlSC

BOOTH

Consent To Be Local Counsel

John P. Luster

HRVC

BOOTH

Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on
05/21/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Vacated + rntn
to withdraw by Wall

John P. Luster

CONT

BOOTH

Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on
05/22/2008 03:OO PM: Continued

John P. Luster

HRSC

BOOTH

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
John P. Luster
05/22/2008 03:OO PM) + MTN TO WITHDRAW
BY KC WALL AND MTN LIMITED ADMISSIONS
ROBERT FRElLlCH

4/23/2008

4/24/2008

51812008

511912008

Judge

John P. Luster

-
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Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

NOTH

MCCORD

Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOHG

LSMITH

Second Amended Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOTH

MCCORD

Amended Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOTH

MCCORD

Amended Notice Of Hearing

John P. Luster

NOTC

MCCORD

Notice of status conference

John P. Luster

NOTC

MCCORD

Notice to vacate hearing

John P. Luster

STlP

MCCORD

Stipulation to change hrg dates

John P. Luster

INHD

INMAN

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
05/22/2008 03:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held +
MTN TO WITHDRAW BY KC WALL AND MTN
LIMITED ADMISSIONS ROBERT FRElLlCH

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order allowing local counsel to withdraw as
attorneys for appellant (KC Wall)

John P. Luster

BRIE

MCCORD

Appellant Kir-Hughes Development LLC's
Consolidated Supplemental & Reply Brief

John P. Luster

FILE

JANUSCH

New File Created***4************

John P. Luster

NOTC

ROBINSON

Notice Of Special Appearance On Behalf of
Intervenors Respondents

John P. Luster

NOTC

PARKER

Amended Notice of Special Appearance on
Behalf of Intevenors/Respondents

John P. Luster

PARKER

Response to Appellant Kirk-Hughes
John P. Luster
Development, LLC's Consolidated Supplemental
& Reply Brief

ORDR

BOOTH

Order (following status conference)

DCHH

BOOTH

Hearing result for Judicial Review held on
John P. Luster
06/04/2008 01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY
SCHEDULED 511 1 AND 22 Over 100 pages

DEOP

BOOTH

Memorandum opinion and order in re: appeal of John P. Luster
decision by Kootenai County Board of County
Commissioners

DEOP

BOOTH

Amended Memorandum Opinion and order in re: John P. Luster
appeal of decision by Kootenai County board of
county commissioners

VICTORIN

Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
John P. Luster
($86.00 for the Supreme Court to be receipted via
Misc. Payments. The $15.00 County District
Court fee to be inserted here.) Paid by:
Thompson, Kristen R. (attorney for Kirk Hughes
Development LLC) Receipt number: 0814089
Dated: 911912008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For:
Kirk Hughes Development LLC (plaintiff)

Judge

John P. Luster

-

811412008

'

icial District Court - Kootenai Count

Date: 1/2/2009
Time: 01 :35 PM
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Case: CV-2008-0000163 Current Judge: John P. Luster
Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, etal.

Kirk Hughes Development LLC vs. Elmer R Currie, Richard A Piazza, W Todd Todd Tondee
Date

Code

User

Judge
-

10/29/2008
10/31/2008

11/21/2008

-

-

-

VICTORIN

Miscellaneous Payment: Supreme Court Appeal John P. Luster
Fee (Please insert case #) Paid by: Kirk-Hughes
DeveloprnentlCV08-163 Receipt number:
0814096 Dated: 911912008 Amount: $86.00
(Check)

NOTC

JOKELA

Notice of Appeal

John P. Luster

APSC

VICTORIN

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John P. Luster

NOTC

VICTORIN

Notice of Address Change

John P. Luster

MOTN

VICTORIN

Motion for Limited Admission

John P. Luster

ORDR

MCCORD

Motion & Order Granting Extension of Time to
File Clerk's Record Appeal

John P. Luster

NOTC

CRUMPACKER Notice of Change of Address of Attorney for
Appellant

John P. Luster

ORDR

RICKARD

John P. Luster

Order Granting Motion For Association Of
Foreign Counsel

Clerk's Certificate on Appeal ..................................................................................................................
A
Notice of Appeal
Filed September 1, 2006 ............................................................................................................
I
Appellant's Brief
8
Filed December 8, 2006 .............................................................................................................
Order Granting Motion for Mediation
Filed December 2 1, 2008 .........................................................................................................
156
Respondent's Brief
159
Filed January 19, 2007 .............................................................................................................
Motion for Stay of Appeal
:.................................... 349
Filed January 23, 2007 .................................................................
Stipulation to Stay Appeal
Filed January 23, 2007 ..........................................................................................................352
Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal
Filed January 3 1, 2007 .............................................................................................................
357
Affidavit of Kacey Wall in Support of Motion for Ex-Parte Order & Order to Show Cause & Motion
to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement
360
Filed April 24, 2007 .................................................................................................................
Supplemental Affidavit of Kacey L. Wall
364
Filed April 24, 2007 .................................................................................................................
Motion for Ex-Parte Order and Order to Show Cause
Filed April 24, 2007 .................................................................................................................
367
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement
Filed April 24, 2007 .................................................................................................................
370
Order Denying Ex-Parte Application
426
Filed April 25, 2007 .................................................................................................................
Emergency Petition for Writ of MandamusIProhibition
Filed July 6, 2007 ................................................................................................................429
Affidavit of Robin Eldridge
Filed July 6, 2007 .....................................................................................................................
46 1
Affidavit of Summer Skalak
Filed July 6, 2007 ..................................................................................................................... 464
Stipulation re. Stay
Filed July 6, 2007 .....................................................................................................................
468

Table of Contents

Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandani~~s/Prohibition
&
Motion to Dismiss Same
Filed July 9, 2007 .....................................................................................................................470
Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Objection to Emergency Petition for Writ of
MandamusIProhibition
Filed July 12, 2007 ...................................................................................................................
473
Motion for Stay of Appeal
477
Filed October 18, 2007 .............................................................................................................
Stipulation to Stay Appeal
.
Filed October 18, 2007 .............................................................................................................
480
Order Granting Motion to Stay Appeal
Filed October 19, 2007 .............................................................................................................
482
Notice of Appeal
Filed January 9, 2008 ...............................................................................................................
485
Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement
490
Filed January 3 1, 2008 .............................................................................................................
Appellant's Supplemental Brief Support of Motion to Enforce Medication Agreement
597
Filed February 1, 2008 .............................................................................................................
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement
Filed February 14, 2008 ...........................................................................................................
752
Affidavit of Elmer R. Currie in Opposition to Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement
763
Filed February 14, 2008 ...........................................................................................................
Appellant's Reply to Respondents' Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's Motion to Enforce
Mediation Agreement
Filed February 20, 2008 ...........................................................................................................
769
'

/

Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement
8 14
Filed March 4, 2008 .................................................................................................................
Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief
Filed April 3, 2008 ...................................................................................................................
8 17
Appellant's Opening Brief
Filed April 15, 2008 .................................................................................................................
844
Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant & Motion to Strike
Filed April 16, 2008 .................................................................................................................

890

Memorandum in Support of Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant & Motion to Strike
Filed April 16, 2008 ................................................................................................................. 893
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BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS" JOHNSON; ELMER R.

CURRIE; KATIE BRODIE AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant; Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC, appeals

against the above named Respondent to the District Court for the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, from the Findings of Fact,
Comprehensive Plan Analysis Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision, entered in the
above entitled proceeding on the 24'h day of August, 2006, Chairman Johnson presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the order

described in paragraph 1 is an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho Code $67-

3.

The following is a preliminary statement of the issues on appeal:

a.
The action of the Respondents in denying Appellant's Application
for the Planned Unit Development Chateau de Loire is capricious, arbitrary and
discriminatory.
b.
The findings of the Respondents are unclear, not dispositive and
unsupported by evidence in the record.
c.
The Respondents based a portion of their decision on an issue that
was not raised prior to their rendering their decision, and, thereby prejudiced
Appellant by that action.
Appellant reserves the right to assert other issues on appeal, as such issues
become known.
4.

A copy of the record before the Board of County Commissioners,

including hearing transcripts, has been requested. Appellant reserves the right to
designate additional documents to be included in the record if, after reviewing the record
as provided by Respondents, Appellant sees a need to so include additional documents.

5.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the clerk

of the Kootenai County Building & Planning Department.
b.

That the clerk of the Kootenai County Building & Planning

Department has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the record.
c.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

d.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this T ~ m A u g u s t2006,
,
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2004 and 2005, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (KHD), purchased a total of five
hundred seventy-eight (578) acres located in Kootenai County, Idaho, on the East Shore of Lake
Coeur d'Alene, with the intent of developing a resort community called Chateau de Loire. Of these
acres, one hundred eighty-four (184) are zoned for Restricted Residential uses and Three Hundred
Ninety-Four (394) are zoned for Rural uses. These zoning designations, allowing for a subdivision
totaling in excess of one thousand (1,000) units or for a Planned Unit Development (PUD), formed
the basis for KHD's investment decision to purchase this project site (Site). The zoning designations
allowed KHD to submit a PUD Application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning
Department without having to request that the Site be rezoned.
The Comprehensive Plan (Comp Plan) for the Site sets forth two (2) separate land use
designations. More than one hundred (100) acres are designated as rural and approximately four
hundred (400) acres are designated timber, surface-water overlay. Under the Comp Plan, the intent,
goals and policies of the timber, surface-water overlay is to preserve existing timber production.
(Record on Appeal (ROA), 1207, fiom Part 1, pg. 20 of County Comp Plan). It is important to note
that the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) acknowledges that for the past forty (40) to sixty
(60) years there has been no timber or agricultural production on the Site; and more importantly, the
BOCC specifically found that no actual timber or agricultural production is sustainable at the Site.
Thls fact is confirmed by the Order of Decision that was handed down on August 24,2006, wherein
the BOCC stated as follows:

Economic Development:
Housing construction and tourism have been a major part o f the economic
expansion of Kootenai County over the last 15 years. Continued growth to the
area's economy and tax base will result.from this development (KHD) andjobs will
be created zf it were to be approved. The .fornzer use of the property was
Agricultural. It does not appear to be a viable or sustainable use o f the property
1

Appellant's Brief

however. It has not been used,fbr~furestryor mining tlses in the recent past. [ROA,
19731

KHD was encouraged by staff' to submit an application for a preliminary PUD prior to
filing for a preliminary SubdivisionPlat Application.

In April, 2005, KHD filed its PUD

Application with the County. On May 4, 2005, it was logged in as PUD 054-05 after the County
had performed its analysis and had ascertained that all necessary components were included in the
Application. On June 6, 2005, the County Planner assigned to KHD's PUD Application followed
standard procedure and sent letters to twelve (12) County Agencies requesting that they respond
within thirty (30) days to Staff with regard to the Application and to provide KHD with copies of
their comments. (ROA, 1291).
The first hearing, for Preliminary PUD approval, was set for October 20, 2005. KHD,
through general counsel Brian Bills, inquired from Staff whether KHD was lacking any information
necessary to obtaining preliminary approval. The County, through Ms. Bowes, represented to Mr.
Bills that all the necessary information had been received. However, one (1) hour prior to the
October 20, 2005, hearing, Staff provided KHD with a report stating that additional information
was, in fact, required. Despite the short notice, KHD attempted to address the issues raised by the
report. At the conclusion of the hearing, Hearing Examiner Gary Young recommended that Staff
provide KHD with a written list of deficiencies. (ROA, 1677). The BOCC adopted Mr. Young's
recommendation. Staff, however, never submitted a written summation detailing any deficiencies
in KHD's Application.
KHD only had the Staff report (the one received just prior to hearing), along with a letter
submitted to the Hearing Examiner, as a representation of what Staff considered the deficiencies
in the Application to be (ROA, 1267-1268). KHD responded to those documents. (ROA, 0301-

Throughout this Brief, "Staff' refers to the employees of the Kootenai County Building and Planning
Department.
2
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0304).

In addition, KHD subsequently addressed all seventeen (17) elements in Section IV of

the Staff Report. (ROA, 0301-0304). After reviewing KHD's supplemental information, and an
Idaho Department of Transportation's (ITD) letter, dated December, 2005, Staff scheduled a second
hearing for February 16, 2006. Prior to the hearing, however, another Staff Report, dated February
8, 2006, was submitted, which recommended that KHD's PUD Application be denied. The
recommendation was apparently based on numerous statements made by Staff-statements

which

were subsequently retracted or modified at the direction of counsel for the County, John Cafferty.
(ROA, 1193-1195).
In a meeting to discuss the critical statements, it was revealed that Rand Wichrnan, former
Director of Kootenai County Building and Planning Department, believed that deviations between
KHD's proposed PUD and the Comp Plan were fatal to KHD's Application. When asked why this
issue had not been raised over the course of the preceding eighteen (18) months, Mr. Wichman
replied, "[yleah, sorry. I guess we made a mistake. It should have (been addressed)." (ROA, 1193
- 1195).

On February 16, 2006, a Hearing was held in fiont of Kootenai County Hearing Examiner,

Gary Young, who sent to the Building and Planning Department a recommendation for approval of
KHD's Preliminary PUD (3/9/06 HT, 0202:8-10, see also, 2/16/06 HT, 0197:24-0198:21).~ In his
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, Mr. Young expressly stated that KHD's "proposed
conceptual PUD is in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance . . . and is compatible
with the goals and policies of the (Kootenai County) Comprehensive Plan . . ." (ROA, 1655, #6.1 &
6.2).

This Hearing Transcript contains testimony and discussion from six (6) meetings, to wit: two (2)
Hearings before the County Hearing Examiner, one (1) Public Hearing and three (3) Deliberation Meetings
by the Board of County Commissioners all pertaming the Case PUD-054-05. The references to the
Transcript will be designated in the Brief as (10/20/05 HT, 0123:3-6) which indicates the date of the
Transcript, page number and lines on that page.
3
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Prior to the next Hearing before the BOCC, the Planning Director, Mr. Wichman unilaterally
contacted ITD, and inexplicably represented to ITD that the July 13, 2006, hearing was for final
approval of KHDysApplication. That representation was blatantly false. KHD did not know of this
communication until it received the June 21,2006 letter fiom ITD, which included acknowledgment
that ITD was under the impression that the PUD was up for final approval, to wit: "[tlhe purpose of
this letter is to summarize the Idaho Transportation Department's (ITD) concerns related to the
Chateau de Loire PUD, which, we understand, will be subject to a final approval hearing on July 13,
2006." (ROA, 1369-1370).
After KHD became aware of ITDys confusion, Mr. Cafferty, was contacted.

He

acknowledged the problem and represented to KHD that he would have Mike Porcelli, (District
Traffic Engineer for ITD with whom KHD had been working) the author of the ITD letter, present at
the July 13,2006 Public Hearing to clarifL the issue.
Notwithstanding this representation, Mr. Porcelli was not present at the Public Hearing.
Instead, ITD was represented by Barbara Babic who appeared and read portions of the June 21,
2006, letter into the Record. Ms. Babic, however, failed to read those portions of the letter wherein
the engineer stated that it was his belief that the July 13,2006, Hearing was for final PUD approval3
(7113105 Public Hearing Transcript, 0244:16 to 0249:6). Pursuant to request, ITD provided a
clarification letter (ROA, 0028-0033), and despite the revealing and exculpatory nature of that letter,
KHD's subsequent motion to have the letter admitted into the Record was denied at the July 27,
2006 Deliberation Meeting on KHD's PUD Application. (7127106 HT, 0391: 18-0392:14). It was
also at the July 27,2006, meeting that Commissioner Currie made known that he had conducted his

own traffic study of State Highway 97. (7127106 HT, 0394:8-0395:7). This was also the first time
The omission of this language had an impact on the news media and the newspaper article published the
day of the Hearing stated that KHD was not complying with ITD's requests and that ITD was
recommending denial of M D ' s PUD. This article further affected KHD's public support for the project
because it represented to the public that KHD had misrepresented its relationship with ITD.
4
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it was noted on the Record that the BOCC did not trust ITD and that ITD had no credibility with
BOCC. (7127106 HT, 039612-19).
On July 27, 2006, at the final Hearing, the BOCC rejected the Hearing Examiner's
recommendation to approve KHD'S PUD Application and voted to deny the Application. On
August 24, 2006, the BOCC issued its Order of Decision denying KHD's Preliminary PUD
Application for Chateau de Loire.
The Order of Decision stated, in conclusion:
Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this document, the
Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Idaho, orders that the application for
Case No. PUD-054-05, request by Kirk Hughes (sic) Development for a planned unit
development known a Chateau de Loire be DENIED. There are no actions the
Applicant could take to obtain a permit. (ROA, 1975, ORDER OF DECISION,
emphasis in original).

KHD then filed the Notice of Appeal that is currently before the Court. ROA, 8-24).

5
Appellant's Brief

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' (BOCC) denial of the

Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the Record?
2. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' denial of the Chateau de
Loire Planned Unit Development should be reversed because it was arbitrary and capricious?
3. Whether the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners' denial of the Chateau de

Loire Planned Unit Development should be reversed because Appellant's substantial rights were
prejudiced by the denial?

6
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
1.

The Standard of Review in this matter is governed by the Idaho Administrative

Procedure Act, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code. The specific Statute for use in this case is found in
the Idaho Code, Section 67-5279, and states in pertinent part:
Section 67-5279. Scope of review - Type of relief
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight
of the evidence on questions of fact.

(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

. . .
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of thls section, agency
action shall be affirmed unless substantial .rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced.
(emphasis added).
2.

The Court's review of a Board's Decision pursuant to this Statute is two-tiered. First

it must be determined that the Board erred with regard to one of the subsections in Idaho Code
Section 67-5279(3), supra. Secondly, it must be shown that a substantial right of the aggrieved
party was prejudiced. Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 917 P.2d 409 (1996). The
appellant in such a case must show that the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners erred
in a manner pursuant to 67-5279(3) and then must show that one of its substantial rights has been
prejudiced. See Pa~etteRiver Property Owners Association v. Board of Commissioners, 132 Idaho
551,976 P.2d 477 (1999).
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3.

A land use map is not the comprehensive plan, but only a subpart of one of twelve

components which go into the making of a plan. See Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693
P.2d 1046 (1 984).
4.

A zoning ordinance does not have to be exactly as the Comprehensive Plan shows it

to be because the issue of whether or not the Zoning Ordinance and Comprehensive Plan are in
accordance with one another is a question of fact. The governing body must take into account those
factors in the comprehensive plan in light of the present factual circumstances surrounding the
request. See Love v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Binnham County, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d
1293 (1985).
5.

A Zoning Ordinance's land use designation does not have to be in strict

conformance with the Comprehensive Plan's land use designation. See Balser v. Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners, 110 Idaho 37,714 P.2d 6 (1 986).
6.

Land may be rezoned despite the fact that the resulting zoning designation would

not be in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. See Fernuson v. The Board of County
Commissioners for Ada County, I 10 Idaho 785, 7 18 P.2d 1223 (1986).
7.

A Comprehensive Plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law but

rather serves to guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning
decisions. The Comprehensive Plan is intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in
guiding zoning decisions. See Urrutia v. Blaine County, Idaho, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738
(2000).
8.

The effect of denying a landowner the lawful use of its property while the

property is not being taken for public use, as generally contemplated by eminent domain, is an
unlawful taking. In those cases where the courts have held that a taking was appropriate, due
compensation for the property taken is always required. See City of Coeur d'Alene vs. Simpson,
8
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142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006); KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho, 577 P.3d, 56
(2003); See also In re the Application for Zoning Change, 140 Idaho 5 12, 96 P.3d, 61 3 (2004).
9.

A regulatory taking can occur through a County's denial of a land use permit. See

Denial Of A Wetland Permit As Basis For Landowners' Remlatory Taking Claim, 58 Am.Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d, 8 1.
10.

Three factors are to be considered in analyzing a regulatory taking claim: (1) the

character of the government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent
to which the regulation interferes with the reasonable investment backed expectations. See Penn
Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d
63 1 (1978).
11.

The Court does not address whether a physical appropriation advances a

substantial government interest. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d, 51 7(2002).
12.

There is, and always has been, a strong public policy against unreasonable

restraints on the alienation of property rights. See Barr Development, Inc. v. Utah Mortgage
Loan Cow., 106 Idaho 46, 675 P.2d 25 (1983) (rejecting a "due on sale" clause as an
unreasonable restraint and against public policy); See also Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene, 64
Idaho 262, 130 P.2d 679 (1942) (construing a contract clause in light of the disfavor of
restrictions upon alienation of real property).
13.

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles a person to an

impartial and disinterested tribunal. This requirement applies to the Court as well as to state
administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses. See Stivers v.
Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (gthCir. 1995) (emphasis added).
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14.

Decisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific polices to specific

individuals, interests or situations are quasi-judicial and subject to due process constraints. See
Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980).
15.

It is unconstitutional to take property without due compensation, and to do so is a

violation of an individual's right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas
m , 189 S.W.3d 157,170 (2006).
16.

Bias of a board member or a commissioner renders his participation in the due

process hearing constitutionally unacceptable, and the reviewing Court must determine the effect
of the conflicted vote in order to assure impartiaI decision-making and to avoid the appearance of
impropriety.

See FIoyd v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 52

P.3d 863 (2002); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,86 P.3d 494 (2004).
It is unconstitutional to take property without due compensation, and to do so is a
violation of an individual's right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas
m , 189 S.W.3d 157,170 (2006).
17.

For the Court's convenience, and to aid the Court in understanding the land use

definitions that are at issue in this case, the following is a summary of important terms:
A Restricted Residential Zone is a land use classification for a district suitable for one- or
two-family homes. A Rural Zone is a land use classification for a district suitable for rural Idaho
(residential and agricultural purposes such as farming or forestry). A Planned Unit Development is

an integrated design used to develop a planned community through a combination of uses under a
single ownership andlor control.

Such uses include residential, commercial, recreational and

industrial and provide the developer with flexibility and creativity in site and building design
pursuant to various zoning ordinances and an approved Comprehensive Plan. A Subdivision is the
division of land, a particular site such as the land at issue in this Appeal, into two (2) or more lots or
10
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parcels by recording a deed or plan. A Plat is a map or drawing of a subdivision of land into lots,
blocks and roads along with associated conveyances to be filed as a public document. (Kootenai
County Ordinances Nos. 344 and 348, respectively).

A Comprehensive Plan is a written guide which acts as an umbrella over the five (5) abovecited definitions; it is a Plan the County follows in the implementation of the regulations governing
the development of a PUD or Subdivision. A Comp Plan is designed to allow for the consideration
of "previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future
situations' for several elements or goals pertaining to planning components such as population,
economic development, land use, natural resources, hazardous areas, public services, transportation,
recreation, special areas, housing, community design and implementation."
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 849, 693 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1984); see also, IC

5

Bone v. City of

67-65 1 1. In trylng to

resolve issues involving these planning components, as in the instant case, it is important to note that
the component is not the Comprehensive Plan but only a subpart thereof whlch goes into making the
Plan.

Id.
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ARGUMENT
In the interest of efficiency and to avoid repeating facts, KHD is presenting its argument
without setting out each Issue on Appeal separately because each Issue on Appeal is interrelated and
should be considered together. The fact that there was substantial evidence in the record to support
approval of KHD's PUD Application makes the BOCC's denial arbitrary, capricious and an abuse
of discretion. Further, it is the denial of the Application that has caused KHD's current inability to
use its property in an economically useful fashion and has prejudiced its right to not have that
economic interest taken by administrative action. Finally, the improper denial of KHD's PUD
Application has caused significant financial damage to KHD because of the delay it has caused in
their development progress.
Upon its review of an administrative agency decision, the Court may either remand the
matter to the appropriate agency for further findings or substitute its judgment for that of the agency
upon a determination that the findings, inferences, conclusions andlor decisions were:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence; or
(e) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of di~cretion.~
The Court must also find that a substantial right of the Appellant has been prejudiced by the agency
whose decision is being reviewed. [IC, Sec.67-5279(4)].
This Court must vacate and remand the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners'
denial of KHD's Preliminary PUD because there is insufficient evidence in the Record to support

IC. Sec.67-5279(3); Application of Havden Pines Water Co., 11 1 Idaho 331, 723 P.2d 875, citing
Administrative Law and Procedure 819; see also, Bone v. Citv of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046
(1984); Ferrruson v. Board of Countv Commissioners, 110 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.1982); Love v.
Board of Countv Commissioners of Binaham County, 108 Idaho 728,701 P.2d 1293 (1985).
12
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such a denial, particularly afier one compares the BOCC's various arbitrary points for denying the
PUD with facts contained in the Record.
The BOCC, in its Final Decision and Order, made clear the issues that it believed supported
denial of KHD's PUD Application:
[Quoting the Hearing Examiner] "I see little difference between the recently
approved Gozzer Ranch PUD and the Chateau de Loire PUD with regard to the
impact to Highway 97 and the impact on the existing character of the area." The
problem with this logic is that it leads to an entitlement mentality. To state what all
parties know, each application is different and is decided on its own merits.
Whether or not the Gozzer Ranch PUD should have been approved is not the issue
before us. The issue before us now is whether or not this PUD fits within the
character of the area and whether or not Highway '97 is capably of safely
accommodating the proposal. (ROA, 1971).
Thus, the two issues are whether KHD's proposed PUD plan should be denied because:
(1) it does not comply with the Comp Plan or fit in with the character of the area and, therefore,
must be rejected; and (2) Highway 97 is incapable of supporting the increased traffic flow that
would result. The following will make it clear that, under any legal analysis, neither of these
reasons support the BOCC's denial, making the denial arbitrary and clearly erroneous.
The BOCC's Order further states (ROA, 1959-1975) that KHD's Proposed Conceptual
PUD "is not in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance No. 348 Section 15.09C,
Required Findings for Approval because:
KHD's proposed conceptual PUD is not compatible with the goals and policies of
1.
the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as Amended.
The main transportation issue with KHD's Project is its location and access tied to
2.
State Highway 97 (SH-97) and the fact the Highway is a scenic route and near capacity.
KHD's proposed uses and structures within the PUD are not compatible with the
3.
surrounding area.
KHD's proposed development is not compatible with surrounding uses and natural
4.
characteristics of the area.
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The services and facilities necessary to serve the KHD Project are located away fi-om
5.
the site.
The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was not made aware of KHD's
6.
desire to perform on-site mining operations.
7.

There is no action KHD can take to obtain a Permit."

(ROA, 1974-1975).
KHD will show that the BOCC's position on any of these points is not supported by the
Record and that, therefore, its denial of KHD's Preliminary PUD was arbitrary and capricious.
Specifically, the BOCC ignored the Record in as much as it was supplemented by the professionals
working for the various agencies Staff desimated to review KHD's conceptual plans. Further, KHD
will show that the professional comments and recommendations were, in fact, supportive of

approval of the Application, and merely set forth some conditions to be met by KHD prior to final
approval (which is standard). Additionally, the professional Hearing Examiner based his findings
on those same comments and recommendations when he made his own recommendation that the
Application be approved. Upon a careful examination of the Order of Decision handed down in this
matter, and a comparison of that Decision to the Record, it will be clear to the Court that, the
BOCC's decision was not supported by the facts of this case, the Record, or the law of the State of
Idaho.

I.

KHD's PUD is compatible with the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as
Amended.
The BOCC's conclusion that KHD's proposed PUD is not compatible with the goals and

policies of the Kootenai County 1994 Comprehensive Plan as Amended (Comp Plan) is not
supported by the Record, is arbitrary and capricious and is inconsistent not with Idaho law, but also
with BOCC's own prior decisions. In its Order, the BOCC reasoned that KHD's PUD is not
compatible with the goals and policies of the Comp Plan because it is not compatible with the Plan's
14
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Future Land Use Plan Map (ROA, 0274), which shows the Site having a land use designation of
"timber." In fact, the Plan Map shows that the Site has a bifurcated designation pursuant to the
Future Land Use Map of approximately four hundred and seventy-five (475) acres designated as
timber and one hundred and three (103) acres designated as rural.
As a component of the KHD PUD Application, KHD submitted a Comp Plan Analysis
(ROA, 1083-1094) outlining the appropriateness of its PUD under the Comp Plan. In particular,
Section 15.07A.3 of the Comp Plan states, "[tlhe plan must be compatible with the goals, policies
and future land use map of the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan." , A clear reading of the
Comp Plan text and existing case law clearly requires a finding by this Court that the BOCC's
determination of the lack of compatibility of KHD's PUD with the Comp Plan was arbitrary and
capricious.
For example, the BOCC used the language in Section 15.07.A.3 as grounds to determine that
KHD's "application is not in compliance with the map." (ROA, 1974). The BOCC made this
determination even after conceding that the language of the Plan was very general with regard to
that map. The Plan specifically states, "[ilt should be understood the map is intentionally general.
Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific sites. . . . Because of the nature of the
map, pockets of different land uses may be hidden by broad designations." (ROA, 1974).
Apparently, the BOCC arrived at its conclusion based on what Staff set forth in its February

8, 2006, Report (ROA, 1204-1216), particularly the statement that "the single most relevant question
is whether this project is appropriate for the location." (ROA, 1214). Staff argued that the area
owned by KHD is for timber production as designated by the Plan which states, "[tlhe purpose of
this designation (timber) is to preserve and protect existing productive timber lands. Timber lands
are defined as areas where the primary use is timber production with dwellings incidental to the
primary use." (ROA, 1207, from Part 1, pg.20, of the Comp Plan). Based on that argument, the
15
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BOCC concluded the land cannot be used for a private resortlresidential community with only four
hundred seventy-five (475) residential units even though the current zoning for the Site allows for
over one thousand (1 000) homes.
Such a conclusion is unquestionably arbitrary and capricious as the Record shows that over
one-third (113) of the Site has already been clear-cut (long before KHD acquired the property) and
used for grazing cattle. The golf course is proposed for this area, eliminating the need for any
significant tree removal. (ROA, 274, Future Land Use Map). More importantly, the BOCC Staff
f J e&

acknowledges that there has been no timber production on the Site for as many as sixty (60)

years and that timber production would not be sustainable on the property. (ROA, 1973, 1975).
Given these contradictory positions, to rely on the Future Land Use Map timber designation as a
basis for denying KHD's Application, is in no way supported by the Record.
Land use map designations, in and of themselves, are not dispositive as to the determination
of the compatibility of a PUD with a Comp Plan. The Kootenai County Comp Plan sets forth the
goals and intentions of the Plan and its integration with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance.
Specifically, Part 1, page 20, of the Comp Plan states, "tlhe goals and policies of this plan shall be
used as a guide for the Zoning Ordinance, which will be site specific, and will recognize any future
pockets and give them appropriate zoning designations."

In particular, the County Hearing

Examiner, in his review of PUD-054-05, stated the following in his March 2,2006, Report in w h c h
he recommended approval of PUD-054-05 to the BOCC:
The proposed conceptual Planned Unit Development is compatible with the
goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan. . . . With regard to the
compatibility of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan Map, there is sufficient
verbiage in the Comprehensive Plan regarding the generality of the Land Use Map.
Part 1, page 20 of the Comprehensive Plan states "It should be understood the map
is intentionally general. Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific
sites." Also, "Because of the nature of the Future land use] map, pockets o f
different land uses may be hidden by broad designations. " . . . It is the underlying
zoning and the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan that should be key in
16
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determining compatibility of the Planned Unit Development, not a Future Land
Use Map that is very general and not intended to be a regulatory map.
Furthermore, the recent adoption of Zoning Ordinance No. 348 found the
ordinance (which includes the zone classification map) is in conformance with
the Comprehensive Plan.
(ROA, 1655, Italics original, other emphasis added).
The Examiner's logic is correct as the Zoning Ordinance and the Comp Plan already
conform to one another, thus there is no need to request a zone change and the PUD Application is
in conformance both with the Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. The Hearing Examiner also relied on
his finding that the goals and policies of a timber designation for the subject Site were impractical
given the current and historical use of the land and the poor economic viability of timber production.
(ROA, 1659-1716). The BOCC agreed with the Hearinn Examiner that the timber desimation is
impractical and that timber production would not be a viable use of the land, but nonetheless went
on to cite this issue as one of the two reasons given in denying KHD's PUD Application.
The Hearing Examiner's determination is supported by Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho
844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984), in which the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[ilt is important to make the
distinction between the city's comprehensive plan and its land use map."

(u.at 849).

KHD would

propose that this reasoning is applicable to the present case, especially when one considers the Idaho
Supreme Court's language:
These plans are to consider "previous and existing conditions, trends,
desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for twelve different
planning components . . . The land use map . . . is developed under the land use
component mentioned above. Under the land use component, Sec. 67-6508(c)
directs that a "map shall be prepared indicating suitable projected land uses for the
jurisdiction."
The land use map, then, is not the comprehensive plan, but only a subpart
of one of twelve components which go into the making of a plan.

(Id.,emphasis added).
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Love v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Binrsham County, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293
(1 985), while following the holding in Bone, supra, expanded on the latitude a landowner had with
regard to the parameters he must follow concerning the use of his property. The Court held that a
zoning ordinance does not have to "be exactly as the Comprehensive Plan shows it to be." (Love, at
730). Because the issue of whether or not the Zoning Ordinance and Comprehensive Plan are in
accordance with one another is a question of fact, the governing body must take "into account those
factors in the comprehensive plan in light of the later present factual circumstance surrounding the
request."

Id.;quoting b,supra, at 849-51.

This is the exact stance KHD has taken with Staff and the BOCC. On several occasions,
KHD attempted to show Staff and the BOCC that the Site for its Project cannot sustain the
logging industry. The BOCC knows that there has been no timber production on the Site for as
many as sixty (60) years. (ROA, 1973, 1975). Furthermore, Staff and the BOCC have been
informed by KHD that the primary timber area of the Site is in the southwest block of the
property, and approximately eighty percent (80%) of this block will remain undisturbed natural
vegetation upon completion of the Project. (ROA, 1203).
Interestingly, in the case of Balser v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 110
Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986), the BOCC was making an argument in direct contradiction to the
argument it would now make. The Balsers first brought the case against the BOCC in this
District Court because it denied their Application for a zoning change wherein the BOCC argued
"that I.C., Sec. 67-651 1 does not require a zoning ordinance's land use designation to be in strict
conformance with the corresponding land use designation of the comprehensive plan."

Id.,at 39.

The District Court found for the Balsers; and on Appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
found for the ~ommissioners.' Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the Zoning

Appellant knows that the present Commissioners were not on the Board twenty (20) years ago but the
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Ordinance's land use designation of "agriculture" did not have to be in strict conformance with
the Comprehensive Plan's land use designation of "industrial."

Id.

As in the Balser case, the land use designations in the instant case for the zoning
ordinance and for the Comp Plan are different. The zoning ordinance land use is designated
"rural" and "restricted residential" which allows KHD to move fonvard with its development of a
golf resort. The Comp Plan land use is designated part timber, surface water overlay and part
rural even though BOCC claims that the total acreage is timber and surface water overlay. These
facts should not be in dispute, as the Comp Plan speaks for itself. As has been shown above, it is
undisputed that the Site cannot sustain the logging industry and that Staff and the BOCC are well
aware that there has been no timber production on this property for as many as 60 years and that
the trend in that part of Coeur d'Alene is moving toward residential use. KHD's PUD is in
compliance with the zoning designation and a portion of the land is designated under the Comp
Plan in such a way that the PUD is in compliance as to that portion, as well. Given this fact, the
fact that the only part of the land that needs to be relatively treeless (the golf course) is already
essentially treeless, and given the nature of the lack of sustainability of timber production on the
land (and the BOCC's recognition of this), the PUD is in compliance with the goals of the Comp
Plan and should be approved.
The case of Ferguson v. The Board of County Commissioners for Ada County, 1 10 Idaho
785, 718 P.2d 1223 (1986), adheres to the holding in the above cases, but goes even further to
give a Board more leeway in making decisions regarding the issue of zoning ordinances and
comprehensive plans.
Rezoning Application.

In Fermson, the Zoning Commission recommended approval of a
Because the proposed land use was not compatible with the

Comprehensive Plan, the Board denied the Rezoning Application. The case was appealed,

Ordinance and the Statute are basically the same now as they were then.
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reversed, and remanded to the Board by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Court found that the
parcel of land at issue was zoned "suburban district" as was the Comp Plan. However, the
property around the parcel had been rezoned "neighborhood commercial."

The Board

determined it would be arbitrary and capricious not to rezone this last parcel as neighborhood
commercial. The District Court reversed the Board's decision and the matter was again appealed
to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court and affirmed the Board's
decision to rezone the parcel of land despite the fact that the resulting zoning designation was not
in compliance with the Comp Plan.
The Court stated that "reclassification of individual property is valid when nonconforming uses are so pervasive that the character of the neighborhood has actually changed
from the purported zoning classification."

Id.at 788, citing Dawson Enterprises, Inc., v. Blaine

County, 98 Idaho 506, 5 15-16, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266-67 (1977). The Court determined that was
what had occurred in the Fernuson case since the parcel at issue was the only property not zoned
for commercial use. The present case is analogous in that, as the Court is likely aware, the
property up and down SH-97 now supports resorts and developments similar to KHD's proposed
development such as Gozzer Ranch (ROA, 1971) and Arrow Point. Additionally, the proposed
Powder Horn development, which will also be similar, albeit much larger, has recently had its
Comp Plan Amendment Application approved by the BOCC, which has been a matter of great
public interest.

As the Court is also likely aware, there are also several smaller housing

developments spread along SH-97, in addition to the larger developments described above.
The Gozzer Ranch and Arrow Point developments were approved before the submittal of
KI-ID's Application.

The Powder Horn development came before the Board after KHD's

Application, but has already had its Amendment to the Comp Plan approved, which will now
permit it to pursue a Zone Change Application. Projects such as Gozzer Ranch, Arrow Point and
20
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Powder Horn are so similar to the development proposed by KHD that for the BOCC to have
treated KHD so differently and without support from the Record shows the arbitrary and
capricious nature of their decision to deny the PUD Application. It is beyond question that the
area surrounding the Site now supports similar, and even larger, resorts. It is also undisputed that
the area trend along SH-97 is moving toward .residential development with smaller neighborhood
commercial facilities and away from the agriculture and timber designations.
Urrutia v, Blaine County, Idaho, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000), provides additional
support of KHD's argument that its PUD is compatible with the goals and policies of the Comp
Plan. In addition to embracing the holdings in the cases discussed above, the Unutia Court held
that "a comprehensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law but rather serves to

guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning decisions."

Id.at

357-58 (emphasis added). The Court further stated that "the comprehensive plan is intended

merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions."

Id. at

359

(emphasis added).
As noted previously, the Comp Plan specifically provides that "[ilt should be understood the
map is intentionally general. Designations should be given to broad areas, not specific sites. . .

.

[blecause of the nature of the map, pockets of different land uses may be hidden by broad
designations." (ROA, 1974). Even Commissioner Elmer Cunie, during the BOCC's deliberation
meeting on July 27, 2006, with regard to PUD-054-05 stated:
Um, the Comp Plan. Um, and it's been stated that urn that it is a law. It is a
law that the County has a Comp Plan. It is not a law um - it's a road map. It's a
guide. It's not a law that you have to comply with the Comp Plan so but it is a
- a road map; it's a very important road map (07127106 HT, 0393:24 to 0394:3,
emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing analyses and the case law, KHD has shown that the Hearing
Examiner's Recommendation for 'approval of KHD's Preliminary PUD Application should have
21
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been accepted by the BOCC, and specifically, the BOCC should have followed the findings of the
Hearing Examiner: that KHD's conceptual PUD is compatible with the goals and policies of the
Comp Plan. KHD has also shown that the BOCC's conclusion as to this issue was not based on
substantial evidence. The applicable law, the Record and evidence found therein all support the fact
that the Application is in compliance with the goals and policies of the Comp Plan and that the
BOCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it reached an opposite conclusion. Finally, in not
treating KHD's Application in the same manner with regard to the law as it did with Gozzer Ranch,
Arrow Point and Powder Horn, KHD's substantial right to due process has been prejudiced. Most
importantly, the BOCC's denial of KHD's PUD Application coupled with its statement, "[tlhere are
no actions the Applicant could take to obtain a permit" (ROA, 1975) constitutes a taking of KHD's
property without compensation.
The effect of denying a property owner of the lawful use of their property is an unlawful
taking. See City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006) (a decision
arising out of a Sanders Beach case addressing regulatory taking); see also KMST, LLC v.
County of Ada, 138 Idaho, 577 P.3d, 56 (2003); see also In re the Application for Zoning
Change, 140 Idaho 512, 96 P.3d, 613 (2004). In these cases where the courts have held that a
taking was appropriate, due compensation for the property taken is always required. An arbitrary
and capricious denial like that of a decision denying Chateau the full and lawful use of its
property without due compensation is a violation of Federal and State constitutional provisions as
well as applicable case law. Determination of the level of the "taking" of property is further
complicated by the BOCC's confusing, inconsistent and, at best, ambiguous discussions
regarding the Comp Plan's designation of the Site as appropriate for timber usage. Obviously,
from its decision, the BOCC does not even contemplate that KHD can coinply with the
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Comprehensive Plan. This is evidenced by comments to the effect that the property would not be
appropriate for such use. Supra.
The type of taking in the present case is most appropriately classified as a regulatory
taking since it arises from the implementation of a regulatory process. An example of this type
of taking involves cases where denial of certain land use permits can be the basis for a
landowner's assertion of a regulatory taking. See ex., Denial Of A Wetland Permit As Basis For
Landowners' Remlatorv Taking Claim, 58 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d, 81.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed and decided a number of land use regulatory
taking cases.

Infra. However,

it was not until 1978 that the Court set out the analytical

framework for determining when a regulatory taking went so far as to require compensation. See
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57
L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The Penn Central Court identified three factors that are to be considered in
analyzing a regulatory taking claim: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the economic
impact of the regulation; and (3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the reasonable
investment backed expectations. These three factors together are commonly referred to as the
Penn Central "ad hoc" balancing test. All three of these factors apply to the BOCC's decision in
this case.
Regulatory taking, as opposed to an actual physical taking, can be clearly distinguished.
Because there is a clear distinction between acquisitions of property for public use and
regulations prohibiting private uses, it would be inappropriate to treat "Takings Clause" cases
involving physical takings as controlling precedence for the evaluation of a claim that there has
been a regulatory taking. Therefore, the Court does not need to address whether a physical
appropriation advances a substantial government interest. . See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
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Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Anencv, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d,
5 17(2002).
In any event, it is well recognized that where a political subdivision inappropriately, and
in an arbitrary and capricious fashion, applies its ordinances to deprive a property owner from the
use of its property, a regulatory taking has occurred, and the property owner must be duly
compensated.
Because the BOCC's denial of KHD's PUD Application was arbitrary and capricious, and
thus not supported by the law, it amounts to a regulatory taking, and KHD should be
compensated if the denial is not duly reversed by this Court.
In addition, there has always been a strong public policy against unreasonable restraints
on the alienation of property rights. See Barr Development, Inc. v. Utah Mortgage Loan Corp.,
106 Idaho 46, 675 P.2d 25 (1983) (rejecting a "due on sale" clause as an unreasonable restraint
and against public policy); See also Ohms v. Church of the Nazarene, 64 Idaho 262, 130 P.2d
679 (1942) (construing a contract clause in light of the disfavor of restrictions upon alienation o f
real property).

The BOCC's denial of KHD's Application, among other things, seriously

impinges upon, and constrains KHD in the exercise of its rights regarding the use of its property.
Landowners have a fundamental right to develop their land in such a way that realizes the
economic viability of that land, within the restrictions of land use laws and limitations that
protect the interests of other persons. To arbitrarily and capriciously deny KHD the right to
develop this land prejudices KHD immensely, and comes without valid reason.
11.

KHD's site location, access and impact regarding State Highway 97 do not create
insurmountable transportation problems sufficient to warrant denial of KHD's PUD.
In the Hearing Examiner's Report of March 2, 2006, in which he recommended that the

BOCC approve KHD's Preliminary PUD Application, the Hearing Examiner acknowledged that
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KHD has proposed a safe and efficient transportation system for its development. (ROA, 1655).
Both the BOCC and the Hearing Examiner indicate in their respective Findings of Fact that ITD
recommended that KHD participates in the funding of the Route Development Plan for State
Highway 97 (SH-97). (ROA, 1966 & 1646 respectively). In a Memo from Director Rand Wichman
to the Hearing Examiner, dated February 14, 2006, Staff advised the Hearing Examiner that KHD
has committed to financially participate in studies pertaining to SH-97 in the amount of One
Hundred Eighty-five Dollars ($185.00) per proposed lot as recommended by the Kootenai
Metropolitan Planning Organization [KMPO]. (ROA, 1193-1 194). In their respective Reports, the
Hearing Examiner and the BOCC discussed the comments they received from ITD and the East Side
Highway District (ESHD), which has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD7s
property is located. (ROA, 1640-1657 & 1 959 -1 975, respectively).
In its Order of Decision, the BOCC acknowledges that the Project's proposed roads, trails
and parking facilities within the Project constitute a safe and efficient transportation system which
minimizes traffic congestion. (ROA, 1975). However, the BOCC hrther states it has "concerns
with the proximity of the exits to one another. Additionally, the main transportation issue with this
development is its location and access tied to Highway 97." (ROA, 1975). The foregoing is one of
the BOCC's Conclusions of Law upon which it based its determination to deny KHD7s PUD
Application. (ROA, 1974).
Also found in the BOCC's Order of Decision is its discussion of the Plan's Transportation
Goal 14 whereby KHD must "[plrovide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective movement of
people and goods." (ROA, 1973). In its analysis of this goal, the BOCC states, "[iln light of the
public testimony, the personal experiences of the BOCC and the inconsistent positions taken by the
ITD, this goal has not been met." Each of these issues is addressed below. (ROA, 1973). The
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Court should note, however, the BOCC has failed to comply with I.C., Sec. 67-6535 which requires
of the BOCC that:
Approval or denial of any application (is) to be based upon standards and to be in
writing. . . .
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter
shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied
upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable provisions
of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, pertinent
constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record.
The BOCC has failed to utilize any of the criteria required by the above statute to explain how
and why KHD has failed to provide an "efficient, safe, and cost-effective" transportation system,
particularly since it has already stated as a Conclusion of Law that KHD's transportation system
"within the development . . . is safe, efficient and minimizes traffic congestion." (ROA, 1975).
As it is undisputed that the transportation within the development is not at issue, the
remaining issue and basis for denial as to transportation can only be the condition of SH-97
With regard to SH-97, the BOCC states in its Order of Decision as follows:
All of the road is narrow and its surface is not suitable for heavy traffic. '. . .
trucks could not safely mix with auto traffic at any point on this road. More over,
this amount of traffic would pulverize the road and turn it into a rutted impassable
mess. (Exhibit HE-1002, Affidavit of Robert Martinez) (ROA, 1966, 2.20 &
1885).
The inclusion of this statement in those materials considered by the BOCC in its denial of
KHD's Application is striking. It is especially puzzling considering the fact that there is no
information as to who Robert Martinez is and what qualifications he may have to reach such a
conclusion. Far worse, it is an incredible fact that the document containing this quote was actually
submitted by William F. Boyd nine (9) years earlier in March of 1997 in opposition to a Zone
Change and Conditional Use Permit regarding a proposed gravel pit to be located south of Moscow
Bay. (ROA, 1877-1903 and Exhibit HE-1002).
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This decade-old document appears to have been re-submitted by Mr. Boyd in opposition to
KHD's proposed development and the BOCC quotes fi-om it in its Order of Decision as a basis for
denying KHD's Application. (ROA, 1959-1975).

It is interesting that the BOCC didn't even

include the first two (2) sentences from the paragraph containing Mr. Martinez' quote, which state,

"I observed the proposed haul road. A portion of it is public and a portion is private." (ROA,
1885(e) (emphasis added). It is public knowledge that SH-97 is a public road and this fact should
have been obvious to the BOCC. That the BOCC would even attempt to use this incredibly
irrelevant information as support for its denial of KHD's Application is a clear example of the
arbitrary and capricious nature of its actions in this case.
It appears that the primary concern at issue with regard to the condition of SH-97 is that of
its capacity to handle the traffic that may be generated by the KHD's PUD. Pursuant to studies
conducted by the Kootenai Metropolitan Planning Organization (KMPO) and talung into
consideration the road width, road design and speed, the carrying capacity of SH-97 is forty (40)
vehicles per minute. This equates to twenty-four hundred (2,400) cars per hour. (07113106 HT,
369:18 to 370:24). In 2005, KMPO conducted a Traffic lmpact Analysis (TIA) of SH-97 covering
the distance from 1-90 south to Harrison, Idaho. The preliminary findings from the TIA were
presented to the KMPO and ITD Board in July, 2005.
This study found that in 2030, 9.8 vehicles per minute would travel SH-97, which means
that only one-fourth (114) of SH-97's carrying capacity will be in use.6 The 9.8 vehicles per minute
equate to five hundred eighty-eight (588) per hour as compared to the carrying papacity of 2,400
vehicles per hour.

(u.)(ROA, 2 171 - 2 172).

This same study found that approximately twelve

hundred (1,200) vehicles per day are currently using SH-97, with that figure increasing to over nine
thousand (9,000) per day over the next twenty (20) years. (ROA, 2 171 - 2 172).
9.8 vehicles per minute divlded by carrying capacity of 40 vehicles per minute equals 24.5% of carrying
capacity is being used in the year 2030.
T 2
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KHD retained The Transpo Group to produce a TIA for the Project. (ROA, 1030-1082,
1400-1402: Amendment to initial TIA). The study area was identified through coordination with
ITD with the study focused on the two (2) access intersections connecting the Site with SH-97. The
analysis was for the weekday morning and evening peak hours of adjacent street traffic and
included the Gozzer Ranch project and additional, temporary traffic from developments to the north
of SH-97. (ROA, 1032, 1035-1038). The Transpo Group figures were combined with the baseline
figures to obtain expected traffic volumes reflecting the Chateau's impact.

Analyses of the

Project's impact at the time of estimated build-out in 2007 and in 2020 also were obtained: (ROA,
1032-1046). The Transpo Group determined that the KHD Project will "generate only minor
impacts when compared to baseline conditions during the years 2007 and 2020." These figures are
estimates based on professionally accepted guidelines. (ROA, 1049).
The foregoing is supported by the testimony of ITD's representative, Barbara Babic, at the
Public Hearing on PUD-054-05 on July 13, 2006, wherein she answered Commissioner Currie's
question regarding the capacity of SH-97 by stating that "it is not at or near capacity." (07113106
HT, 0248:4-8). Having been told by ITD's representative; having heard the testimony of Michael
Swensen from The Transpo Group, having received the Transportation Impact Analysis; and
having received the Hearing Examiner's recommendation to approve KHD's Preliminary PUD
Application, the BOCC still insisted that SH-97 is at or near capacity.
A reading of the July 13, 2006, Public Hearing Transcript (07113106 HT, 205-389) shows
that the BOCC relied heavily on amateur traffic studies of SH-97, on Commissioner Currie's own

exparte study and on the Commissioners' personal experience driving SH-97, rather than on the
reports and analyses of the professional agencies commissioned to make a determination as to this
issue. At the July 2006 Public Hearing, citizens spoke of having conducted their own "traffic
studies" but, of course, the citizens provided no evidence as to the standards used for their studies,
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nor did they speak to the parameters, methodology, or accuracy of their testing. (07113106 HT,
0279:20-23; HT, 0325:22 to 0327:24).
As mentioned above, Commissioner Currie made it known at the July 27, 2006, hearing
that he had conducted an ex parte traffic study of State Highway 97. (7127106 HT, 0394:80395:7). He also made it known, for the first time, that the BOCC apparently does not trust ITD
and that ITD has no credibility with BOCC. (7127106 HT, 0396:2-19). Commissioner Currie's
personal study is, at best, an unlawful exparte action (Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780,
86 P.3d 494 (2004)) and, at worst, a sloppy and deliberate act that defies logic and has
undermined the integrity of the BOCC's deliberations. Standing alone, this fact that the BOCC
relied on Commissioner Currie's "findings" is enough to show the Court that the decision of the
BOCC was arbitrary and capricious.
Commissioner Currie stated as follows:
Um, I did my own traffic study. I took a drive out there. And I made sure
it was on the weekend where there was (sic) no trucks and it was um very, very late
in the day so there was ah minimal amount of traffic. Speed limit on the road ah is
45 miles an hour. Um, other than the yellow signs that change that, you cannot
drive that road at 45 miles an hour. And I have - I tend to have a lead foot but I
could not drive that road. I drove it twice. One very aggressively and I apology for
that urn and one very conservatively. I and - I had my stop watch. I had to stop
once to let-when 1 was aggressive, obviously, to let some cars get ahead of me so
I could catch up again. But I also had to stop when I was driving conservatively.
Obviously, there was people are (sic) driving more conservatively than me. (sic)
So I have major concerns um with that. The capacity of - of - of the road was
stated by the Highway District that it was not to capacity and it's, and it is not to
capacity. But it's close. It is darn close to capacity . . . (07127106 HT, 0394:825).
This interesting description of the status of SH-97's capacity begs the question: what are Mr.
Currie's credentials that allow him to completely ignore the professional opinions to the contrary and
make a determination that, despite all the scientific evidence to the contrary, the highway is close to
capacity?
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The three (3) individuals on the BOCC have the responsibility of determining how various
individuals' lands can be used, based on applicable legal standards. As such, the BOCC must listen
to, consider and take the advice of the experts they solicit for such information. Following are
examples of the comments from the Agencies responsible for determining the appropriateness of the
KHD project:

a.

Idaho Transportation Department

In its July 26, 2005, letter (ROA, 1374-1375), the Idaho Transportation Department
informed Staff that it agreed with the methodology and techmcal aspects of the Traffic Impact Study
prepared by The Transpo Group and dated April, 2005.

(ROA, 1030-1082 & 1400-1402).

However, the one aspect lacking was a discussion of a grade separation which would allow traffic to
flow from one side of the Project to the other without crossing SH-97. The grade separation issue is
addressed below. ITD also recommended, as did JSMPO, that KHD participate financially in the
SH-97 Corridor Study and the SH-97 Safety Study.

In the Memo to the Hearing Examiner dated February 14,2006, Staff advised that KHD had
willingly committed to financially participating in the studies pertaining to SH-97. (ROA, 11931194). More specifically, in a June 2 1,2006, Memo from KHD to Staff, KHD stated:
Following PUD approval, we will place in escrow approximately $1 58,000,
as requested by JSMPO and the Idaho Transportation Department. That's our
(KHD) share of the SH 97 Corridor Study and SH 97 Safety Project they plan to
undertake.
In addition to the recommended mitigation efforts by Kootenai County
Building and Planning Department, KMPO and ITD, we (KHD) will deposit into
escrow the entire amount necessary to provide for the completion of guard rails
along Highway 97 between 1-90 and the top of the Beauty Bay grade where there
currently are neither guard rails nor concrete barriers so as to provide increased
safety for our neighbors, residents and the driving public. (ROA, 0052).
Although in her September 15, 2005, letter (ROA, 0319-0320) to Mike Porcelli of ITD,
Cheri Howell, the former Director of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department and
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KHD's initial Planner, included a list of amendments proposed for KHD's Preliminary PUD
Application, she did not include discussions regarding a grade separation. Even though KHD
pointed out that ITD traditionally does not require grade separations when the projected 20-year
traffic impact is a Grade B, as is KHD's, on or about November 16,2005, KHD submitted to Staff
its conceptual approaches to a grade separation design and an off-set intersection design as solutions
to the cross development traffic flows.
KHD also informed ITD that, due to economic reasons, it preferred the off-set intersection
design. In a letter to Staff dated December 8, 2005 (ROA, 1371), ITD agreed to "continue
consideration of both concepts and suggested that [KHD] prepare a presentation to be made to the
ITD District encroachment permit committee. . ." (which KHD was doing).

ITD further stated it

"has no objection to proceeding with the preliminary approval steps in the development

process." (ROA, 1371, emphasis added). However, ITD did "request that no final approvals be
given until the final decision is made as to the design of the main access, and ITD is prepared to
issue an encroachment permit." (ROA, 1371). ITD reiterated this stance in its June 21, 2006, letter
to Staff. (ROA, 1369-1370). Again, KHD recognized the importance of complying with these
suggestions and, in fact, agrees that a final determination on this issue is not appropriately made at
the preliminary approval stage (which is where KHD was in the process when the BOCC issued its
denial).
As fiu-ther evidence of ITD's support of the project, a September 14,2005 letter from ITD's
Division of Aeronautics, informed Staff that the Division had "reviewed the . . . heliport proposed
for the Chateau de Loire subdivision . . . (and had) evaluated the proposed site and (could) find no
immediate, potentially adverse impacts on general aviation in the surrounding area." Therefore, "the
State of Idaho will not object to this heliport proposal." (ROA, 1413).
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Another important issue affecting ITD's review of KHD's project was that Staff led ITD to
believe the July 13, 2006, Public Hearing was for the final approval on KHD's PUD Application
when, in fact, the Application was only up for preliminary approval-this

is especially relevant

because KHD was still in the process of considering, and implementing requests made by ITD.
ITD's letter to Staff dated June 21, 2006, assumed finality even though KHD was only at the
Preliminary PUD Application stage. (ROA, 1369-1370). This confusion was cleared up when Mike
Porcelli and Mike Swensen, Senior Transportation Engineer for The Transpo Group, consultant for
KHD, spoke on July 6, 2006, and exchanged e-mails on July 7 and 10, 2006, wherein Mr. Porcelli
informed Mr. Swensen that Mr. Wichrnan had requested the June 21,2006, letter from ITD. At the
request of Mr. Swensen, Mr. Porcelli wrote a clarification letter to Staff stating that the completeness
of KHD's submittals and their timing with regard to the various stages of the approval process is
clearly "the call of the County", not ITD. (ROA, 1368). And, unfortunately, it seems that the
County was calling for a more complete Application than is required by the Zoning Ordinance at the
conceptual and preliminary stage.
The BOCC arbitrarily and capriciously stuck to its position that "adding capacity (to SH-97)
is not feasible" (ROA, 1971), and that KHD had not met the Transportation Goals, despite the fact
that: (1) ITD has stated it does not object to KHD proceeding with the preliminary approval stage;
(2) SH-97 is not even near capacity; (3) TIA has shown that the Project will have minimal impact on
SH-97's traffic flow; (4) KHD has committed over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00)
to fund SH-97 studies and safety features; (5) the Hearing Examiner has recommended that KHD's
PUD be approved with conditions (ROA, 1640-1657); and (6) BOCC, itself, found that the
transportation system within KHD's development is "safe, efficient and minimizes traffic
congestion" (ROA, 1975). Even though KHD has managed each of the above, it would seem, as the
BOCC has stated, that there truly are "no actions the Applicant could take to obtain a permit" (ROA,
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1975). The question, then, must be asked . . . why not? It is common knowledge that other
developments have been approved along SH-97 and all professional reports support preliminary
approval of KHD's Application.
b.

East Side Highway District (ESHD)

The ESHD has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD's Project is located;
and for this reason, KHD has worked closely with the ESHD and its personnel in developing roads
and safety features for the Project. In a letter dated July 6, 2005, John Pankratz, ESHD District
Supervisor, informed Staff that he had met with KHD's representatives, and the District's "Board of
Commissioners feel that the applicant has addressed the Highway District concerns." The BOCC
has been assured that the "private roads within the subdivision will be built to Highway District
standards. . . (and) the board will grant a variance to allow a twenty-four foot (24') paved width
due to the terrain." (ROA, 1430).
In a letter dated September 6,2005, (ROA, 1392), the ESHD informed Staff it had reviewed
and accepted KHD's fifteen (15) changes to its Preliminary PUD Application. The ESHD also
advised Staff in its September 17,2005, letter that it has "reviewed not only the road layout, but also
slope and cross sections of the road network and approve of the design included in (KHD's)
Application." It also advised in a letter to Staff dated March 22,2006, (ROA, 1378), that the ESHD
found it was not necessary for KHD to build an access road through the subdivision to allow access
"to private lands lying adjacent to or beyond the subdivision . . ." The ESHD was also aware that
KHD had been requested by KMPO and ITD to share in the funding of the SH-97 Corridor Study
and the SH-97 Safety Study, which it knew KHD was prepared to do. Finally, John Pankratz stated
at the Public Hearing, "I would just like to make a statement that, ah, the developer has worked
really closely with the commissioners of the East Side Highway District and they have met the
requirements that we have set on them and that's all I have to say." (02116106 HT, 0192:9-13).
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Considering this positive feedback from the Agencies that Staff contacted to solicit
comments on KHD's Preliminary PUD Application with regard to the transportation and access
issues, there is no viable reason for the BOCC to have concluded that KHD's Application must be
denied with no recourse to meet and satisfy conditions as recommended by the Hearing Examiner.
(ROA, 1957-1975: denial; 1656-1657: conditions).

c.

East Side Fire Protection District (ESFD)

The ESFD has jurisdiction over the geographical area in which KHD's Project is located;
and for this reason, KHD has worked closely with the ESFD and its personnel in developing a
facility for an emergency vehicle and personnel to be present in close proximity to the Project's
residences and with regard to safety features for the Project. In a July 19, 2005, Memo (ROA,
1422), to Staff from Captain Michael Brannan, Fire Marshall for the District, the Captain laid out
concerns and suggestions the District had with KHD's PUD Application. These were reviewed by
KHD and it has already acted upon many of them. For example, the heliport is a part of KHD's
PUD Application as is the offer to the Fire District to use the golf cart paths for its emergency
responses. KHD's PUD Application also includes the construction of a facility to house an ESFD
emergency vehicle and personnel.
Captain Brannan sent a Memo to Staff on August 22,2005, in which he advised Staff he had
met with KHD's representatives and had reviewed KHD's new plans for the Project. These plans
show "roads on both sides of the project, which make the subdivision more contiguous in its traffic
flow. . ." The Captain stated that the new plans as well as "the use of golf cart paths for emergency
access is acceptable." (ROA, 1417). Capt. Brannan further stated, "[tlhere is only one place that
grade will be above lo%, and that is to be mitigated by building a turnout along that section, w h c h
is acceptable according to International Fire Code." (ROA, 1417).
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Even though the ESFD has stated it accepts KHD's conceptual plans, will continue to work
with the Project's representatives and found only one place where the grade is over ten percent
(lo%), the BOCC chose to ignore any of the ESFD statements and, instead, somehow arrived at the
conclusion that the area where many homes are proposed to be built has slopes of fifteen percent
(15%) or greater and would not meet the ESFD standards, which is, of course, absolutely false.
(ROA, 1975).
d.

County Sheriff and County Emergency Medical Sewices (EMS)

In a letter to KHD fi-om the County Sheriffs Department dated September 2, 2005, Captain
Ben Wolfinger of the Support Service Bureau stated that he "appreciate(d) the fact that [KHD] not
only addressed, but exceeded [his] requests for emergency routes in [KI-ID's] proposal." Captain
Wolfinger hrther stated, "After reviewing all of the proposed amendments, I completely endorse
your plans . . ." (ROA, 2 19 1, emphasis original).

As the above communications show, none of the agencies responsible for ensuring the safety
of the residents of the area are concerned about whether the emergency services and facilities
necessary to serve the development will be readily available. KHD has worked closely with each of
these organizations to ensure their approval of the safety aspects of the development.
Beginning on October 20, 2005, there had been two (2) Hearings before the Hearing
Examiner, a Public Hearing conducted by the BOCC and three (3) Deliberation Meetings by the
BOCC. The last Meeting was held July 27, 2006, and it was at that Hearing when the BOCC
denied KHD's PUD Application. Despite this extensive communication, it was not until that final
Hearing that KHD learned that the BOCC does not trust ITD.
At that Meeting, Commissioner Currie stated,
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I am not going to approve another development when IDT (sic) says that
um we will work this out later because IDT (sic) has some good rules and I agree
with most of their rules but the problem being is once we approve it, then their
rules change and we're left holding the bag and I'm not going to have that happen
again. So, ah, so if you haven't ah got my drift, I am not going to support this
development. (07/27/06 HT, 396:2-9).
No inconsistencies have been present as to ITD's position with regard to KHD's application.
ITD's three (3) major concerns throughout this process have been:
1.

The need for additional discussion to determine the best way to address the flow of

traffic across SH-97, as the Site straddles the highway. Currently, there are two proposals relating to
this issue, and KHD has agreed with ITD that it is appropriate to make a final decision as to which
proposal is safest when the development is closer to the construction phase. It is then that ITD's
Encroachment Committee will be able give final approval based on which proposal is the safest;

2.

The need for an updated Traffic Impact Study and confirmation that KHD is

participating in the funding with KMPO of studies of SH-97. It is undisputed that KHD will put the
required money in Escrow for the use by the KMPO upon it receiving approval to proceed with the
project; and
3.

The concern that no final approval of the Project should be given to KHD until the

conditions proposed by ITD are met.
These concerns have been consistently expressed by ITD throughout the Application process and
KHD has consistently cooperated with ITD to resolve each of its concerns as KHD shares the goal of
achieving the highest level of safely possible.
Every professional entity involved in determining the appropriateness of this project at the
Site has made a determination that, once final safety issues have been decided, the Site is appropriate
for the proposed development. To completely ignore these findings and rely instead on the
completely inappropriate actions of one of the commissioners, and the unsubstantiated opinions of
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citizens, is unquestionably arbitrary. There is a glaring lack of significant evidence in the Record to
support denying the PUD on the basis of SH-97. Further, to inform KHD at the time of denying its
PUD Application that the BOCC has no trust in ITD is inherently unfair and reflective of its lack of
interest in following the dictates of the process. This is especially true considering the fact that it
was the BOCC itself that requested that ITD review KHD's Application, and in fact, the BOCC
requested a continuance at one point in the process to allow more time to gather information from
ITD.
111.

There is no proposed mining operation, and therefore, there has been no mining
information about which the Department of Environmental Quality should have been
made aware.
In its Conclusions of Law section of its Order of Decision, the BOCC states that KHD's

"proposed conceptual PUD is not in compliance with the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance .. .
because:" (ROA, 1974, 6.01) ". .. it appears that DEQ was not made aware of the Applicant's
desire to perform on site mining operations." (ROA, 1975, 6.07). The BOCC firther states that
evidence found in Exhibit HE-1002 points out "that this area is not suitable for mining operations
such as are proposed by the Applicant." (ROA,.)d
.I
As was discussed above in the section regarding to SH-97, Exhibit HE-1002 is a ten ( I 0)
year old document that is not even remotely related to the Application that was before the
BOCC. In any event, KHD has read the document listed as Exhibit HE-1002 and cannot find
the quotation attributed to it by the BOCC. Simply put, KHD has never included in any of its
proposals any language concerning mining operations. KHD has not had and does not now

have plans to do any mining on the Site.
The BOCC raised the issue that, in none of its communications does the DEQ address the
"mining" issue. There was a simple answer. There is no mining issue and has never been one for
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the DEQ to address. As stated, KHD has never raised the issue and has no intention of performing
any mining operations on the Site.
The Comment letters received from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
regarding KHD's Preliminary PUD Application have been favorable and have not addressed
mining. Rather, they have concerned drinking water and the storage of the Project's wastewater.
For example, in its April 8, 2005, letter to the Building and Planning Department, Gary Gaffney,

P.E., stated that "the proposed drinking water system employing the selected surface water source
should be capable of supplying a sufficient quantity of safe drinking water to the .proposed
population of thls development." (ROA, 1445). This position taken by the DEQ was also reflected
in its August 4, 2005, letter to KI-ID in which Mr. Gaffney stated that "the proposed drinking water
and sanitary sewage systems outlined in the application . . . appear to be feasible." (ROA, 14181419).

IV.

Chateau de Loire will not exceed 475 residential units.
Staff has expressed concerns about what it perceives to be discrepancies between KHD's

PUD Narrative and the Site Layout. In the Narrative, KHD is requesting no more than four
hundred seventy-five (475) residential units and a small commercial area, which Staff asked

KHD to include in its Plan. Staff is correct that in the Site Plan KHD has accounted for only
four hundred five (405) units, however, since this is only the preliminary PUD stage, there is no
requirement to delineate all actual lots or prepare plats designating and locating the 475 units, nor
would it be logical or efficient to do so, as such plans certainly change during the .actual
construction phase of any project.
KHD has submitted a conceptual layout showing possible lot line delineations for a total
of three hundred fifteen (3 15) residential lots and ninety (90) condos, but until the PUD approval
process is completed, these figures may change which could change the figures for the
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SubdivisionIPlat Preliminary Application. (ROA, 01 09-01 10) The exact delineation of lots and
then the numbers will be set out, as is standard, in KHD's Subdivision/Plat Application. (ROA,
0301-0304, 01 08-01 10)
Because the proposed development will have less than half of the permissible number of
units, and will use already cleared land for its golf course, and because it is committed to
preserve the integrity of the natural beauty of the Site, the PUD will ensure the project is
compatible with the surrounding area.
V.

KHD's right to due process has been violated by the BOCC.

There have been violations of KHD's right to due process throughout this preliminary
approval process. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution entitles a person to
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. "This requirement applies to the Court as well as to state
administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses." Stivers v. Pierce,
71 F.3d 732 (9'" Cir. 1995). Decisions by a zoning board applying general rules or specific
polices to specific individuals, interests or situations are quasi-judicial and subject to due process
constraints. Coooer v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,4 1 1, 6 14
P.2d 947, 95 1 (1980). Bias of a board member or a commissioner renders his participation in the
due process hearing constitutionally unacceptable, and the reviewing Court must determine the
effect of the conflicted vote in order to assure impartial decision-making and to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. Floyd v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho
718, 726, 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002); Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494,
495 (2004).
Commissioner Currie announced at the July 27, 2006, Deliberation Meeting that he had
conducted his own traffic study. However, he did not supply the Parties with a copy of any
report gleaned from his observation. More important is the fact that pursuant to Article 15,
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Section 15.08(14) a traffic impact study will be made part of the PUD Application when
requested by a road agency or the Director. The information presented to the BOCC by citizens
who conducted their own "studies" are not valid and the BOCC should not have given them any
weight just as Commissioner Currie's "study" should not have been given any weight. The
BOCC has to base its decision on the Record and not on matters outside the Record. (Eacret, at
784). Commissioner Currie's information cannot be considered part of the record because it was
an improper exparte action, impermissible by law as no notice was given that he had viewed the
site at issue and had done his own study of the traffic on the highway. Notice must be given to
the Public if a viewing is to take place so that all interested parties could have the opportunity to
rebut facts derived from the visit that may come to bear on the decision and create an appearance
of bias.

(Id.at 786).

The amateur studies should never have been considered because they have

no underlying scientific basis and have been presented without any underlying supporting data.
Unfortunately, that bell has already been rung and the damage caused cannot be undone.
Further, the BOCC continually asked for more detailed reports, plats, and information than is
normally required at the preliminary stage. The BOCC's comments that it was not going to apply
the same criteria to Chateau de Loire as it did to Gozzer Ranch is just another example of the
BOCC's bias andlor obvious appearance of bias. As early cited, the BOCC stated in its Order and
Decision the following which is highly prejudicial to KHD:
[Quoting the Hearing Examiner] "1 see little difference between the recently
approved Gozzer Ranch PUD and the Chateau de Loire PUD with regard to the
impact to Highway 97 and the impact on the existing character of the area." The
problem with this logic is that it leads to an entitlement mentality. To state what all
parties know, each application is different and is decided on its own merits.
Whether or not the Gozzer Ranch PUD should have been approved is not the issue
before us. The issue before us now is whether or not this PUD fits within the
character of the area and whether or not Highway 97 is capable of safely
accommodating the proposal. (ROA, 1971).
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.-I

1,

The BOCC has missed the point by citing the above. Yes, all applications are to be decided
on the merits but what is used as a standard to determine if the merits exist must be evenly and fairly
I

applied to each applicant. This is not the situation in the instant case. The "entitlement mentality"
actually held by KHD is the same as any landowner should have; that it is entitled to be treated fairly
and to have its Application considered using the same criteria that has been applied to other
developments.
KHD also claims that pursuant to 42 USC 1983, its substantial rights have been
prejudiced because it has a right under the Statute and the 1 4 ' ~Amendment to a have its property
right protected. The irrational behavior of the BOCC in not colnplying with the Statutes and
Ordinances of the State of Idaho and the County of Kootenai and denying KHD's Preliminary
PUD Application without setting forth, as did the Hearing Examiner, any conditions it could
attempt to meet in order to have its Application accepted, allowing it to move on to the next stage
of the process, is a taking of KHD's property without due compensation and in violation of its
right to due process. See Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 189 S.W.3d 157, 170
(2006).
VI.

KHD is entitled to have the BOCC provide it with a list of actions it can take to
obtain approval.
The BOCC is required by ordinance to provide an applicant with what conditions it would

impose, or with a list of actions the applicant could take to obtain approval. The BOCC in the
present case stated in its Order of Decision that there is no action KHD could take to obtain
approval. (ROA, 1974-1975). Looking at what the BOCC presents clearly as the two main
issues which led, however erroneously, to denial by the BOCC, it seems that the BOCC most
certainly should have complied with this requirement. If the BOCC had a legitimate issue with
KHD's supposed lack of compliance with the Comp Plan, it could have listed an action KHD
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could take to obtain approval. For example, the BOCC could have required that KHD obtain a
Comp Plan Amendment. As to SH-97, the BOCC could have made any number of restrictions:
limit the number of large trucks that KHD could cause to be on the road, require KHD build an
overpass over SH-97 where the property is divided by the highway, or even require KHD to
disproportionately contribute to improving the safety of the highway. There is no requirement
that the BOCC provide a list of actions that is efficient or economically feasible, but KHD is
entitled to have such a list to determine the efficiency and feasibility itself and, the fact is, the
BOCC provided nothing. Not even one suggestion was made as to how KHD could achieve
approval.
CONCLUSION
The BOCC deliberately used irrelevant and immaterial information to form its purported
basis for denying KHD's preliminary PUD Application. The BOCC's decision is erroneous and
not based on substantial evidence when such evidence is viewed in light of the Record. As such,
the decision is arbitrary and capricious and KHD has had its rights prejudiced.
The BOCC's erroneous rulings have resulted in KHD being forced to retain local counsel in
order to pursue an appeal and have also caused considerable delays in KHD7sproject plans. KHD
is entitled, pursuant to Idaho Code

5

12-1 17, to recover its attorney fees as a result of the BOCC's

improper actions requiring it to proceed with this appeal.

If this Court agees with the Appellant and deems KHD's appeal meritorious and remands
to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (BOCC), it should reverse the BOCC's denial,
and order that KHD's Preliminary PUD Application be approved. In the alternative, the Court
should remand the matter to the BOCC so that KHD's Preliminary PUD Application will have the
opportunity to be considered in light of the Record, and applicable law, as other area developinents
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applications have been. Finally, if the Court denies KHD's appeal, the Court should nonetheless
order compensation to KHD as a result of the BOCC's regulatory taking.
DATED this &day

of ~ecember,2006.

GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM

Glen E. Walker
Kacey L. Wall
Attorneys for Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on
day of December, via hand-delivery to the following:

this

John Cafferty
Kootenai County
Department of Legal Services
45 1 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 16-9000
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FURLONG COMPANIES, INC., Respondent,
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Background: Developer brought mandamus action
against city, seeking an order compelling the city to
approve its plat application and seeking damages
under $ 1983. The Circuit Court, Jackson County,
Justine E. Del Muro, J., found in favor of developer.
City appealed.

4 14 Zoning and Planning

4 141 In General

4 14k5 Source and Scope of Power
41 4k5.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The governmental body has great latitude regarding
zoning.

Zoning and Planning 414 -245

414 Zoning and Planning
Construction, Operation and Effect
4 14V(A) In General
414k245 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Regulations in General. Most Cited Cases
"Plat approval" is the ministerial application of
zoning requirements, uniformly, to all particular
parcels within the zoned area.

Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1
Holdings: The Supreme Court, William Ray Price,

Jr., J., held that:

acircuit court was not limited to review of evidence
in administrative record;
Q
J substantial evidence supported trial court's finding
that city's decision was unlawful, unreasonable, and
arbitrary;

122city's conduct violated Q

1983; and

4
(J substantial evidence supported finding that
developer suffered $174,871 as a result of delay in
plat approval.

4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A) In General
414k375 Right to Permission, and
Discretion
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
A municipality has far less latitude regarding a
decision on plat approval than a decision on zoning,
as each landowner is entitled to equal application of
the zoning and planning laws applicable to his
property.

Zoning and Planning 414 -355
4 14 Zoning and Planning
-

Affirmed as modified.
West Headnotes
Zoning and Planning 414 -1

414 Zoning and Planning
4141 In General
4 14kl k. Nature in General. Most Cited Cases
"Zoning" is the exercise of legislative authority as to
what land uses are in the interest of the public for
particular areas within the political subdivision.

U Zoning and Planning 414 -5.1

4 14VII Administration in General
4 14k353 Powers, Duties, and Liabilities
414k355 k. Legislative, Judicial, or QuasiJudicial Power. Most Cited Cases
When proceeding under the subdivision ordinance,
the plan commission and the city council are acting in
an administrative capacity and not in a legislative
capacity.

Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1
4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A)In General
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414k375 Right to Permission, and
Discretion
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited

250k87 k. Proceedings to Procure and Grant
or Revoke Licenses, Certificates, and Permits. Most
Cited Cases

Cases
Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5

414 Zoning and Planning
4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 14V111Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A) In General
4 14k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
The law does not permit administrative bodies to
exercise an arbitrary and subjective authority over the
granting or denying of subdivision plats; the exercise
of discretion and judgment vested in the
administrative body is to determine whether a plan
meets the zoning or subdivision requirements.

4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A) In General
414k375 Right to Permission, and
Discretion
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
The approval of a preliminary plat that meets the
subdivision and zoning requirements is a ministerial
act, and mandamus is the proper remedy in seeking to
review the denial of such a plat.

J
l
O
J

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

-470
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

4 14 Zoning and Planning
-

4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A) In General
4 14k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
It is not a discretion of the planning commission and
the city council to approve a plan that does not meet
the zoning or subdivision requirements.

Zoning and Planning 414 -375.1

414 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A1 In General
414k375 Right to Permission, and
Discretion
414k375.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Neither the planning commission nor the city council
has the authority to deny a subdivision plat that
complies with the subdivision ordinance; if the plat
complies, then it is the ministerial duty of the
commission and the council to approve it, and they
have no discretion to deny it.

15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
1 5Ak469 Hearing
15Ak470 k. Necessity and Purpose in
General. Most Cited Cases
"Contested cases" under the Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act provide the parties with an opportunity
for a formal hearing with the presentation of
evidence, including sworn testimony of witnesses and
cross-examination of witnesses, and require written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. V.A.M.S. tj
536.010(4).

llfl

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
-681.1

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak68 1 Further Review
15Ak681.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -682
Mandamus 250 -87
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

250 Mandamus
-

25011 Subjects and Purposes of Relief

250II(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public
Officers and Boards and Municipalities

15AV Judicial Review of
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak68 1 Further Review
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15Ak682 k. Record. Most Cited Cases
The trial court's decision in reviewing a contested
case under the Missouri Administrative Procedure
Act is appealable, but the appellate court also looks
back to the record created before the administrative
body. V.A.M.S. 6 536.140.

1121

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

-470

1141

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A
-665.1

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

15AV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak665 Right of Review
15Ak665.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

& Administrative Law and Procedure
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
1SAIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications
15Ak469 Hearing
15Ak470 k. Necessity and Purpose in
General. Most Cited Cases

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -676
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

15AV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A -676
Administrative
-744.1

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases
Non-contested cases do not require formal
proceedings or hearings before the administrative
body; as such, there is no record required for review.

1131

Law

and

Procedure

15A

15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

15AV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
1 5AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak744 Trial De Novo
15Ak744.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

-676
15A Administrative Law and Procedure
-

15AV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
15AV(A) In General
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases

Administrative
-744.1

Law

and

Procedure

In 'either a contested or a non-contested case the
private litigant is entitled to challenge the
governmental agency's decision; the difference is
simply that in a contested case the private litigant
must try his or her case before the agency, and
judicial review is on the record of that administrative
trial, whereas in a non-contested case the private
litigant tries his or her case to the court. V.A.M.S. $
4 536.100, 536.140.

15A

1151Mandamus 250 -12

j
5
t
J Administrative Law and Procedure
Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
1 5AV(D) Scope of Review in General
15Ak744 Trial De Novo
15Ak744.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
In the review of a non-contested decision, the circuit
court does not review the administrative record, but
hears evidence, determines facts, and adjudges the
validity of the agency decision.
V.A.M.S. 6
536.150(1).

250 Mandamus
Nature and Grounds in General
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded.
Most Cited Cases
The purpose of the extraordinary writ of mandamus
is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty
that one charged with the duty has refused to
perform.

1161Mandamus 250 -12
250 Mandamus
2501 Nature and Grounds in General
-
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250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded.
Most Cited Cases
The writ of mandamus can only be issued to compel
a party to act when it was his duty to act without it.

1171Mandamus 250 -12

30XVI Review
30XVI(Q Harmless Error
30XVI(J)I In General
30k1032 Burden to Show Prejudice from
Error
30k1032(1) k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

250 Mandamus
Nature and Grounds in General
250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded.
Most Cited Cases
A writ of mandamus confers upon the party against
whom it may be issued no new authority, and from its
very nature can confer none.

1181Mandamus 250 -10
250 Mandamus
-

aNature and Grounds in General

250k10 k. Nature and Existence of Rights to
Be Protected or Enforced. Most Cited Cases
A litigant asking relief by mandamus must allege and
prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific right
to a thing claimed; he must show hmself possessed
of a clear and legal right to the remedy.

1191Mandamus 250 -12

Merely asserting error without malung a showing of
how that error was somehow prejudicial is not
sufficient for reversal.

J
2
2
J Mandamus 250 @=;;3168(3)
250 Mandamus
-

350111 Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
350k168 Evidence
250k168(3) k. Admissibility of Gidence.
Most Cited Cases
In mandamus action that sought order requiring city
to approve plat application, developer had the right to
adduce any evidence relevant to proving that it
presented the city with sufficient evidence to show
that it met the requirements for preliminary approval;
city did not conduct preliminary plat hearing as a
contested case, and thus, the circuit court was not
limited to review of evidence in administrative
record. V.A.M.S. 6 536.150(1].

250 Mandamus
250I Nature and Grounds in General

1231Mandamus 250 -168(3)

250k12 k. Nature of Acts to Be Commanded.
Most Cited Cases
Mandamus does not issue except in cases where the
ministerial duty sought to be coerced is definite,
arising under conditions admitted or proved and
imposed by law.

250 Mandamus
-

1201Mandamus 250 -87
250 Mandamus
-

250111 Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
250k168 Evidence
250k168(3) k. Admissibility of Evidence.
Most Cited Cases
In a mandamus proceeding, any competent evidence
tending to establish, or in any way affecting, the right
of the relator or duty of respondent, and within the
allegations of the petition and writ, is admissible.

Subjects and Purposes of Relief
2501I(B) Acts and Proceedings of Public
Officers and Boards and Municipalities
250k87 k. Proceedings to Procure and Grant
or Revoke Licenses, Certificates, and Permits. Most
Cited Cases
If a subdivision plat complies with the requirements
of the subdivision statute or ordinance, mandamus
may compel approval of the plat; if the plat does not
comply, mandamus is unavailable and improper.

1241Mandamus 250 -1

1211Appeal and Error 30 -1032(1)

1251

250 Mandamus
-

2501 Nature and Grounds in General
-

250kI k. Nature and Scope of Remedy in
General. Most Cited Cases
Under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act,
mandamus is generally not available if the
proceeding was tried as a contested case before an
administrative body. V.A.M.S. t; 536.150.

Administrative Law and Procedure 15A

-676
30 Appeal and Error
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Administrative Law and Procedure
I SAV Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions
I 5AV(A) In General
15Ak676 k. Record. Most Cited Cases
In reviewing agency action in a non-contested case,
the evidentiary standard "as may be properly
adduced" is not limited to a review of the
administrative record; this is because in such
proceedings the parties were not afforded the ability
to create a record upon which viable review could
occur. V.A.M.S. 4 536.150/1).

U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.

1281Civil Rights 78 -1031
78 Civil Rights
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination
~ r o r b i t e din General
78k1030 Acts or Conduct Causing Deprivation
78k1031 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The truly irrational standard for government action in
a (i 1983 claim is something more than arbitrary,
capricious, or in violation of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. $
a

1983.

1261Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5
1291Constitutional Law 92 -278.2(1)

414 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 14VIII(A) In General
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Substantial evidence supported trial court's finding
that the city's decision to deny approval of
developer's preliminary plat was unlawful,
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious; traffic study
indicated that the development would not impact
traffic, city planner testified that the staclung
requirement for cars at proposed car wash was
satisfied, plat complied with lot depth to width ratio
requirements, developer agreed to satisfy the
conditions as proposed by the city staff, and city's
attorney advised that the city could not legally deny
preliminary plat.

1271Constitutional Law 92 -251.3
92 Constitutional Law
-

92XIIDue Process of Law

92k25 1.3 k. Reasonableness or Arbitrariness;
Rational Basis and Relation to Object. Most Cited

Cases
Constitutional Law 92 -277(1)
92 Constitutional Law
92XIIDue Process of Law
92k277 Property and Rights Therein Protected
92k277(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
There are two elements that must be established to
prevail on a due process claim under (j 1983; first, a
claimant must establish a protected property interest
to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
protection applies, and a claimant must also establish
that the governmental action was truly irrational.
a

92 Constitutional Law
Due Process of Law
92k278.2 Zoning, Building, and Planning
Regulations
92k278.2(1 k. In General. Most Cited
a

Cases
Zoning and Planning 414 -381.5
4 14 Zoning and Planning
4 14VIII Permits, Certificates and Approvals
4 i 4VIII(A) In General
414k378 Grounds for Grant or Denial
414k381.5 k. Maps, Plats, or Plans,
Conformity to Regulations. Most Cited Cases
City's conduct in denying developer preliminary plat
approval was truly irrational in violation of
developer's due process rights and entitled developer
1983, where the city plan
to relief under &
commission ignored the advice of the plats review
committee recommending approval, developer's
attempts to learn the reasons for the denial were
rebuffed and it was never afforded any opportunity to
amend or correct the preliminary plat, and once the
plat was brought before the city council, the council
subjected developer to numerous delays and denied
approval despite the fact that the city's attorney
advised the city that it could not legally deny the
preliminary plat. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; 42
U.S.C.A. !j 1983.

1301Civil Rights 78 -1071
78 Civil Rights
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination
prohibited in General
78k107 1 k. Property Rights. Most Cited Cases
When government acts with intentional disregard of
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its own valid law, knowing that its actions deprive
individuals of their property rights, such action is
truly irrational for purposes of 9 1983 claim. 42
U.S.C.A. 6 1983.

Paul A. Campo, Lee's Summit, Stephen P. Chinn,
Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Kansas City, amicus
curiae.WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge.
I. Introduction

1311Civil Rights 78 -1031
78 Civil Rights
781 Rights Protected and Discrimination
prohibited in General
78k1030 Acts or Conduct Causing Deprivation
78k103 1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Causation is an essential element of a 4 1983 action.
42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983.

1321Civil Rights 78 -1464
78 Civil Rights
78111 Federal Remedies in General
-

78k1458 Monetary Relief in General
78k1464 k. Measure and Amount. Most
Cited Cases
Substantial evidence supported a finding in
developer's S; 1983 action against city based on city's
failure to approve preliminary plat that city's delay in
approving plat resulted in damages to developer
amounting to $174,871, where delay resulted in loan
fees that were incurred as the terms of the project
were revised based on the city's conduct, delay
required property to be hydroseeded to prevent
erosion, and it resulted in commercial economic
damages. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.

1331Civil Rights 78 -1462
78 Civil Rights
78111 Federal Remedies in General
78k1458 Monetary Relief in General
78k1462 k. Grounds and Subjects;
Compensatory Damages. Most Cited Cases
Evidence was not sufficient to support finding in
developer's 4 1983 action against city for city's
failure to approve preliminary plat that $50,000 loan
that developer took from his retirement account was
used to pay expenses that were attributable to the
city's delay in approving the plat, and thus, the loan
was not allowable as delay damages. 42 U.S.C.A. $
1983.
*I60 Douglas M. McMillan, Galen Beaufort, Kansas
City, for appellant.
Robert A. Horn, K. Christo~herJawram, Kansas
City, for respondent.

The City of Kansas City, Missouri, appeals from a
judgment in mandamus directing that it grant a
preliminary plat to Furlong Companies, Inc. and
awarding actual damages of $224,871.00 and
attorney's fees in the amount of $148,435.20 against
the city under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 arising from
the denial of the plat. The city complains that the
trial court improperly engaged in de novo review
applicable to noncontested case matters under the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act. Section
5 3 6 . 1 5 0 . ~The city contends that the review should
have been limited to the' record before the city
council because the proceeding was one in
mandamus. The city also contends that the evidence
was not sufficient to support the 42 U.S.C. section
1983judgment against it.

FNI.

All state statutory references are to
RSMo 2000.

The trial court's judgment granting mandamus and
awarding actual damages and attorney's fees is
affirmed as modified.

11. Facts
Furlong owned 2.76 acres of real property located in
Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, on the north
side of Red Bridge Road near Holmes Road. The
property is located in an area that is zoned for
intermediate business, high buildings.
Furlong
intended to subdivide the land into three lots and
develop it for commercial use, with the land
ultimately to contain two fast food restaurants and a
car wash.
Furlong *I61 purchased the property
largely because of the established favorable zoning,
which would allow for the intended uses without the
difficulty of rezoning.
Furlong's plan for development of the land was to
first construct a car wash and, once the land was
finally platted and properly subdivided, sell or lease
the other two tracts of land for the construction of
fast food restaurants. The proceeds from the sale or
lease of the subdivided tracts would then be used to
repay or offset Furlong's purchase and construction
loans.
Prior to completing the platting process,
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Furlong entered into a contract to sell one of the
tracts to a developer for the construction of a
Wendy's restaurant and entered into a contract to
lease the other tract to a developer for the
construction of a Sonic drive-in. The terms of these
contracts required that the land be properly and
finally platted and subdivided before construction.
On October 1, 1999, Furlong filed an application for
approval of a preliminary plat for the property with
the city. On November 3, 1999, Furlong and its
engineers met with the city's plats review committee
to receive comments on the preliminary plat. The
committee reviewed Furlong's application and
suggested certain conditions that needed to be met
prior to approval. On December 7, 1999, at a public
hearing, city staff recommended that the city plan
commission approve the preliminary plat application
subject to the conditions. Furlong agreed to all of
the conditions of approval set forth by city staff.
Notwithstanding the city staffs recommendation, the
commission voted to deny Furlong's preliminary plat
application. The commission did not issue findings
of fact and conclusions of law as to why Furlong's
application was denied.
City staff told Furlong that they could not discuss the
denial of the application "for fear of litigation."
Furlong attempted to submit a revised preliminary
plat reflecting compliance with the conditions, but
city staff refbsed to accept it. Furlong then requested
that the plat application be submitted to the city
council. On February 3, 2000, a proposed ordinance
reflecting Furlong's preliminary plat application was
introduced to the city council for first reading.
On March 1, 8, 15, and 29 of 2000, the Planning,
Zoning & Economic Development Committee (the
"P & Z committee"), a subcommittee of the full city
council, held public hearings regarding approval of
Furlong's preliminary plat. During the course of
those hearings, the P & Z committee heard comments
from area residents both in favor of and in opposition
to the plat application. The city also requested a
traffic study to analyze the effect of Furlong's
proposed plat on the surrounding area.
Furlong
complied with the traffic study request. The study
ultimately concluded that Furlong's plat would have
little impact on the existing traffic system.
At the March 15, 2000, hearing the city requested
more time and information regarding the traffic
study. On March 29, 2000, Furlong provided the P
& Z committee with a revised, more comprehensive
traffic study, which also concluded that Furlong's

proposed plat would have little impact on traffic in
the surrounding area. At the March 29 meeting the P
& Z committee voted the matter "off the docket,"
meaning that it would not be reviewed again for up to
six months.
On April 13, 2000, the chairman of the P & Z
committee called Furlong's preliminary plat
ordinance out of committee for docketing before the
entire city council. The chairman stated that the
city's legal counsel had attended a closed session and
advised that there was no legal basis for rejecting
Furlong's application. On May 4, 2000, the city
Furlong's
council voted not to approve"l62
preliminary plat by a vote of 9 to 4. Again, no
findings of fact or conclusions of law were issued in
regard to' the city's denial of Furlong's preliminary
plat.
Furlong filed suit against the city on May 9, 2000,
seelung an order of mandamus compelling the city to
approve its plat application and also seeking damages
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
After hearing
evidence on Furlong's mandamus claim, the trial
court entered an order of mandamus against the city
on November 29, 2000, compelling the city to
approve Furlong's plat application immediately and
without undue delay. In so doing, the trial court
expressly found that the city's action in denying
Furlong's preliminary plat application was unlawful,
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. After the
entry of the mandamus order, Furlong moved
forward with its development plans.
Today, the
property has been completely developed and contains
a car wash, a Wendy's restaurant, and a Sonic drivein.
Subsequent to the mandamus trial, the trial court
heard evidence on Furlong's additional claim for
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The trial
court found "the City's conduct to be more than a
mere violation of the law but that the action of the
City rose to the level of truly irrational." The trial
court awarded Furlong $224,871 .OO in actual
damages and $148,435.20 for costs and attorney's
fees. The city appeals.

111. Points of Error
The city seeks review asserting four points of error.
I.
The trial court erred in granting a writ of
mandamus because it exceeded its permissible scope
of review by hearing the proceeding de novo in that
review of a plat application denial is limited to the
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 8
(Cite as: 189 S.W.3d 157)
information presented to the city council.
11. The trial court erred in granting a writ of
mandamus because there was insufficient evidence to
show that the city council's decision was arbitrary or
capricious in that the information the city council
reviewed was sufficient to support the city council's
decision to deny the preliminary plat application.
111. The trial court's grant of judgment on the
substantive due process claim was clearly erroneous
because there was no substantial evidence to support
a finding that the city acted in a clearly irrational
manner when its city council denied Furlong's
preliminary plat application in that the trial court
erroneously declared the law and in that the plat did
not comply with the city's subdivision ordinance and
this was a rational basis for the city's denial and in
that Furlong used the process available and therefore
was not denied due process
IV. The trial court's award of damages was clearly
erroneous because there was no substantial evidence
to support a finding that the city proximately caused
the damages award to Furlong.

IV. General Legal Background

A. Zoning and Plat ApprovaI
Zoning and plat approval for subdivision
development are crucial tools for the orderly
development of our cities and counties. Yet, these
tools impact significantly on the freedom of
landowners to do what they might want with their
real property and on the relative value that any
particular piece of property might have.
*I63 11lI21r31r41 Zoning and plat approval represent
different types of authority in political subdivisions.
"Zoning" is the exercise of legislative authority as to
what land uses are in the interest of the public for
particular areas within the political subdivision. The
governmental body has great latitude in this regard.
"Plat approval" is the ministerial application of
zoning requirements, uniformly, to all particular
parcels within the zoned area. Far less latitude exists
in this regard, as each landowner is entitled to equal
application of the zoning and planning laws
applicable to his property. See generally, Yokely,
E.C., Law of Subdivisions 2 17-3 18 (2d ed. 1981).

B. Missouri law regarding subdivision plat
approval

Sections 445.030 and 89.4 10 set forth the procedures
and mechanisms by which Missouri cities may
govern the subdividing of land. Section 445.030, in
relevant part, states:
... that if such map or plat be of land situated within
the corporate limits of any incorporated city, town or
village, it shall not be placed of record until it shall
have been submitted to and approved by the common
council of such city, town or village, by ordinance,
duly passed and approved by the mayor, and such
approval endorsed upon such map or plat under the
hand of the clerk and the seal of such city, town, or
village ...
Section 89.4 10.1 states:The planning commission
shall recommend and the council may by ordinance
adopt regulations governing the subdivision of land
within its jurisdiction. The regulations, in addition
to the requirements provided by law for the approval
of plats, may provide requirements for the
coordinated development of the city, town or village;
for the coordination of streets within subdivisions
with other existing or planned streets or with other
features of the city plan or official map of the city,
town or village; for adequate open spaces for traffic,
recreation, light and air; and for a distribution of
population and traffic; provided that, the city, town
or village may only impose requirements for the
posting of bonds, letters of credit or escrows for
subdivision-related improvements as provided for in
subsections 2 to 5 of this section.
These two statutes were harmonized by the decision
in City of' Bellefont(iine Neighbors 1,. J.J. Kellcv
Reultv d Building Co., 460 S.W.2d 298
(Mo.Aup.1970).
In that case, the court he1d:The
specificity of [section 89.4101 may be considered to
restrict the broad grant of power given by section
445.030 and to establish the procedures for carrying
out the regulation of subdivisions authorized by
section 445.030.
Where the legislature has
authorized a municipality to exercise a power and
prescribed the manner of its exercise, the right to
exercise the power in any other manner is necessarily
denied.

Section 89.4 10.1 requires that regulation of
subdivisions be accomplished in municipalities by
ordinance. Stale o f Missouri ex tlel. Schnefet. v.
Clevel~nd,847 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo.Aup.1992).
Chapter 66 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of
Kansas City, Missouri, contains the rules and
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regulations regarding the subdivision of land located
in the city. Section 66-42 of the code establishes a
three-step process for ultimate approval of
subdivision plats: (1) preliminary plat phase, (2)
final plat phase review before the city plan
commission, and (3) final plat phase review before
the city council. Each phase has a number of steps
within it.

*I64 The dispute at issue herein occurred at the
preliminary plat phase. The preliminary plat phase
is defined as follows:
During the preliminary plat phase, the applicant will
hold preapplication conferences with the secretary to
the city plan commission, or his designated staff
representative, to discuss in general the procedures
and requirements for platting, and more specifically
the basic plans of the applicant. It is recommended
that the applicant's engineer meet with the city
engineer, or his designated staff representative, to
review the physical features of the development
relative to the public improvements. The product of
the preapplication conference will allow the applicant
to complete a preliminary plat and submit it formally
for review by the plats review committee. The plats
review committee shall have the authority to approve
or disapprove any preliminary plat; provided the
preliminary plat must comply with all of the
requirements of this chapter. The developer may
elect to submit the preliminary plat to the city plan
commission and city council. Generally, the election
to proceed before the city plan commission and city
council is recommended when:
a. The plats review committee disapproves the
preliminary plat;
b. The developer is requesting a variance or
conditional exception from this chapter; or
c. The development is planned to be platted in two or
more phases If the developer elects to proceed to the
city plan commission and city council, the plats
review committee will review and forward its
recommendations to the city plan commission and
city council.

When the developer elects to proceed before the city
plan commission, the plats review committee issues a
recommendation as to approval or denial to the city
plan commission. Kansas City Code section 6643(f). There is then to be a public hearing before the
city plan commission.
Id. If the commission
approves the preliminary plat, it is submitted to the
city council for approval as an ordinance. Kansas
City Code section 66-43(g). If the plan commission
rejects or withholds approval, the developer may
request in writing that the plan be submitted to the
city council. Id. There is then another public hearing
before the city council. Id.
J51r61f'71f'81[9] When proceeding under the
subdivision ordinance, the plan commission and the
city council are acting in an administrative capacity
and not in a legislative capacity. State ex re/.
Westside Develoamcnl Co.. Inc. v. Wcutker-bv Lake,
935 S.W.2d 634. 640 (Mo.Avp. 1996). The law does
not permit administrative bodies to exercise an
arbitrary and subjective authority over the granting or
denying of subdivision plats. ScltaefL.r, 847 S.W.2d
at 873. The exercise of discretion and judgment
vested in the administrative body is to determine
whether a plan meets the zoning or subdivision
requirements. Irl. It is not a discretion to approve a
Nor do
plan that does not meet the requirements.
the statutes and the ordinance grant the commission
or the council the authority to deny a subdivision plat
that complies with the subdivision ordinance.
If
the *I65 plat complies, then it is the ministerial duty
of the commission and the council to approve it, and
they have no discretion to deny it. U The approval
of a preliminary plat that meets the subdivision and
zoning requirements is a ministerial act, and
mandamus is the proper remedy in seelung to review
the denial of such a plat. See Weatherby Lake. 935
S.W.2d at 640; Slate ex !-el Menlchlw v. Cia) of
Pevely, 865 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Mo.Aup.1993);
Schaefer; 847 S.W .2d at 87 1.

a

C. Missouri Administrative Procedure Act
Kansas City Code section 66-42. The stated purpose
of the preliminary plat is to convey the developer's
"ideas and intentions in platting the proposed
subdivision." Kansas City Code section 66-43(a).
The developer may also elect to submit his
preliminary plat to the city plan commission and the
city council for approval. Kansas City Code section
66-43(e). It appears from the testimony at trial that
submitting a preliminary plat to the city plan
commission is the standard procedure in Kansas City.

The Missouri Administrative Procedure Act
for two types of cases: contested cases and noncontested cases. The distinction between these two
types of cases is an often-litigated issue.
A
"contested case" is defined in the MAPA as "a
proceeding before an agency in which legal rights,
duties or privileges of specific parties are required by
law to be determined after hearing."
Section
536.010(4). The MAPA does not explicitly define a
"non-contested case," but it has been defined by this
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Court as a decision that is not required by law to be
determined after a hearing. Stnte ex re/. M'il.son
Chevr-ole[, hic. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d 867. 870
(Mo. 1960).

110111 I ]

Contested case review is controlled by
sections 536.100 to 536.140.
Contested cases
provide the parties with an opportunity for a formal
hearing with the presentation of evidence, including
swom testimony of witnesses and cross-examination
of witnesses, and require written findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Hcrael~)v. Board o f Educution of
tlie Webstet- Groves School District, 84 1 S.W.2.d 663,
668 (Mo. banc 1992). The review of a contested
case is a review by the trial court of the record
created before the administrative body. Section
536.140. The trial court's decision upon such review
is appealable, but the appellate court also looks back
to the record created before the administrative body.
C i h o f Cnbool v. Missouri Sfate Board o f Mediation,
689 S.W.2d 51.53 (Mo. banc 1985).
11211 131 Non-contested cases do not require formal
proceedings or hearings before the administrative
body. Farnler's Bank o f Antonia v. Kosin~nn,577
S.W.2d 915.92 1 (Mo.A~p.19791. As such, there is
no record required for review. P h i ~ u .11.~ School
District of Kansas Citv, 645 S.W.2d 91, 94-5
( M o . A ~ ~ . 1 9 8 2 ) .In the review of a non-contested
decision, the circuit court does not review the
administrative record, but hears evidence, determines
facts, and adjudges the validity of the agency
decision. Id. Under the procedures of section
536.1 50, the circuit court conducts such a hearing as
an original action. Id at 96; section 536.150. I.
In either a contested or a non-contested case the
private litigant is entitled to challenge the
governmental agency's decision. The difference is
simply that in a contested case the private litigant
must try his or her case before the agency, and
judicial review is on the record of that administrative
trial, whereas in a non-contested case the private
litigant tries his or her case to the court. Depending
upon the circumstances, this difference may result in
procedural advantages or disadvantages to the parties,
but in either situation, the litigant is entitled to
develop an evidentiary record in one forum or
another.

D. Mandamus

1151[16lr1711181~191

The
purpose
of
the
extraordinary writ of mandamus is to compel the

performance of a ministerial duty that one charged
with the duty has refused to perfom. *166Sfatc ex
re/. Phillip v. P~lhlicSchool Relit-en~c)ntS,)stern. 364
Mo. 395, 262 S.W.2d 569. 574 (19531. The writ
can only be issued to compel a party to act when it
was his duty to act without it. Icl. It confers upon the
party against whom it may be issued no new
authority, and from its very nature can confer none.
A litigant asking relief by mandamus must allege
and prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific
right to a thing claimed. He must show himself
possessed of a clear and legal right to the remedy. Id_
Mandamus does not issue except in cases where the
ministerial duty sought to be coerced is definite,
arising under conditions admitted or proved and
imposed by law. Sfnte e,v re/. Bunlcer Resource
Recvclinn und Reclumation, Inc. v. Melzun, 782
S.W.2d 381,389 (Mo. banc 1990).
If a subdivision plat complies with the
requirements of the subdivision statute or ordinance,
mandamus may compel approval of the plat. If the
plat does not comply, mandamus is unavailable and
improper.

V. Analysis

In its first point of error, the city alleges that "the trial
.court erred in granting a writ of mandamus because it
exceeded its permissible scope of review by hearing
the proceeding de novo in that review of a plat
application denial is limited to the information
presented to the city council." FN2

FN2.

The parties do not explain the
significance of the fact that the plat has now
been approved and the project has been
completed. Neither argues that this issue is
moot. Neither explains the consequences of
this decision beyond its impact upon the Q
U.S.C. section 1983 claim.

The city fails to point to any specific evidence that
was admitted in error or to any prejudice resulting
from the admission of such evidence.
The city
makes a singular, non-specific reference to "expert
testimony on the compliance of the plat."
Other
evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Furlong told
city staff members that he would comply with all of
their conditions; that city staff members told Mr.
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Furlong that they would not discuss with him the
denial of his preliminary plat "for fear of litigation;"
that Mr. Furlong attempted to submit a revised
preliminary plat but was not allowed to do so; that
Mr. Furlong was subjected to various delays during
the process; and that the city was advised that it had
no legal basis to deny the preliminary plat.
1211r221"By both statute and rule, an appellate court
is not to reverse a judgment unless it believes the
error committed by the trial court against the
appellant materially affected the merits of the
action." Lewis v. Wuhl, 842 S.W.2d 82, 84-5 (Mo.
banc 1992) (citing section 512.160(2) and Rule
84.13(b)). Merely asserting error without making a
showing of how that error was somehow prejudicial
is not sufficient for reversal. Nonetheless, there was
no error in admitting the evidence.
Neither party contends that the City should have
conducted Furlong's preliminary plat hearing as a
contested case and we do not address that question.
The parties concede that mandamus was the proper
procedure to challenge the denial of a preliminary
See Weaiherhv Lake, 935 S.W.2d at 640;
plat.
Menlilzus. 865 S.W.2d at 874: Schaefcr, 847 S.W.2d
at 871.
The standard for admission of evidence in a
mandamus proceeding is the same whether at
common law or under the MAPA. At common law, it
is well established that the ordinary principles
relating to admissibility of evidence in civil actions
generally are applicable in mandamus proceedings.
55 C.J.S. Mandunzus 6 352 (1998). Any competent
evidence tending *I67 to establish, or in any way
affecting, the right of the relator or duty of
respondent, and within the allegations of the petition
and writ, is admissible. Id., see also, State ex re/.
Raw1in.e~ v. Kansas City, 2 13 Mo.App. 349, 250
S.W. 927 (1923).
J2411251 Under the MAPA, mandamus is generally
not available if the proceeding was tried as a
"contested case" before an administrative body.
State ex rel. Keeven 1). Citv o f Hazelwood, 585
S.W.2d 557, 560 IMo.App.19792; State ex re/.
Dodson v. McNenl, 552 S.W.2d 34. 36
fMo.App.1977);
section 536.150.
Section
536.150.1 provides for review of non-contested cases
as follows:
When any administrative officer or body existing
under the constitution or by statute or by municipal
charter or ordinance shall have rendered a decision
which is not subject to administrative review,

determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of
any person, including the denial or revocation of a
license, and there is no other provision for judicial
inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision
may be reviewed by suit .for injrinction, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, or other appropriate action,
and in any such review proceeding the court may
determine the facts relevant to the question whether
such person at the time of such decision was subject
to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled
to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on
such question as may be properly adduced, and the
court may determine whether such decision, in view
of the facts as they appear to the court, is
unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious or involves an abuse of discretion; and the
court shall render judgment accordingly, and may
order the administrative officer or body to take such
further action as it may be proper to require; but the
court shall not substitute its discretion for discretion
legally vested in such administrative officer or body,
and in cases where the granting or withholding of a
privilege is committed by law to the sole discretion of
such administrative officer or body, such discretion
lawfblly exercised shall not be disturbed.
(emphasis added). The evidentiary standard "as may
be properly adduced" is not limited to a review of the
administrative record.
This is because in
proceedings such as the one here, the parties were not
afforded the ability to create a record upon which
viable review could occur. See Hanc.lv, 84 1 S.W.2d
at 668.
In making its argument that the review in the circuit
court is limited to the record, the city makes the
simple mistake of confusing Furlong's burden of
proof with the standard for determining the
admissibility of evidence. Although Furlong was
required to prove that it presented the city with
sufficient evidence to show that it met the
requirements for preliminary plat approval, it had the
right, before the circuit court, to adduce any evidence
relevant to proving such facts.
The driving idea behind administrative law in
Missouri is that the citizen is entitled to a fair
opportunity to present the facts of his or her case. If
this occurs in the context of the procedural formality
and protection of a "contested case" before the
administrative agency, the review in the courts can be
limited to the record. If the citizen is denied this
opportunity before the agency, then he or she is
entitled to present such evidence as is necessary
before the courts to determine the controversy.
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The city relies on Wenfherhy Lake as support for a
more limited review.
Although Weatherhv Lake
correctly notes "the reviewing court is not authorized
to *I68 substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the administrative body if such findings of fact are
supported by competent and substantial evidence,"
nothing in Weulherhv Lake precludes the introduction
of evidence to establish what actually occurred in the
administrative process.

The city also argues that "a reasonable person could
doubt" that Furlong's plat complied with the
"stacking" requirements for cars at a car wash.
However, at trial, the city planner and Furlong's
engineer testified that the staclung requirement had
been satisfied.
Moreover, the staff report
recommending approval of Furlong's preliminary plat
indicates that the stacking requirement was satisfied.
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to
find that Furlong complied with section 80140(b)(l)d.4 of the zoning ordinance.

In its second point of error, the city argues that
"the trial court erred in granting a writ of mandamus
because there was insufficient evidence to show that
the city council's decision was arbitrary or capricious
in that the information the city council reviewed was
sufficient to support the city council's decision to
deny the preliminary plat application."

FN3. Stacking refers to the space occupied

The trial court found that the city's decision was
"unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in
that the [city] failed to perform its ministerial duty,
given that this court finds that [Furlong] met the
subdivision regulations and the preliminary plat is
consistent with the zoning ordinance." The standard
of review for a bench-tried case is well-established.
An appellate court must sustain the decree or
judgment of the trial court unless there is no
substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against
the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously
declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the
law. Mzrrpliv v. Cur-ron. 536 S.W.2d 30. 32 (Mo.
banc 1976).
Despite the language of its point relied on, the city
apparently only challenges the sufficiency of
Furlong's evidence regarding four conditions for
approval. First, the city argues that the project had a
"potential impact on traffic." The record reflects,
however, that the city council required Furlong to
conduct a traffic study to examine the impact of the
proposed development based on Furlong's intended
uses of the land. Furlong hired a traffic-engineering
firm to conduct such a study.
The city council
questioned the findings of the initial study, and
Furlong then asked the traffic engineers to perform a
more comprehensive study. The studies ultimately
concluded that the proposed development would have
little or no impact on existing traffic patterns. There
was substantial evidence for the trial court to find that
the proposed development would not have a
"potential impact on traffic."

by a motor vehicle waiting to enter a car
wash bay.
The city argues that Furlong did not comply with the
requirement that the ratio of the lot depth to width
generally not exceed three to one when subdividing
large parcels. Under one method of measurement,
lot 2 as shown on the preliminary plat before the city
council had a ratio of 3.07 to 1. Other methods of
measurement, such as talung the average lot depth as
compared to average lot width, would generate a ratio
well within the three to one requirement.
Regardless, there is substantial evidence that this
issue was easily correctable through a simple revision
"169 In fact,
of one of the lot boundary lines.
Furlong made such a revision and attempted to
submit that revised preliminary plat to the city, but
was not allowed to do so. There was also evidence
at trial that the three to one ratio requirenient was not
even applicable to Furlong's preliminary plat because
the ratio was intended to apply only to the
subdivision of "large tracts or parcels." There was
testimony at trial that this provision typically was
only applied to tracts of ten acres or more, whereas
Furlong's parcel was only 2.76 acres. There was
substantial evidence for the trial court to find that
Furlong's preliminary plat complied with the
requirement that the lot depth not exceed three times
the lot width.
Finally, the city argues that Furlong's preliminary plat
did not comply with one of the proposed conditions
recommended by the city staff because it did not
eliminate the easterly drive on proposed lot 3.
However, there was evidence that the easterly drive
had already been approved by Kansas City parks and
recreation such that the city staff could not properly
require its elimination. There was also evidence that
Furlong had agreed to satisfy the conditions as
proposed by the city staff and was specifically
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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willing to address the issues surrounding the easterly
drive on proposed lot 3. There was substantial
evidence for the trial court to find that Furlong's
preliminary plat complied, or could easily comply
through simple revision, with all of city staffs
conditions for approval.
It also appears that the city's attorney advised, in
closed session, that the city could not legally deny
Furlong's preliminary plat. A member of the city
council indicated that, although he thought Furlong's
plan was "terrible," he argued in favor of Furlong's
preliminary plat to the other members of the city
council based on the advice of the city attorney.
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to
find that the city's decision to deny approval of
Furlong's
preliminary plat
was
unlawful,
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.

In its third point of error, the city argues that "the
trial court's grant of judgment on the substantive due
process claim was clearly erroneous because there
was no substantial evidence to support a finding that
the city acted in a clearly irrational manner when its
city council denied Furlong's preliminary plat
application in that the trial court erroneously declared
the law and in that the plat did not comply with the
city's subdivision ordinance and this was a rational
basis for the city's denial and in that Furlong used the
process available and therefore was not denied due
process."
Furlong alleged that the city violated 42 U.S.C. 4
1983in denying its preliminary plat in contravention
of its ministerial duty to approve it upon compliance
with the subdivision regulations. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the
purposes*170 of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
1271r281 There are two elements that must be
established to prevail on a claim under section 1983.
First, a claimant must establish "a protected property
interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process protection applies." Bifunrino~isMrrterial.~,
Inc. v. Rice Countv, Minn.. 126 F.3d 1068. 1070 (8th
Cir.1997). A claimant must also establish that the
governmental action was "truly irrational." Id. The
truly irrational standard has been fbrther defined as
"something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in
violation of state law." Chesterfield Developmen/
Cow. v. Cify o f Chester-field, 963 F.2d 1 102, 1 104
(8th Cir.1992); Frison v. Citv o f Pnncdulc, 897
S.W.2d 129, 132 (Mo.Am.1995).
As stated
previously, the standard of review for a bench-tried
case in Missouri is well-established. An appellate
court must sustain the judgment of the trial court
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it,
unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless
it erroneously declares the law, o r unless it
erroneously applies the law. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at
32.
The city apparently does not dispute that Furlong had
a protected property interest, and asserts only that the
city's conduct in denying Furlong's preliminary plat
was not truly irrational. The city argues that because
it believed that Furlong's preliminary plat did not
comply with the subdivision regulations, its conduct
in denying the preliminary plat could not technically
be considered irrational. In part V.B of this opinion,
the city asserted four bases for its belief that
Furlong's preliminary plat did not comply with the
subdivision regulations. As discussed in that part,
there was substantial evidence for the trial court to
find not only that Furlong's plat did comply with the
subdivision regulations as to each of the city's four
arguments but that there was no rational basis for any
of those arguments.
The city also appears to argue that there could be no
violation of section 1983 because the trial court
ultimately remedied the improper denial of Furlong's
preliminary plat. The fact that a trial court remedied
the city's wrongful and irrational conduct has no
bearing on whether that conduct was violative of
section 1983.
As previously stated, 42 U.S.C. section 1983
liability requires evidence that exceeds an arbitrary
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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and capricious standard and rises to the "truly
irrational" level. Unfortunately, there was sufficient
evidence on which the trial court could determine
that the city's conduct was truly irrational.
The city plan commission ignored the advice of the
plats review committee recommending approval and
denied Furlong's preliminary plat.
Furlong's
attempts to learn the reasons for denial were rebuffed
and Furlong was never afforded any opportunity to
amend or correct the preliminary plat.

that ten-year time period. Such a deviation both
from the standard treatment of preliminary plats over
a ten-year period and from the advice of staff and
counsel leaves no question as to the sufficiency of
evidence on which the trial court based its decision.
The Court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but
only to review the decision for sufficiency of
evidence. See Mumhv. 536 S.W.2d at 32. All plat
denial cases do not give rise to an action for violation
of section 1983. Bitlrnzinolis A4ateriul.s. 126 F.3d at

1070.
Once Furlong requested that the preliminary plat be
brought before the city council, the city council
subjected Furlong to numerous delays. On March 1,
2000, the P & Z committee of the city council held a
public meeting to determine the fate of Furlong's
preliminary plat. No vote was taken and the issue
During the
was continued until March 8, 2000.
March 8, 2000, meeting no vote was taken, the issue
was continued for one week, and the committee
ordered Furlong to undertake a traffic impact study.
During the March 15, 2000, meeting the committee
requested that a more detailed traffic study be
performed, no vote was taken, and the issue was
continued for two weeks. Finally, on March "171
29, 2000, after completing two waves of a traffic
impact study finding that the proposed development
would have little or no impact on existing traffic
condition^,^ the committee again failed to vote on
Furlong's preliminary plat, instead voting it "off the
docket," where it could be held in legislative limbo
for several months with no final decision.
Ultimately, the preliminary plat was presented to the
full city council for a final vote on May 4,2000.

FN4. The city's own

engineer reviewed the
traffic impact study and agreed with the
findings.

Mere delay or mistaken application of the law is not
alone sufficient to meet the "truly irrational"
standard.
In dicta, the Eighth Circuit has even
suggested that bad faith enforcement of an invalid
law would not be sufficient to state a claim. /d..
Chesterfield Developnzent, 963 F.2d at 1105.
The facts of this case go beyond mistaken,
arbitrary, or capricious application of the law. It is
clear from the record that all or nearly all of the
members of the city council believed that Furlong's
proposed project would be bad for this area of Kansas
City. To this extent, they were acting in good faith
and with the best intentions of serving those who
elected them. However, it is equally clear that under
the existing and valid ordinances of Kansas City and
the established law of thls State that Furlong was
entitled to have its preliminary plat approved.
Further, there was evidence from which the trial court
could find that, despite the recommendations of staff
and legal counsel, and ultimately the arguments of a
fellow city council member, the city council
intentionally delayed and denied Furlong its property
rights in disregard of the law. When government
acts with intentional disregard of its own valid law,
knowing that its actions deprive individuals of their
property rights, such action is "truly irrational."

The city's attorney advised, in closed session, that the
city could not legally deny Furlong's preliminary plat.
A member of the city council indicated that, although
he thought Furlong's plan was "terrible," he argued in
favor of Furlong's preliminary plat to the other
members of the city council based on the advice of
that city attorney.
Nonetheless, the city council
voted to deny the preliminary plat application.

The overall course of conduct that the city undertook
as it reviewed and ultimately denied Furlong's
preliminary plat was substantial evidence for the trial
court to find that the city acted in a "truly irrational"
manner.

In the ten years leading up to and including Furlong's
plat application, there were 197 plat applications
submitted to the city for review. Of those, 196 were
approved, typically within one week of submission.
Only Furlong's preliminary plat was denied during

In its fourth point of error, the city argues that "the
trial court's award of damages was clearly erroneous
because there, was no substantial evidence to
support*172 a finding that the city proximately
caused the damages awarded to Furlong."
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Causation is an essential element of a sectioli
1983 action. Mor?oti 11. Bcclicr-, 793 F.2d 185, 187
(8th Cir.1986). In order to award damages, the trial
court had to determine that the city's conduct in
denying Furlong's preliminary plat proximately
caused the economic damage for which Furlong
seeks to recover. As stated previously, an appellate
court must sustain the judgment of the trial court
unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it
is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously
declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law.
M~rrphv,536 S.W.2d at 32.
There was substantial evidence in the trial court
to support a finding of proximate cause. Furlong
presented John Ward, an economic expert, to
establish its damages. Mr. Ward testified that the
earliest date Furlong's plat could have been.approved
was March 2, 2000, the date of the first P & Z
committee meeting. The trial court ordered the city
to approve Furlong's preliminary plat on November
29,2000. The plat was not finally approved until the
city complied with the order of the trial court on
December 14, 2000. This constitutes a delay of 287
days. Mr. Ward testified that the total commercial
economic damages suffered by Furlong as a result of
the denial of the preliminary plat and the resulting
287-day delay in development amounted to
$173,071.00.
This figure did not include a
$50,000.00 loan that Mr. Furlong took from his
retirement account and infused into the company.
The figure also omitted the costs of hydraseeding the
property to prevent erosion and runoff ($1,300.00)
and the loan fees incurred as the terms of the project
were continually revised based on the city's conduct
($500.00). The trial court appears to have accepted
Mr. Ward's damage calculations as well as the
testimony as to the retirement account loan, the cost
of hyrdraseeding, and the loan fees. These figures
total the $224,871.00 that the trial court awarded.
The city does not object to the amount of the
damages stated by Mr. Ward or the methodology he
used in calculating damages.

1331 The

cost of hydraseeding was caused by the
delay because Furlong incurred the expense of
maintaining property that would have been sold but
for the delay in approving Furlong's preliminary plat.
Likewise, the loan fees were directly attributable to
the delay as the loan terms had to be revised as the
city continued to prolong the process and ultimately
denied Furlong's preliminary plat. The $50,000.00
loan Mr. Furlong took from his retirement account,
however, is not allowable as delay damages. There

is no evidence that the retirement account loan h n d s
were used to pay expenses that were not already
accounted for in Mr. Ward's calculations or were
attributable to the delay.
The city makes two arguments that Furlong's
damages were not proximately caused by the city's
conduct in denying Furlong's preliminary plat. First,
the city asserts that Furlong should have sought
conditional building permits while the plat was being
considered or while the litigation was pending. The
city argues that any delay in construction on the site
could have been avoided had Furlong sought such
conditional permits. The city fails to reconcile its
argument with the fact that the contracts that Furlong
had with both Wendy's and Sonic were conditioned
on the land first being properly and finally platted
and subdivided. Moreover, the law simply does not
require a party to accept the risk of going forward
with construction of multi-million dollar facilities on
the basis of conditional building permits on land that
*I73 has not been finally platted and is the subject of
ongoing litigation.
The city also argues that Furlong caused the delay by
seeking de novo review of the city council's decision
rather than proceeding on the record made before the
city council. As already established, review de novo
was the proper procedure in this case.
Furlong
cannot be expected to sacrifice its right to proper
review for the sake of expediency.
There was substantial evidence for the trial court to
find that $174,871.00 of Furlong's damages were
proximately caused by the City's conduct in denying
the preliminary plat.FNS

FN5. The

city apparently does not contest
the award or amount of attorney's fees.

VI. Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court as to actual damages
is reduced to a sum of $174,871.00, and as modified
the judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
Mo.,2006.
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P
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
YorkU.S.N.Y., 1978.
Supreme Court of the United States
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY et al., Appellants,
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK et al.
No. 77-444.
Argued April 17, 1978.
Decided June 26, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1978.
See 439 U.S. 883,99 S.Ct. 226.
Following refusal of New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission to approve plans for
construction of 50-story office building over Grand
Central Terminal, which had been designated a
"landmark," the terminal owner filed suit charging,
inter alia, that application of landmarks preservation
law constituted a "taking" of the property without
just compensation and arbitrarily deprived owners of
their property without due process. The Supreme
Court, Trial Term, New York County, granted
injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, reversed.
The Court of Appeals, 42 N.Y.2d 324. 397 N.Y.S.2d
914, 366 N.E.2d 1271, affirmed, and owners
appealed. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan,
held that: (1) owners could not establish a "talung"
merely by showing that they had been denied the
right to exploit the superadjacent airspace,
irrespective of remainder of the parcel; (2) landmark
laws which embody a comprehensive plan to
preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest are
not discriminatory, like "reverse spot" zoning; (3)
that the law affected some owners more severely than
others did not itself result in a "taking," and (4) the
law did not interfere with owners' present use or
prevent it from realizing a reasonable rate of return
on its investment, especially since preexisting air
rights were transferable to other parcels in the
vicinity.
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in
which Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice
Stevens joined.
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believe that such review will be less effective than
would be so in case of zoning or any other context.
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414k251 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Owners of New York City railway terminal, which
was designated a "landmark," were not solely
burdened and unbenefitted by City's landmark Law
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numbers of structures in the City in addition to the
terminal and the law was enacted on basis of
legislative judgment that preservation of landmarks
benefits the citizenry economically as well as by
improving the overall quality of city life.
Administrative Code N.Y.
205- 1.O(a); General
Municiual Law N.Y. 6 96-a; U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 5,14.
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Health and
Environment, 4 14k 106)
Although New York City's landmark law applies only
to individual tracts, applicability of the law to large
number of parcels in the City provides an assurance
against arbitrariness. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej
205-l.O(a); General Municipal Law N.Y. f 96-a;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14.
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-
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148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.27 Environmental Protection
148k2.27(31 k. Historic Preservation;
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1))
Designating New York City railroad termination as a
"landmark" under New York City landmarks law no
more effectuated an appropriation of the air space
above the terminal for governmental use than a
zoning law appropriates property since the
designation simply prohibited owners or others from
occupying certain features of that space while
allowing them gainfully to use remainder of the
parcel. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej 205- 1.O(a);
General Municipal Law N.Y. 6
96-a;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14.
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148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.27 Environmental Protection
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation;
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1))
New York City's landmark law is not rendered
invalid because of failure to provide "just
compensation" whenever a landmark owner is
restricted in the exploitation of property interest, such
air rights, to a greater extent than provided for under
applicable zoning laws. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej
205-l.O(a); General Municipal Law N.Y. 4 96-a;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14.
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148 Eminent Domain
148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
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& What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.27 Environmental Protection
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation;
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1))
Designation of New York City railway terminal as a
"landmark" and concomitant refusal to permit
construction of 50-story office building over the
terminal did not constitute an interference of such
magnitude as to constitute a "taking" since the
"landmark" designation did not interfere with present
uses, owners were not completely prohibited from
occupying airspace above the terminal and
preexisting air r~ghtswere made transferable to at
least eight nearby parcels, one or two of which had
been found suitable for construction of new office
buildings. Administrative Code N.Y. Ej 205- 1.O(a);
General Mullici~al Law N.Y. (I
96-a;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,14.

1211Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(3)
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-

Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.27 Environmental Protection
148k2.27(3) k. Historic Preservation;
Landmarks. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(5), 148k2(1))
While ability to transfer preexisting air rights over
railroad terminal, which was designated a
"landmark," might not have constituted just
compensation if a taking had occurred, such rights
mitigated whatever financial burdens the landmark
law had imposed on terminal owners and, for such
reason, were to be taken into account in considering
impact of the regulation. Administrative Code N.Y.
Ej 205-1 .O(a); General Munici~alLaw N.Y. (I 96-a;
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5,u.
**2649 Syllabus FNI

j
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J

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part

of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader.
See United
States 11. Detr-oil Tinihcr & L~mil~er.
Co., 200
U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.

499.
"104 Under New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law (Landmarks Law), which was
enacted to protect historic landmarks and
neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy
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or fundamentally alter their character, the Landmarks
Preservation Commission (Commission) may
designate a building to be a "landmark" on a
particular "landmark site" or may designate an area
to be a "historic district." The Board of Estimate
may thereafter modify or disapprove the designation,
and the owner may seek judicial review of the final
designation decision. The owner of the designated
landmark must keep the building's exterior "in good
repair" and before exterior alterations are made must
secure Commission approval. Under two ordinances
owners of landmark sites may transfer development
rights from a landmark parcel to proximate lots.
Under the Landmarks Law, the Grand Central
Terminal (Terminal), which is owned by the Penn
Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates (Penn
Central) was designated a "landmark" and the block
it occupies a "landmark site."
Appellant Penn
Central, though opposing the designation before the
Commission, did not seek judicial review of the final
designation decision.
Thereafter appellant Penn
Central entered into a lease with appellant UGP
Properties, whereby UGP was to construct a
multistory office building over the Terminal. After
the Commission had rejected appellants' plans for the
building as destructive of the Terminal's historic and
aesthetic features, with no judicial review thereafter
being sought, appellants brought suit in state court
claiming that the application of the Landmarks Law
had "taken" their property without just compensation
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and arbitrarily deprived them of their property
without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court's grant of
relief was reversed on appeal, the New York Court of
Appeals ultimately concluding that there was no
"taking" since the Landmarks Law had not
transferred control of the property to the city, but
only restricted appellants' exploitation of it; and that
there was no denial of due process because (1) the
same use of the Terminal was permitted as before;
(2) the appellants had not shown that they could not
earn a reasonable return on their investment*l05 in
the Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper
could never operate at a reasonable profit, some of
the income from Penn Central's extensive real estate
holdings in the area must realistically be imputed to
the Terminal; and (4) the development rights above
the Terminal, which were made transferable to
numerous sites in the vicinity, provided significant
compensation for loss of rights above the Terminal
itself. Held: The application of the Landmarks Law
to the Terminal property does not constitute a
"talung" of appellants' property within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the

States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
2666.

Pp. 2559-

(a) In a wide variety of contexts the government
may execute laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values without its action
constituting a "taking," and in instances such as
zoning laws where a state tribunal has reasonably
concluded that "the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld
land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely
affected real property interests. In many instances
use restrictions that served a substantial public
purpose have been upheld against "talung"
challenges, e. 2.. Goldblatt v. Hem~stead,369 U.S.
590. 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130: Hadc~chrckv.
Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394. 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348,
though a state statute that substantially furthers
important public policies may so frustrate distinct
to
investment-backed expectations as ""2650
constitute a "taking," e. p.. Pennsvh~aninCoal Co. I).
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393. 43 S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322,
and government acquisitions of resources to permit
uniquely public functions constitute "talungs," a
United States v. Catuh11.328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062,
90 L.Ed. 1206. Pp. 2659-2662.
(b) In deciding whether particular governmental
action has effected a "taking," the character of the
action and nature and extent of the interference with
property rights (here the city tax block designated as
the "landmark site") are focused upon, rather than
discrete segments thereof. Consequently, appellants
cannot establish a "taking" simply by showing that
they have been denied the ability to exploit the superjacent airspace, irrespective of the remainder of
appellants' parcel. Pp. 2662-2663.
(c) Though diminution in property value alone, as
may result from a zoning law, cannot establish a
"taking," as appellants concede, they urge that the
regulation of individual landmarks is different
because it applies only to selected properties. But it
does not follow that landmark laws, which embody a
comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic
or aesthetic interest, are discriminatory, like "reverse
spot" zoning. Nor can it be successfully contended
that designation of a landmark involves only a matter
of taste and therefore will inevitably "106 lead to
arbitrary results, for judicial review is available and
there is no reason to believe it will be less effective
than would be so in the case of zoning or any other
context. Pp. 2663-2664.
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(d) That the Landmarks Law affects some
landowners more severely than others does not itself
result in "taking," for that is often the case with
general welfare and zoning legislation.
Nor,
contrary to appellants' contention, are they solely
burdened and unbenefited by the Landmarks Law,
which has been extensively applied and was enacted
on the basis of the legislative judgment that the
preservation of landmarks benefits the citizenry both
economically and by improving the overall quality of
city life. Pp. 2664-2665.
(e) The Landmarks Law no more effects an
appropriation of the airspace above the Terminal for
governmental uses than would a zoning law
appropriate property; it simply prohibits appellants
or others from occupying certain features of that
space while allowing appellants gainfully to use the
remainder of the parcel. United States v. Causby,
supra, distinguished. P. 2665.
(f) The Landmarks Law, which does not interfere
with the Terminal's present uses or prevent Penn
Central from realizing a "reasonable return" on its
investment, does not impose the drastic limitation on
appellants' ability to use the air rights above the
Terminal that appellants claim, for on this record
there is no showing that a smaller, harmonizing
structure would not be authorized. Moreover, the
pre-existing air rights are made transferable to other
parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, thus
mitigating whatever financial burdens appellants
have incurred. Pp. 2665-2666.

its owners' property in violation**2651
and Fourteenth Amendments.

of the Fifth

Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500
municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or
require the preservation of buildings and areas with
historic or aesthetic importance.= These nationwide
legislative efforts have been "108 precipitated by
two concerns. The first is recognition that, in recent
years, large numbers of historic structures,
landmarks, and areas have been destroyed FN2 without
adequate consideration of either the values
represented therein or the possibility of preserving
the destroyed properties for use in economically
productive ways.
The second is a widely shared
belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or
architectural significance enhance the quality of life
for all.
Not only do these buildings and their
workmanship represent the lessons of the past and
embody precious features of our heritage, they serve
"[Hlistoric
as examples of quality for today.
conservation is but one aspect of the much larger
problem, basically an environmental one, of
enhancing-or perhaps developing for the first timethe quality of life for people." FN4

FNI.

42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 366 N.E.2d
1271,affirmed.

Daniel M. Gribbon, Washington, D. C., for
appellants.
Leonard J. Koerner, New York City, for appellees.
Patricia M. Wald, Washington, D. C., for the U. S.,
as amicus curiae, by special leave of Court.
*I07 Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion
of the Court.
The question presented is whether a city may, as part
of a comprehensive program to preserve historic
landmarks and historic districts, place restrictions on
the development of individual historic landmarks-in
addition to those imposed by applicable zoning
ordinances-without effecting a "taking" requiring the
payment of "just compensation." Specifically, we
must decide whether the application of New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law to the parcel of
land occupied by Grand Central Terminal has "taken"

See National Trust for Historic
Preservation, A Guide to State Historic
Preservation Programs (1976); National
Trust for Historic Preservation, Directory of
Landmark
and
Historic
District
Commissions (1976). In addition to these
state and municipal legislative efforts,
Congress has determined that "the historical
and cultural foundations of the Nation
should be preserved as a living part of our
community life and development in order to
give a sense of orientation to the American
people," National Historic Preservation Act
of 1966, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U.S.C. 6 470(b)
(1976 ed.), and has enacted a series of
measures
designed
to
encourage
preservation of sites and structures of
historic,
architectural,
or
cultural
significance.
See generally Gray, The
Response of Federal Legislation to Historic
Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 14
(197 1 ).
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FN2. Over one-half of the buildings listed in
the Historic American Buildings Survey,
begun by the Federal Government in 1933,
have been destroyed. See Costonis, The
Chicarlo Plan: Incentive Zoning and the
Preservation of Urban Landmarks. 85
Harv.L.Rev. 574, 574 n. 1 (19721, citing
Huxtable, Bank's Building Plan Sets Off
Debate on "Progress," N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1971, section 8, p. 1, col. 2.

FN3.

See, e. g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code, $
205-1 .O(a) (1976).

FN4. Gilbert,
-

Introduction, Precedents for
the Future, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 11,
3 12 (1971), quoting address by Robert Stipe,
1971 Conference on Preservation Law,
Washington, D. C., May 1, 1971
(unpublished text, pp. 6-7).
New York City, responding to similar concerns and
acting "109 pursuant to a New York State enabling
A C ~adopted
, ~ its Landmarks Preservation Law in
1965. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, $ 205-1.0
el seq. (1976). The city acted from the conviction
that "the standing of [New York City] as a worldwide tourist center and world capital of business,
culture and government" would be threatened if
legislation were not enacted to protect historic
landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate
decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter their
character. $ 205-l.O(a). The city believed that
comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable
features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its
citizens in a variety of ways: e. g., fostering "civic
pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the
past"; protecting and enhancing "the city's attractions
to tourists and visitors"; "support[ing] and stimul
[ating] business and industry"; "strengthen[ing] the
economy of the city"; and promoting "the use of
historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and
scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and
welfare of the people of the city." $ 205-1 .O(b).
FN5.
-

See N.Y.Gen.Mun.Law #
96-a
{McKinnev 1977). It declares that it is the
public policy of the State of New York to
preserve structures and areas with special
historical or aesthetic interest or value and
authorizes local governments to impose
reasonable restrictions to perpetuate such
structures and areas.

The New York City law is typical of many urban
landmark laws in that its primary method of
achieving its goals is not by **2652 acquisitions of
historic properties,w but rather by involving public
entities in land-use decisions affecting these
properties "110 and providing services, standards,
controls, and incentives that will encourage
preservation by private owners and users.:N7 While
the law does place special restrictions on landmark
properties as a necessary feature to the attainment of
its larger objectives, the major theme of the law is to
ensure the owners of any such properties both a
"reasonable return" on their investments and
maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes
not inconsistent with the preservation goals.
FN6. The
-

consensus is that widespread
public ownership of historic properties in
urban settings is neither feasible nor wise.
Public ownership reduces the tax base,
burdens the public budget with costs of
acquisitions and maintenance, and results in
the preservation of public buildings as
museums and similar facilities, rather than
as economically productive features of the
urban scene. See Wilson & Winkler, The
Response of State Legislation to Historic
Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob.
329,330-33 1,339-340 (197 1).
FN7. See Costonis, supra
-

n.2, at 580-581;
Wilson & Winkler, supra n.6; Ranlun,
Operation and Interpretation of the New
York City Landmark Preservation Law, 36
Law & Contemp. Prob. 366 (1971).

The operation of the law can be briefly summarized.
The primary responsibility for administering the law
is vested in the Landmarks Preservation Commission
(Commission), a broad based, I 1-member agency
assisted by a technical staff. The Commission first
performs the function, critical to any landmark
preservation effort, of identifying properties and
areas that have "a special character or special
historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the
development, heritage or cultural characteristics of
the city, state or nation." $ 207-1 .O(n); see Q 2071 .O(h). If the Commission determines, after giving
all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, that a
building or area satisfies the ordinance's criteria, it
will designate a building to be a "landmark," Q 207l.O(n),
situatedxlll on a particular "landmark
site," $ 207-1.0(0 ),
or will designate an area to
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After the
be a "historic district," jj 207-l.O(h).
Commission makes a designation, New York City's
Board of Estimate, after considering the relationship
of the designated property "to the master plan, the
zoning resolution, projected public improvements
and any plans for the renewal of the area involved," jj
207-2.0(g)(l), may modify or disapprove the
designation, and the owner may seek **2653 judicial
review of the final designation decision. Thus far,
3 1 historic districts and over 400 individual
d , ~the
landmarks have been finally d e ~ i ~ n a t e and
process is a continuing one.

FNs.

The ordinance creating
the
Commission requires that it include at least
three architects, one historian qualified in
the field, one city planner or landscape
architect, one realtor, and at least one
resident of each of the city's five boroughs.
N.Y.C. Charter jj 534 (1976). In addition
to the ordinance's requirements concerning
the composition of the Commission, there is,
according to a former chairman, a "prudent
tradition" that the Commission include one
or two lawyers, preferably with experience
in municipal government, and several
laymen with no specialized qualifications
other than concern for the good of the city.
Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts,
36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 379, 384-385
(1971).

FN9.

" 'Landmark.'
Any improvement, any
part of which is thirty years old or older,
which has a special character or special
historical or aesthetic interest or value as
part of the development, heritage or cultural
characteristics of the city, state or nation and
which has been designated as a landmark
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."
4 207-1 .O(n).

FN 10. " 'Landmark site.' An improvement
parcel or part thereof on which is situated a
landmark and any abutting improvement
parcel or part thereof used as and
constituting part of the premises on which
the landmark is situated, and which has been
designated as a landmark site pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter." jj 207-1.0(0 ).

FNII.

" 'Historic district.'
Any area which:
(1) contains improvements which: (a) have
a special character or special historical or

aesthetic interest or value; and (b) represent
one or more periods or styles of architecture
typical of one or more eras in the history of
the city; and (c) cause such area, by reason
of such factors, to constitute a distinct
section of the city; and (2) has been
designated as a historic district pursuant to
jj 207the provisions of this chapter."
l.O(h).
The Act also provides for the
designation of a "scenic landmark," see #
207-1 .O(w), and an "interior landmark."
See 4 207-1 .O(m).

FN 12. See Landmarks
Preservation
Commission of the City of New York,
Landmarks and Historic Districts. (1977).
Although appellants are correct in noting
that some of the designated landmarks are
publicly owned, the vast majority are, like
Grand Central Terminal, privately owned
structures.
Final designation as a landmark results in restrictions
upon the property owner's options concerning use of
the landmark site. First, the law imposes a duty
upon the owner to keep the exterior features of the
building "in good' repair" to assure that the law's
objectives not be defeated by the landmark's "112
falling into a state of irremediable disrepair. See #
207-lO.O(a). Second, the Commission must approve
in advance any proposal to alter the exterior
archtectural features of the landmark or to construct
any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus
ensuring that decisions concerning construction on
the landmark site are made with due consideration of
both the public interest in the maintenance of the
structure and the landowner's interest in use of the
property. See jj jj 207-4.0 to 207-9.0.
In the event an owner wishes to alter a landmark site,
three separate procedures are available through which
administrative approval may be obtained. First, the
owner may apply to the Commission for a "certificate
of no effect on protected architectural features": that
is, for an order approving the improvement or
alteration on the ground that it will not change or
affect any architectural feature of the landmark and
will be in harmony therewith.
See jj 207-5.0.
Denial of the certificate is subject to judicial review.
Second, the owner may apply to the Commission for
a certificate of .''appropriateness." See jj 207-6.0.
Such certificates will be granted if the Commission
concludes-focusing upon aesthetic, historical, and
architectural values-that the proposed construction on
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the landmark site would not unduly hinder the
protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the
landmark. Again, denial of the certificate is subject
to judicial review. Moreover, the owner who is
denied either a certificate of no exterior effect or a
certificate of appropriateness may submit an
alternative or modified plan for approval. The final
procedure-seeking a certificate of appropriateness on
the ground of "insufficient return," see 4 207-8.0provides special mechanisms, which vary depending
on whether or not the landmark enjoys a tax
exemption,m to ensure **2654 that designation
does not cause economic hardship.

FN13. If the owner of a non-tax-exempt
parcel has been denied certificates of
appropriateness for a proposed alteration
and shows that he is not earning a
reasonable return on the property in its
present state, the Commission and other city
agencies must assume the burden of
developing a plan that will enable the
landmark owner to earn a reasonable return
on the landmark site.
The plan may
include, but need not be limited to, partial or
complete tax exemption, remission of taxes,
and
authorizations
for
alterations,
construction, or reconstruction appropriate
for and not inconsistent with the purposes of
the law. jj 207-8.0(c). The owner is free
to accept or reject a plan devised by the
Commission and approved by the other city
agencies.
If he accepts the plan, he
proceeds to operate the property pursuant to
the plan.
If he rejects the plan, the
Commission may recommend that the city
proceed by eminent domain to acquire a
protective interest in the landmark, but if the
city does not do so within a specified time
period, the Commission must issue a notice
allowing the property owner to proceed with
the alteration or improvement as originally
proposed in his application for a certificate
of appropriateness.
Tax-exempt structures are treated somewhat
differently.
They become eligible for special
treatment only if four preconditions are satisfied: (1)
the owner previously entered into an agreement to
sell the parcel that was contingent upon the issuance
of a certificate of approval; (2) the property, as it
exists at the time of the request, is not capable of
earning a reasonable retum; (3) the structure is no
longer suitable to its past or present purposes; and
(4) the prospective buyer intends to alter the

landmark structure.
In the event the owner
demonstrates that the property in its present state is
not earning a reasonable return, the Commission
must either find another buyer for it or allow the sale
and construction to proceed.
But this is not the only remedy available for owners
of tax-exempt landmarks.
As the case at bar
illustrates, see infra, at 2658, if an owner files suit
and establishes that he is incapable of earning a
"reasonable retum" on the site in its present state, he
can be afforded judicial relief. Similarly, where a
landmark owner who enjoys a tax exemption has
demonstrated that the landmark structure, as
restricted, is totally inadequate for the owner's
"legitimate needs," the law has been held invalid as
applied to that parcel. See Lrrtherrrn Chirrch V . Citv
o f N e w York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 316
N.E.2d 305 (1974).
"113 Although the designation of a landmark and
landmark site restricts the owner's control over the
parcel, designation also enhances the economic
position of the landmark owner in one significant
respect.
Under New York City's zoning laws,
owners of real property who have not developed their
property *I14 to the full extent permitted by the
applicable zoning laws are allowed to transfer
development rights to contiguous parcels on the same
city block. See New York City, Zoning Resolution
Art. I, ch. 2, 8 12-10 (1978) (definition of "zoning
lot").
A 1968 ordinance gave the owners of
.landmark sites additional opportunities to transfer
development rights to other parcels. Subject to a
restriction that the floor area of the transferee lot may
not be increased by more than 20% above its
authorized level, the ordinance permitted transfers
from a landmark parcel to property across the street
or across a street intersection.
In 1969, the law
governing the conditions under which transfers from
landmark parcels could occur was liberalized, see
New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793,
apparently to ensure that the Landmarks Law would
not unduly restrict the development options of the
owners of Grand Central Terminal. See Marcus, Air
Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 372, 375 (1971).
The class of
recipient lots was expanded to include lots "across a
street and opposite to another lot or lots which except
for the intervention of streets or street intersections f
[orlm a series extending to the lot occupied by the
landmark building [, provided that] all lots [are] in
the same ownership."
New York City Zoning
. ~addition,
Resolution 74-79 (emphasis d e ~ e t e d ) In
the 1969 amendment permits, in highly
cornmercialized*115 areas like midtown Manhattan,
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the transfer of all unused development rights to a
single parcel. Ibid.
FN14. To obtain
-

approval for a proposed
transfer, the landmark owner must follow
First, he must
the following procedure.
obtain the permission of the Commission
which will examine the plans for the
development of the transferee lot to
determine whether the planned construction
would be compatible with the landmark.
Second, he must obtain the approbation of
New York City's Planning Commission
which will focus on the effects of the
transfer on occupants of the buildings in the
vicinity of the transferee lot and whether the
landmark owner will preserve the landmark.
Finally, the matter goes to the Board of
Estimate, which has final authority to grant
or deny the application. See also Costonis,
supra n.2, at 585-586 (1972).

This case involves the application of New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central
Terminal (Terminal). The Terminal, which is owned
by the Penn Central Transportation Co. and its
affiliates (Penn Central), is one of New York City's
most famous buildings.
Opened in 1913, it is
regarded not only as providing an ingenious
engineering solution to the problems presented by
urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent
example of the French beaux-arts style.
The Terminal is located in midtown Manhattan. Its
south facade faces 42d Street and that street's
intersection with Park Avenue. At street level, the
Terminal is bounded on the west by Vanderbilt
Avenue, on the east by the Commodore Hotel, and on
the north by the Pan-American Building. Although a
20-story office tower, to have been located above the
Terminal, was part of the original design, the planned
~ Terminal itself
tower was never c o n ~ t r u c t e d .The
is an eight-story structure which Penn **2655 Central
uses as a railroad station and in which it rents space
not needed for railroad purposes to a variety of
commercial interests. The Terminal is one of a
number of properties owned by appellant Penn
Central in this area of midtown Manhattan. The
others include the Barclay, Biltmore, Commodore,
Roosevelt, and Waldorf-Astoria Hotels, the PanAmerican Building and other office buildings along
Park Avenue, and the Yale Club. At least eight of

these are eligible to be recipients of development
rights afforded the Terminal by virtue of landmark
designation.
FN 15. The Terminal's present foundation
includes columns, which were built into it
for the express purpose of supporting the
proposed 20-story tower.
On August 2, 1967, following a public hearing, the
Commission designated the Terminal a "landmark"
and designated the *I16 "city tax block" it occupies
a "landmark site."
The Board of Estimate
confirmed this action on September 21, 1967.
Although appellant Penn Central had opposed the
designation before the Commission, it did not seek
judicial review of the final designation decision.
FN 16. The Commission's report stated:
"Grand Central Station, one of the great buildings of
America, evokes a spirit that is unique in this City.
It combines distinguished architecture with a brilliant
engineering solution, wedded to one of the most
fabulous railroad terminals of our time. Monumental
in scale, this great building functions as well today as
it did when built. In style, it represents the best of
the French Beaux Arts." Record 2240.
On January 22, 1968, appellant Penn Central, to
increase its income, entered into a renewable 50-year
lease and sublease agreement with appellant UGP
Properties, Inc. (UGP), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom
corporation. Under the terms of the agreement, UGP
was to construct a multistory ofice building above
the Terminal. UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1
million annually during construction and at least $3
million annually thereafter. The rentals would be
offset in part by a loss of some $700,000 to $1
million in net rentals presently received from
concessionaires displaced by the new building.
Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied to
the Commission for permission to construct an office
building atop the Terminal. Two separate plans,
both designed by architect Marcel Breuer and both
apparently satisfying the terms of the applicable
zoning ordinance, were submitted to the Commission
for approval. The first, Breuer 1, provided for the
construction of a 55-story office building, to be
cantilevered above the existing facade and to rest on
the roof of the Terminal. The second, Breuer I1
~ e v i s e dcalled
, ~ for tearing *I17 down a portion
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of the Terminal that included the 42d Street facade,
stripping off some of the remaining features of the
Terminal's facade, and constructing a 53-story office
building. The Commission denied a certificate of no
exterior effect on September 20, 1968. Appellants
then applied for a certificate of "appropriateness" as
to both proposals. After four days of hearings at
which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission
denied this application as to both proposals.

FN17.

Appellants also submitted a plan,
denominated Breuer 11, to the Commission.
However, because appellants learned that
Breuer I1 would have violated existing
easements, they substituted Breuer I1
Revised for Breuer 11, and the Commission
evaluated the appropriateness only of Breuer
I1 Revised.

The Commission's reasons for rejecting certificates
respecting Breuer I1 Revised are summarized in the
following statement: "To protect a Landmark, one
does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural
features, one does not strip them off." Record 2255.
Breuer I, which would have preserved the existing
vertical facades of the present structure, received
more sympathetic consideration. The Commission
first focused on the effect that the proposed tower
would have on one desirable feature created by the
present structure and its surroundings: the dramatic
view of the Terminal from Park Avenue South.
Although appellants had contended that the PanAmerican Building had already destroyed the
silhouette of the south facade and that one additional
tower could do no **2656 hrther damage and might
even provide a better background for the facade, the
Commission disagreed, stating that it found the
majestic approach from the south to be still unique in
the city and that a 55-story tower atop the Terminal
would be far more detrimental to its south facade
than the Pan-American Building 375 feet away.
Moreover, the Commission found that from closer
vantage points the Pan Am Building and the other
towers were largely cut off from view, which would
not be the case of the mass on top of the Terminal
planned under Breuer I.
In conclusion, the
Commission stated:
"[We have] no fixed rule against making additions to
designated buildings-it all depends on how they are
done . . . . But to balance a 55-story office tower
above *I18 a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems
nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply,
the tower would overwhelm the Tefminal by its sheer
mass. The 'addition' would be four times as high as

the existing structure and would reduce the Landmark
itself to the status of a curiosity.
"Landmarks cannot be divorced from their settingsparticularly when the setting is a dramatic and
integral part of the original concept. The Terminal,
in its setting, is a great example of urban design.
Such examples are not so plentiful in New York City
that we can afford to lose any of the few we have.
And we must preserve them in a meaningful waywith alterations and additions of such character,
scale, materials and mass as will protect, enhance and
perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm
it." Id., at 2251.

FN18. In discussing Breuer I, the
Commission also referred to a number of
instances in which it had approved additions
to landmarks: "The office and reception
wing added to Gracie Mansion and the
school and church house added to the 12th
Street side of the First Presbyterian Church
are examples that harmonize in scale,
material and character with the structures
they adjoin. The new Watch Tower Bible
and Tract Society building on Brooklyn
Heights, though completely modem in
idiom, respects the qualities of its
surroundings and will enhance the Brooklyn
Heights Historic District, as Butterfield
House enhances West 12th Street, and
Breuer's own Whitney Museum.its Madison
Avenue locale." Record 225 1.
Appellants did not seek judicial review of the denial
of either certificate.
Because the Terminal site
enjoyed a tax exemption,w remained suitable for its
present and future uses, and was not the subject of a
contract of sale, there were no further administrative
remedies available to appellants as to the Breuer I
and Breuer I1 Revised plans.
See n. 13, supra.
Further, appellants did not avail themselves of the
opportunity to develop *I19 and submit other plans
for the Commission's consideration and approval.
Instead, appellants filed suit in New York Supreme
Court, Trial Term, claiming, inter. alia, that the
application of the Landmarks Preservation Law had
"taken" their property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and arbitrarily deprived them of their property
without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellants sought a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the
city from using the Landmarks Law to impede the
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construction of any structure that might otherwise
lawfilly be constructed on the Terminal site, and
damages for the "temporary taking" that occurred
between August 2, 1967, the designation date, and
the date when the restrictions arising from the
Landmarks Law would be lifted. The trial court
granted the injunctive and declaratory relief, but
severed the question of damages for a "temporary
talung."

increase the Terminal's commercial income by
transforming vacant or underutilized space to
revenue-producing use, or that the unused
development rights over the Terminal could not have
been profitably transferred to one or more nearby
site^.^ The Appellate Division concluded that all
appellants had succeeded in showing was that they
had been deprived of the property's most profitable
use, and that this showing did not establish that
appellants had been unconstitutionally deprived of
their property.

FN19. See N.Y. Real Prou. Tax Law Ci 489aa et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1977).
FN20. Although that court suggested that
any regulation of private property to protect
landmark values was unconstitutional if
"just compensation" were not afforded, it
also appeared to rely upon its findings: first,
that the cost to P e m Central of operating the
Terminal building itself, exclusive of purely
railroad operations, exceeded the revenues
received from concessionaires and tenants in
the Terminal; and second, that the special
transferable development rights afforded
Penn Central as an owner of a landmark site
did not "provide compensation to plaintiffs
or minimize the harm suffered by plaintiffs
due to the designation of the Terminal as a
landmark."
**2657 111 Appellees appealed, and the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. 50
A.D.2d 265,377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975). The Appellate
Division held that the restrictions on the development
of the Terminal site were necessary to promote the
legitimate public purpose of protecting landmarks
and therefore that appellants could sustain their
constitutional claims only by proof that the regulation
deprived them of all reasonable beneficial use of the
property.
The Appellate Division held that the
*I20 introduced at trialevidence appellants
"Statements of Revenues and Costs," purporting to
show a net operating loss for the years 1969 and
1971, which were prepared for the instant litigationhad not satisfied their b ~ r d e n .First,
~
the court
rejected the claim that these statements showed that
the Terminal was operating at a loss, for in the court's
view, appellants had improperly attributed some
railroad operating expenses and taxes to their real
estate operations and compounded that error by
failing to impute any rental value to the vast space in
the Terminal devoted to railroad purposes. Further,
the Appellate Division concluded that appellants had
failed to establish either that they were unable to

FN2 1. These statements appear to have
reflected the costs of maintaining the
exterior architectural features of the
Terminal in "good repair" as required by the
law. As would have been apparent in any
case therefore, the existence of the duty to
keep up the property was here-and will
presumably always be-factored into the
inquiry concerning the constitutionality of
the landmark restrictions.
The Appellate Division also rejected the claim that
an agreement of Penn Central with the Metropolitan
Transit Authority and the Connecticut Transit
Authority provided a basis for invalidating the
application of the Landmarks Law.
FN22. The record reflected that Penn
Central had given serious consideration to
transferring some of those rights to either
the Biltmore Hotel or the Roosevelt Hotel.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 42
N.Y.2d 324. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 366 N.E.2d 1271
(1977). That court summarily rejected any claim
that the Landmarks Law had "taken" *I21 property
without "just compensation," id.. at 329, 397
N.Y.S.2d. at 917, 366 N.E.2d. at 1274, indicating that
there could be no "talung" since the law had not
transferred control of the property to the city, but
only restricted appellants' exploitation of it. In that
circumstance, the Court of Appeals held that
appellants' attack on the law could prevail only if the
law deprived appellants of their property in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether or not there was a denial of
substantive due process turned on whether the
restrictions deprived Penn Central of a "reasonable
return" on the "privately created and privately
managed ingredient" of the Terminal. Id., at 328,
397 N.Y.S.2d. at 916, 366 N.E.2d. at 1 2 7 3 . ' ~ ~ 'The
Court of **2658 Appeals concluded that the
Landmarks Law had not effected a denial of due
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process because:
(1) the landmark regulation
permitted the same use as had been made of the
Terminal for more than half a century; (2) the
appellants had failed to show that they could not earn
a reasonable return on their investment in the
Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper could
never operate at a reasonable profit some of the
income from Penn Central's extensive real estate
holdings in the area, which include hotels and office
buildings, must realistically be imputed to the
Terminal; and "122 (4) the development rights
above the Terminal, which had been made
transferable to numerous sites in the vicinity of the
Terminal, one or two of which were suitable for the
construction of office buildings, were valuable to
appellants and provided "significant, perhaps 'fair,'
compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal
itself." Id.. at 333-336. 397 N.Y.S.2d. at 922, 366
N.E.2d. at 1276-1278.

FN23. The Court of Appeals suggested that
in calculating the value of the property upon
which appellants were entitled to earn a
reasonable return, the "publicly created
components of the value of the property-i.
e., those elements of its value attributable to
the "efforts of organized society" or to the
"social complex" in which the Terminal is
located-had to be excluded. However, since
the record upon which the Court of Appeals
decided the case did not, as that court
recognized, contain a basis for segregating
the privately created from the publicly
created elements of the value of the
Terminal site and since the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in any event rests upon
bases that support our aMirmance see infra,
this page, we have no occasion to address
the question whether it is permissible or
feasible to separate out the "social
increments" of the value of property. See
Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context
for the Grand Cen~ralTerminal Decision,
91 Harv.L.Rev. 402,416-4 17 (1977).
Observing that its affirmance was "[oln the present
record," and that its analysis had not been fully
developed by counsel at any level of the New York
judicial system, the Court of Appeals directed that
counsel "should be entitled to present . . . any
additional submissions which, in the light of [the
court's] opinion, may usefully develop further the
factors discussed." Id., at 337, 397 N.Y.S.2d, at 922,
366 N.E.2d. at 1279. Appellants chose not to avail

themselves of this opportunity and filed a notice of
appeal in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction.
434 U.S. 983 (19771. We affirm.

The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether
the restrictions imposed by New York City's law
upon appellants' exploitation of the Terminal site
effect a "taking" of appellants' property for a public
use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
which of course is made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicapo, B.
& 0. R. Co. v. Chicapo. 166 U.S. 226, 239, 17 S.Ct.
581. 585. 41 L.Ed. 979 (18971, and, (23, if so,
whether the transferable development rights afforded
appellants constitute "just compensation" w i t h the
meaning of the Fifth ~ r n e n d m e n t .We
~ need only
address the question whether a "taking" has
occ~rred.~

FN24. Our statement of the issues is a
distillation of four questions presented in the
jurisdictional statement:
"Does the social and cultural desirability of
preserving historical landmarks through government
regulation derogate from the constitutional
requirement that just compensation be paid for
private property taken for public use?
"Is Penn Central entitled to no compensation for that
large but unmeasurable portion of the value of its
rights to construct an office building over the Grand
Central Terminal that is said to have been created by
the efforts of 'society as an organized entity'?
"Does a finding that Penn Central has failed to
establish that there is no possibility, without
exercising its development rights, of earning a
reasonable return on all of its remaining properties
that benefit in any way from the operations of the
Grand Central Terminal warrant the conclusion that
no compensation need be paid for the talung of those
rights?
"Does the possibility accorded to Penn Central,
under the landmark-preservation regulation, of
realizing some value at some time by transferring the
Terminal development rights to other buildings,
under a procedure that is conceded to be defective,
severely limited, procedurally complex and
speculative, and that requires ultimate discretionary
approval by governmental authorities, meet the
constitutional requirements of just compensation as
applied to landmarks?" Jurisdictional Statement 3-4.
The first and fourth questions assume that there has
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been a taking and raise the problem whether, under
the circumstances of this case, the transferable
development rights constitute "just compensation."
The second and third questions, on the other hand,
are directed to the issue whether a taking has
occurred.
FN25. As is implicit in our opinion, we do
not embrace the proposition that a "taking"
can never occur unless government has
transferred physical control over a portion of
a parcel.

Before considering appellants' specific
contentions, it will be useful to review **2659 the
factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth
Amendment injunction "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a
problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court
has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole," Armstrong v. United States,
364 *124U.S.
40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4
L.Ed.2d 1554 (19601, this Court, quite simply, has
been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
See Goldblatl v. Hemuslead, 369 U.S. 590, 594. 82
S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). Indeed, we
have frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the
government's failure to pay for any losses
proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the
particular circumstances [in that] case." United
States v. Central Eirreka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155,
168, 78 S.Ct. 1097, 1104. 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (1958);
see United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156,
73 S.Ct. 200,203.97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several
factors that have particular significance.
The
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.
See Goldhlutt v. Henzpstead, supru, 369 U.S.. at 594,

82 S.Ct.. at 990. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "talung" may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government,
see, e. g..United Stutes v. Cni~shv,328 U.S. 256. 66
S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946L than when
interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general
law," Pennsvlvanicr Coal Co. v. Muhon. 260 U.S.
393.413.43 S.Ct. 158. 159.67 L.Ed. 322 (1922, and
this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide
variety of contexts, that government may execute
laws or programs that adversely affect recognized
economic values. Exercises of the taxing power are
one obvious example. A second are the decisions in
which this Court has dismissed "taking" challenges
on the ground that, while the challenged government
action caused *I25 economic harm, it did not
interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound
up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to
constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes.
See, e. g.. United States v. Willo14t River Power Co.,
324 U.S. 499, 65 S.Ct. 761, 89 L.Ed. 1101 (1945)
(interest in high-water level of river for runoff for
tailwaters to maintain power head is not property);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Wcrter.P o ~ w rCo.,
229 U.S. 53, 33 S.Ct. 667, 57 L.Ed. 1063 (1913) (no
property interest can exist in navigable waters); see
also Dernoresl v. Citv Bunk Co.. 321 U.S. 36, 64
S.Ct 384, 88 L.Ed. 526 (1944); M~rhlkerv. Hurlem
R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 25 S.Ct. 522, 49 L.Ed. 872
(1905); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale
L.J. 36,61-62 (1964).
More importantly for the present case, in instances in
which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that "the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses
of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations
that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real
property interests. See N e c t o ~v.~ Cambrid~c.277
U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842
(1928).
Zoning laws are, of course, the classic
example, see **2660Euclicl v. Anihler Renlhi Co..
272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926)
(prohibition of industrial use); Gorich
Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608, 47 S.Ct. 675, 677, 71 L.Ed. 1228
(requirement that portions of parcels be left
unbuilt); JYelck v. S~vn.sey,214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct.
567. 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909) (height restriction), which
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have been viewed as permissible governmental action
even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the
property. See Goldhlatt v. Hernpstead, .supr-u. 369
U.S., at 592-593, 82 S.Ct., at 988-989, and cases
cited; see also Eastlake 11. Forest Citv Enter~rises~
Inc.. 426 U.S. 668, 674, n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2362 n.
8.49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976).
Zoning laws generally do not affect existing uses of
real property, but "taking" challenges have also been
held to be without merit in a wide variety of
situations when the challenged g&ernmental actions
prohibited a beneficial use to which individual
parcels had previously been devoted and thus caused
substantial individualized harm. Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246. 72 L.Ed. 568 (19281, is
illustrative. In that case, a state entomologist, acting
*I26 the
pursuant to a state statute, ordered
claimants to cut down a large number of ornamental
red cedar trees because they produced cedar rust fatal
to apple trees cultivated nearby.
Although the
statute provided for recovery of any expense incurred
in removing the cedars, and permitted claimants to
use the felled trees, it did not provide compensation
for the value of the standing trees or for the resulting
decrease in market value of the properties as a whole.
A unanimous Court held that this latter omission did
not render the statute invalid. The Court held that
the State might properly make "a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the
other" and since the apple industry was important in
the State involved, concluded that the State had not
exceeded "its constitutional powers by deciding upon
the destruction of one class of property [without
compensation] in order to save another which, in the
judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the
public." Id.. at 279.48 S.Ct., at 247.
Again, Hadaclzech- v. Sebrrstiun, 239 U.S. 394, 36
S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (19151 upheld a law
prohibiting the claimant from continuing his
otherwise lawful business of operating a brickyard in
a particular physical community on the ground that
the legislature had reasonably concluded that the
presence of the brickyard was inconsistent with
neighboring uses. See also United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., supra (Government order closing
gold mines so that skilled miners would be available
for other mining work held not a taktng); Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Conrni'n, 346
U.S. 346. 74 S.Ct. 92, 98 L.Ed. 51 (1953) (railroad
may be required to share cost of constructing railroad
grade improvement); Wulls v. Midlrrnd Crn-)>onCo.,
254 U.S. 300,41 S.Ct. 11 8.65 L.Ed. 276 (1920) (law
prohibiting manufacture of carbon black upheld);

Rcinn1ar1 I). Little Rocli. 237 U.S. 17 1 , 35 S.Ct. 5 1 1 ,
59 L.Ed. 900 (191 51 (law prohibiting livery stable
upheld); Mi~rlerv. Kon.~a.r, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct.
273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887) (law prohibiting liquor
business upheld).
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, is a recent
example.
There, a 1958 city safety ordinance
banned any excavations below *I27 the water table
and effectively prohibited the claimant from
continuing a sand and gravel mining business that
had been operated on the particular parcel since 1927.
The Court upheld the ordinance against a "taking"
challenge, although the ordinance prohibited the
present and presumably most beneficial use of the
property and had, like the regulations in Miller and
Hadacheck, severely affected a particular owner.
The Court assumed that the ordinance did not prevent
the owner's reasonable use of the property since the
owner made no showing of an adverse effect on the
value of the land. Because the restriction served a
substantial public purpose, the Court thus held no
taking had occurred. It is, of course, implicit in
Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may
constitute a "talung" if not reasonably necessary to
the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, see
**2661 Necto~vv. Conrbridne, .s~rur-a; cf. Moore v.
East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 5 13-514, 97 S.Ct.
1932, 1943, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (19771 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring), or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh
impact upon the owner's use of the property.
Penn.s~~lvcmiuCoal Co. v. Muhon, 260 U.S. 393, 43
S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), is the leading case
for the proposition that a state statute that
substantially fbrthers important public policies may
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations
as to amount to a "taking." There the claimant had
sold the surface rights to particular parcels of
property, but expressly reserved the right to remove
the coal thereunder. A Pennsylvania statute, enacted
after the transactions, forbade any mining of coal that
caused the subsidence of any house, unless the house
was the property of the owner of the underlying coal
and was more than 150 feet from the improved
property of another. Because the statute made it
commercially impracticable to mine the coal, id., at
414. 43 S.Ct., at 159, and thus had nearly the same
effect as the complete destruction of rights claimant
had reserved from the owners of the surface land, see
id.. at 414-415, 43 S.Ct., at 159-160, the Court held
that the statute was invalid as effecting a "taking"
"128 without just compensation.
See also
Ar-mstron~!v. U~~itecl
Stutes, 364 U.S. 40, 80 S.Ct.
1563. 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960) (Government's
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complete destruction of a materialman's lien in
certain property held a "taking"); Hucisort Water. Co.
11. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 28 S.Ct. 529, 53 1,
52 L.Ed. 828 (1908) (if height restriction makes
property wholly useless "the rights of property . . .
prevail over the other public interest" and
compensation is required).
See generally
Michelman, Pro~ertv. Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law. 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1 165, 12291234 (19671.
Finally, government actions that may be
characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or
facilitate uniquely public functions have often been
held to constitute "takings." Uniled Slales v. Culisbv.
328 U.S. 256.66 S.Ct. 1062.90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, is
illustrative. In holding that direct overflights above
the claimant's land, that destroyed the present use of
the land as a chicken farm, constituted a "taking,"
Causby emphasized that Government had not
"merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of
it for the flight of its planes." Id., 328 U.S.. at 262263. n. 7. 66 S.Ct.. at 1066. See also Gripas v .
Allealtenv Counts, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7
L.Ed.2d 585 (1962) (overflights held a talung);
Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43
S.Ct. 135. 67 L.Ed. 287 (1922) (United States
military installations' repeated firing of guns over
claimant's land is a taking); United S1ate.y v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316. 37 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917)
(repeated floodings of land caused by water project is
talung); but see YMCA 1). United Stales, 395 U.S. 85,
89 S.Ct. 1511, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 17 (1969) (damage
caused to building when federal officers who were
seelung to protect building were attacked by rioters
held not a taking). See generally Michelman, supra,
at 1226-1229; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
Yale L.J. 36 (1964).

121 In

contending that the New York City law has
"taken" their property in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, appellants make a series of
arguments, which, while tailored to the facts of this
case, essentially urge that *I29 any substantial
restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law must
be accompanied by just compensation if it is to be
constitutional.
Before considering these, we
emphasize what is not in dispute. Because this Court
has recognized, in a number of settings, that States
and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls
to enhance the quality of life by preserving the

character and desirable aesthetic features of a city,
see Ne1.1) Orlcat7,v 11. D ~ ~ k e 427
s . U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct.
2513. 49 L.Ed.2d 51 1 (1976); Younr v. Amn-icntl
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50. 96 S.Ct. 2440. 49
L.Ed.2d 3 10 (1 976); Villnpe o f Belle Tert-c v.
Bornas. 416 U.S. 1. 9-10. 94 S.Ct 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d
797 (1974); **2662 Berman v. Parker: 348 U.S. 26,
33. 75 S.Ct. 98, 102. 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Welch 11.
S~vasev,214 U.S., at 108, 29 S.Ct., at 571, appellants
do not contest that New York City's objective of
preserving structures and areas with special historic,
architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely
permissible governmental goal. They also do not
dispute that the restrictions imposed on its parcel are
appropriate means of securing the purposes of the
New York City law.
Finally, appellants do not
challenge any of the specific factual premises of the
decision below. They accept for present purposes
both that the parcel of land occupied by Grand
Central Terminal must, in its present state, be
regarded as capable of earning a reasonable
r e t ~ r n and
, ~ that the transferable development
rights afforded appellants by virtue of the Terminal's
designation as a landmark are valuable, even if not as
valuable as the rights to construct above the
Terminal. In appellants' view none of these factors
derogate from their claim that New York City's law
has effected a "talung."
FN26. Both the Jurisdictional Statement 7-8,
n. 7, and Brief for Appellants 8 n. 7 state
that appellants are not seeking review of the
New York courts' determination that Penn
Central could earn a "reasonable return" on
its investment in the Terminal. Although
appellants suggest in their reply brief that
the factual conclusions of the New York
courts cannot be sustained unless we accept
the rationale of the New York Court of
Appeals, see Reply Brief for Appellants 12
n. 15, it is apparent that the findings
concerning Penn Central's ability to profit
from the Terminal depend in no way on the
Court of Appeals' rationale.

"130 They first observe that the airspace above the
Terminal is a valuable property interest, citing United
Stales v. Causby, supra.
They urge that the
Landmarks Law has deprived them of any gainfil use
of their "air rights" above the Terminal and that,
irrespective of the value of the remainder of their
parcel, the city has "taken" their right to this
superadjacent airspace, thus entitling them to "just
compensation" measured by the fair market value of
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Appeals contrasted the New York City
Landmarks Law with both zoning and
historic-district legislation and stated at one
point that landmark laws do not "further a
general community plan," 42 N.Y.2d 324,
330. 397 N.Y.S.2d 914. 918. 366 N.E.2d
1271. 1274 (1977h it also emphasized that
the implementation of the objectives of the
Landmarks Law constitutes an "acceptable
reason for singling out one particular parcel
for different and less favorable treatment."
Ihid., 397 N.Y.S.2d. at 918, 366 N.E.2d. at
1275. Therefore, we do not understand the
New York Court of Appeals to disagree with
our characterization of the law.
[131[141 Equally without merit is the related
argument that the decision to designate a structure as
a landmark "is inevitably arbitrary or at least
subjective, because it is basically a matter of taste,"
Reply Brief for Appellants 22, thus unavoidably
singling out individual landowners for disparate and
unfair treatment. The argument has a particularly
hollow ring in this case. For appellants not only did
not seek judicial review of either the designation or
of the denials of the certificates of appropriateness
and of no exterior effect, but d o not even now suggest
that the Commission's decisions concerning the
Terminal were in any sense arbitrary or unprincipled.
But, in *I33 any event, a landmark owner has a right
to judicial review of any Commission decision, and,
quite simply, there is no basis whatsoever for a
conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty
identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the
context of landmark regulation than in the **2664
context of classic zoning or indeed in any other
context.=

FN29. When a property owner challenges
the application of a zoning ordinance to his
property, the judicial inquiry focuses upon
whether the challenged restriction can
reasonably be deemed to promote the
objectives of the community land-use plan,
and will include consideration of the
treatment of similar parcels. See generally
NCCIOM)
V . Cnntbrid~e,277 U.S. 183, 48
S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928). When a
property owner challenges a landmark
designation or restriction as arbitrary or
discriminatory, a similar inquiry presumably
will occur.
Next, appellants observe that New York City's

law differs from zoning laws and historic-district
ordinances in that the Landmarks Law does not
impose identical or similar restrictions on all
structures located in particular physical communities.
It follows, they argue, that New York City's law is
inherently incapable of producing the fair and
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of
governmental action which is characteristic of zoning
laws and historic-district legislation and which they
maintain is a constitutional requirement if "just
compensation" is not to be afforded. It is, of course,
true that the Landmarks Law has a more severe
impact on some landowners than on others, but that
in itself does not mean that the law effects a "talung."
Legislation designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others.
The
owners of the'brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar
trees in Miller v. Schoene, and of the gravel and sand
mine in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely
burdened by the legislation sustained in those
case^.^ Similarly, zoning"l34 laws often affect
some property owners more severely than others but
have not been held to be invalid on that account. For
example, the property owner in Euclid who wished to
use its property for industrial purposes was affected
far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors
who wished to use their land for residences.

FN30. Appellants attempt to distinguish
these cases on the ground that, in each,
government was prohibiting a "noxious" use
of land and that in the present case, in
contrast, appellants' proposed construction
above the Terminal would be beneficial.
We observe that the uses in issue in
Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were
perfectly lawful in themselves.
They
involved no "blameworthiness, . . . moral
wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous
risk-talung which induce[d society] to shift
the cost to a pa[rt]icular individual." Sax,
Talungs and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J.
36, 50 (1964).
These cases are better
understood as resting not on any supposed
"noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but
rather on the ground that the restrictions
were
reasonably
related
to
the
implementation of a policy-not unlike
historic preservation-expected to produce a
widespread public benefit and applicable to
all similarly situated property.
Nor, correlatively, can it be asserted that the
destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic
landmark is not harmful. The suggestion that the
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beneficial
quality
of appellants'
proposed
construction is established by the fact that the
construction would have been consistent with
applicable zoning laws ignores the development in
sensibilities and ideals reflected in landmark
legislation like New York City's. Cf. West Bros.
Brick Co. v. Alexandria. 169 Va. 271, 282-283. 192
S.E. 881. 885-886. u ~ p e a lcli.smis.se~1fbr want o f ' a
suhsfuntial fe(lerc11otlestion, 302 U.S. 658. 58 S.Ct.
369. 82 L.Ed. 508 (1937).
1161r171 In any event, appellants' repeated
suggestions that they are solely burdened and
unbenefited is factually inaccurate. This contention
overlooks the fact that the New York City law applies
to vast numbers of structures in the city in addition to
the Terminal-all the structures contained in the 31
historic districts and over 400 individual landmarks,
.~
many of which are close to the ~ e r m i n a l Unless
we are to reject the judgment of the New York City
Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits
all New York citizens and all structures, both
economically and by improving the quality of life in
the city as a whole-which we are unwilling to do-we
cannot *I35 conclude that the owners of the
Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law. Doubtless appellants believe they
are more burdened than **2665 benefited by the law,
but that must have been true, too, of the property
owners in Miller, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Goldblatt.

FN32
-

FN31. There are some 53 designated
landmarks and 5 historic districts or scenic
landmarks in Manhattan between 14th and
59th Streets. See Landmarks Preservation
Commission, Landmarks and Historic
Districts (1977).
FN32. It is, of course, true that the fact the
duties imposed by zoning and historicdistrict legislation apply throughout
particular physical communities provides
assurances against arbitrariness, but the
applicability of the Landmarks Law to a
large number of parcels in the city, in our
view, provides comparable, if not identical,
assurances.
[181Appellants' final broad-based attack would have
us treat the law as an instance, like that in United
States v. Causby, in which government, acting in an
enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their
property for some strictly governmental purpose.

Apart from the fact that Catlsby was a case of
invasion of airspace that destroyed the use of the
farm beneath and this New York City law has in
nowise impaired the present use of the Terminal, the
Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants' parcel for
city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any
entrepreneurial operations of the city. The situation
is not remotely like that in Causby where the airspace
above the property was in the flight pattern for
military aircraft. The Landmarks Law's effect is
simply to prohibit appellants or anyone else from
occupying portions of the airspace above the
Terminal, while permitting appellants to use the
remainder of the parcel in a gainful fashion. This is
no more an appropriation of property by government
for its own uses'than is a zoning law prohibiting, for
"aesthetic" reasons, two or more adult theaters within
a specified area, see Y O Z ~ I VI.P Anzericnn Mini
Theatres, Itzc., 427 U . S . 50. 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49
L.Ed.2d 3 10 (19761, or a safety regulation prohibiting
excavations below a certain level. See Goldblatt v.
Hempstead.

Rejection of appellants' broad arguments is not,
however, the end of our inquiry, for all we thus far
have established is '136 that the New York City law
is not rendered invalid by its failure to provide "just
compensation" whenever a landmark owner is
restricted in the exploitation of property interests,
such as air rights, to a greater extent than provided
for under applicable zoning laws. We now must
consider whether the interference with appellants'
property is of such a magnitude that "there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain [it]." Pennsvlvaniri Coal Co. v. Mnhon, 260
U.S., at 413. 43 S.Ct., at 159. That inquiry may be
narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact
of the law on appellants' parcel, and its resolution in
turn requires a carehl assessment of the impact of the
regulation on the Terminal site.
1201r211 Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt,
Millel; Causby, Griggs, and Hadacheck, the New
York City law does not interfere in any way with the
present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a
landmark not only permits but contemplates that
appellants may continue to use the property precisely
as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad
terminal containing office space and concessions.
So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly,

O 2006 ThornsodWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 20
438 U.S. 104,98 S.Ct. 2646, 11 ERC 1801,57 L.Ed.2d 631, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,528
(Cite as: 438 U.S. 104,98 S.Ct. 2646)
on this record, we must regard the New York City
law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit
from the Terminal but also to obtain a "reasonable
return" on its investment.
Appellants, moreover, exaggerate the effect of the
law on their ability to make use of the air rights
First, it
above the Terminal in two respects.M
simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that
appellants have been prohibited from occupying any
portion of the airspace above the Terminal. While
the Commission's actions in denying applications to
construct an *I37 office building in excess of 50
stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will
rehse to issue a certificate**2666 of appropriateness
for any comparably sized structure, nothing the
Commission has said or done suggests an intention to
prohibit any construction above the Terminal. The
Commission's report emphasized that whether any
construction would be allowed depended upon
whether the proposed addition "would harmonize in
scale, material and character with [the Terminal]."
Record 225 1.
Since appellants have not sought
approval for the construction of a smaller structure,
we do not know that appellants will be denied any
use of any portion of the airspace above the
Terminal.

FN33. Appellants, of course, argue at length
that the transferable development rights,
while valuable, do not constitute "just
compensation." Brief for Appellants 36-43.
FN34. Counsel for appellants admitted at
oral argument that the Commission has not
suggested that it would not, for example,
approve a 20-story office tower along the
lines of that which was part of the original
plan for the Terminal. See Tr, of Oral Arg.
19.
Second, to the extent appellants have been denied
the right to build above the Terminal, it is not literally
accurate to say that they have been denied all use of
even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to
use these rights has not been abrogated; they are
made transferable to at least eight parcels in the
vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have
been found suitable for the construction of new office
buildings.
Although appellants and others have
argued that New York City's transferable
development-rights program is far from ideal,M the
New York courts here supportably found that, at least
in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are

valuable. While these rights may well not have
constituted ''just compensation" if a "taking" had
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly
mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be
taken into account in considering the impact of
regulation. Cf. Goldhlatt v. Hemn.steud, 369 U.S., at
594 n. 3.82 S.Ct.. at 990 n. 3.
FN35. See Costonis, supra n. 2, at 585-589.
"138 On this record, we conclude that the
application of New York City's Landmarks Law has
not effected a "talung" of appellants' property. The
restrictions imposed are substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit
reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
also afford appellants opportunities further to
enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also
other properties.m

FN36. We emphasize that our holding today
is on the present record, which in turn is
based on Penn Central's present ability to
use the Terminal for its intended purposes
and in a gainful fashion. The city conceded
at oral argument that if appellants can
demonstrate at some point in the future that
circumstances have so changed that the
Terminal ceases to be "economically
viable," appellants may obtain relief. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43.
Afjrm ed.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF
JUSTICE and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.
Of the over one million buildings and structures in
the city of New York, appellees have singled out 400
for designation as official andm marks.^ The owner
of a building might initially be pleased that his
property has been chosen by a distinguished
committee of architects, historians, and city *I39
planners for such a singular distinction. But he may
well discover, as appellant Penn Central
Transportation Co, did here, that the landmark
designation imposes upon him ""2667 a substantial
cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except for the
honor of the designation. The question in this case is
whether the cost associated with the city of New
York's desire to preserve a limited number of
"landmarks" within its borders must be borne by all
of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed
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entirely on the owners of the individual properties.
FNI. A large percentage
-

of the designated
landmarks are public structures (such as the
Brooklyn Bridge, City Hall, the Statute of
Liberty and the Municipal Asphalt Plant)
and thus do not raise Fifth Amendment
taking questions.
See Landmarks
Preservation Commission of the City of
New York, Landmarks and Historic Districts
(1977 and Jan. 10, 1978, Supplement).
Although the Court refers to the New York
ordinance as a comprehensive program to
preserve historic landmarks, ante, at 265 1,
the ordinance is not limited to historic
buildings and gives little guidance to the
Landmarks Preservation Commission in its
selection of landmark sites. Section 2071.O(n) of the Landmarks Preservation Law,
as set forth in N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A
(1976), requires only that the selected
landmark be at least 30 years old and
possess "a special character or special
historical or aesthetic interest or value as
part of the development, heritage or cultural
characteristics of the city, state or nation."
Only in the most superficial sense of the word can
this case be said to involve "zoning." FNZ Typical
zoning restrictions may, it is true, so limit the
prospective uses of a piece of property as to diminish
the value of that property in the abstract because it
may not be used for the forbidden purposes. But any
such abstract decrease in value will more than likely
be at least partially offset by an increase in value
which flows from similar restrictions as to use on
neighboring *I40 properties. All property owners
in a designated area are placed under the same
restrictions, not only for the benefit of the
municipality as a whole but also for the common
benefit of one another. In the words of Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court in Pennsvlvanin Coal
Co. 1). Mallon. 260 U . S . 393, 415. 43 S.Ct. 158, 160,
67 L.Ed. 322 (19221, there is "an average reciprocity
of advantage."

FN2.Even the New York Court of Appeals
conceded that "[tlhis is not a zoning case. . .
. Zoning restrictions operate to advance a
comprehensive community plan for the
common good. Each property owner in the
zone is both benefited and restricted from
exploitation,
presumably
without

discrimination,
except
for permitted
continuing nonconforming uses.
The
restrictions may be designed to maintain the
general character of the area, or to assure
orderly development, objectives inuring to
the benefit of all, which property owners
acting individually would find difficult or
impossible to achieve . . . .
'Wor does this case involve landmark regulation of a
historic district. . . . [In historic districting, as in
traditional zoning,] owners although burdened by the
restrictions also benefit, to some extent, from the
furtherance of a general community plan.

"Restrictions on alteration of individual
landmarks are not designed to hrther a
general community plan.
Landmark
restrictions are designed to prevent
alteration or demolition of a single piece of
property. To this extent, such restrictions
resemble
'discriminatory'
zoning
restrictions, properly condemned . . . ." 42
N.Y.2d 324. 329-330, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914,
917-91 8.366 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1977).
Where a relatively few individual buildings, all
separated from one another, are singled out and
treated differently from surrounding buildings, no
such reciprocity exists. The cost to the property
owner which results from the imposition of
restrictions applicable only to his property and not
that of his neighbors may be substantial-in this case,
several million dollars-with no comparable reciprocal
benefits.
And the cost associated with landmark
legislation is likely to be of a completely different
order of magnitude than that which results from the
imposition of normal zoning restrictions. Unlike the
regime affected by the latter, the landowner is not
simply prohibited from using his property for certain
purposes, while allowed to use it for all other
purposes. Under the historic-landmark preservation
scheme adopted by New York, the property owner is
under an affirmative duty to preserve his property as
a landmark at his own expense. To suggest that
because traditional zoning results in some limitation
of use of the property zoned, the New York City
landmark preservation scheme should likewise be
upheld, represents the ultimate in treating as alike
things which are different. The rubric of "zoning"
has not yet sufficed to avoid the well-established
proposition that the Fifth Amendment bars the
"Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
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should be borne by the public as a whole."
Arni.sfronn v. United Stntes. 364 U.S. 40. 49, 80 S.Ct.
1 563, 1569.4 L.Ed.2d 1554 ( 1960). See discussion
infra, at pp. 2671-2672.
In August 1967, Grand Central Terminal was
designated a landmark over the objections of its
owner Penn Central.
Immediately upon this
designation, Penn Central, like all *I41 owners of a
landmark site, was placed under an affirmative duty,
backed **2668 by criminal fines and penalties, to
keep "exterior portions" of the landmark "in good
repair." Even more burdensome, however, were the
strict limitations that were thereupon imposed on
Penn Central's use of its property. At the time Grand
Central was designated a landmark, Penn Central was
in a precarious financial condition. In an effort to
increase its sources of revenue, Penn Central had
entered into a lease agreement with appellant UGP
Properties, Inc., under which UGP would construct
and operate a multistory office building cantilevered
above the Terminal building. During the period of
construction, UGP would pay Penn Central $1
million per year. Upon completion, UGP would rent
the building for 50 years, with an option for another
25 years, at a guaranteed minimum rental of $3
million per year.
The record is clear that the
proposed office building was in full compliance with
all New York zoning laws and height limitations.
Under the Landmarks Preservation Law, however,
appellants could not construct the proposed office
building unless appellee Landmarks Preservation
Commission issued either a "Certificate of No
Exterior
Effect"
or
a
"Certificate
of
Appropriateness." Although appellants' architectural
plan would have preserved the facade of the
Terminal, the Landmarks Preservation Commission
has refused to approve the construction.

The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
*I42 In a very literal sense, the
actions of appellees violated this constitutional
prohibition. Before the city of New York declared
Grand Central Terminal to be a landmark, Penn
Central could have used its "air rights" over the
Terminal to build a multistory office building, at an
apparent value of several million dollars per year.
Today, the Terminal cannot be modified in any form,
including the erection of additional stories, without
the permission of the Landmark Preservation
Commission, a permission which appellants, despite

good-faith attempts, have so far been unable to
obtain.
Because the Taking Clause of the Fifth
Amendment has not always been read literally,
however, the constitutionality of appellees' actions
requires a closer scrutiny of this Court's interpretation
of the three key words in the Taking Clause"property," "taken," and "just compensation." ';NJ

FN3.

The guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation is applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the state "legislature may
prescribe a form of procedure to be observed
in the taking of private property for public
use, . . . it is not due process of law if
provision be not made for compensation."
Chicano, B. & 0. R. Co. v. Chica,co. 166
U.S. 226, 236. 17 S.Ct. 581. 584, 41 L.Ed.
979 (1 897).
FN4. The Court's opinion touches base with,
-

or at least attempts to touch base with, most
of the major eminent domain cases decided
by this Court. Its use of them, however, is
anything but meticulous.
In citing to
United States v. Cr~ltex,Inc., 344 U.S. 149,
156. 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (19521, for
example, ante, at 2659, the only language
remotely applicable to eminent domain is
stated in terms of "the destruction of
respondents' terminals by a trained team of
engineers in the face of their impending
seizure by the enemy." 344 U.S., at 156. 73
S.Ct., at 203.
A

Appellees do not dispute that valuable property
rights have been destroyed.
And the Court has
frequently emphasized that the term "property" as
used in the Taking Clause includes the entire "group
of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]."
United States v. Genernl Motors C o r ~ .323
. U.S. 373,
65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (1945). The term is not
used in the
"vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing
with respect to which the citizen exercises rights
recognized by law. [Instead, it] . . . denote [s] the
group o f rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical THING, AS
"143 THE RIGHT TO
POSSESS, USE AND DISPOSE OF IT. . . . the
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort o f
inter:est the **2669citizen may possess." Id., at 377-
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378, 65 S.Ct.. at 359 (emphasis added)
While neighboring landowners are free to use their
land and "air rights" in any way consistent with the
broad boundaries of New York zoning, Penn Central,
absent the permission of appellees, must forever
maintain its property in its present statesm The
property has been thus subjected to a nonconsensual
servitude not borne by any neighboring or similar
properties. EM

See also *144Uriitetl Slutes v. Lvnah, 188 U.S. 445,
469, 23 S.CL. 349. 47 L.Ed. 539 1903);
Duran
v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625, 83 S.CL. 999. 1009, 10
L.Ed.2d 15 (1963). Because "not every destruction
or injury to property by governmental action has been
held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense,"
Armstron.~1). UnitedSlutes, 364 U.S.. at 48, 80 S.Ct.,
at 1568, however, this does not end our inquiry. But
an examination of the two exceptions where the
destruction of property does not constitute a taking
demonstrates that a compensable talung has occurred
here.

FN5. In particular, Penn Central cannot
increase the height of the Terminal. Thls
Court has previously held that the "air
rights" over an area of land are "property"
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See
United States 1). Causbv, 328 U.S. 256, 66
S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) ("air
rights" taken by low-flying airplanes);
Griaas v. Alleahenv County, 369 U.S. 84, 82
S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed2d 585 (1962) (same);
Portsmolrtk Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United Sfates. 260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. 135,
67 L.Ed. 287 (1922) (firing of projectiles
over summer resort can constitute taking).
See also Butler v. Frontier Tele~honeCo.,
186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 7 16 (1906) (stringing
of telephone wire across property constitutes
a taking).

FN6.

It is, of course, irrelevant that
appellees interfered with or destroyed
property rights that Penn Central had not yet
physically used.
The Fifth Amendment
must be applied with "reference to the uses
for which the property is suitable, having
regard to the existing business or wants of
the community, or such as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate
future." Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403. 408, 25 L.Ed. 206 (1879) (emphasis
added).

Appellees have thus destroyed-in a literal sense,
"takenw-substantial property rights of Penn Central.
While the term "taken" might have been narrowly
interpreted to include only physical seizures of
property rights, "the construction of the phrase has
not been so narrow. The courts have held that the
deprivation of the former owner rather than the
accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign
constitutes the taking." Id., at 378, 65 S.Ct., at 359.

FN7. "Such a construction would pervert the
constitutional provision into a restriction
upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights
stood at the common law, instead of the
government, and make it an authority for
invasion of private right under the pretext of
the public good, which had no warrant in the
laws or practices of our ancestors." 188
U.S., at 470, 23 S.Ct., at 357.

As early as 1887, the Court recognized that the
government can prevent a property owner from using
his property to injure others without having to
compensate the owner for the value of the forbidden
use.
"A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner
in the control or use of his property for lawful
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is
only a declaration by the State that its use by any one,
for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the
public interests. . . . The power which the States
have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the
morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and,
consistently with the existence and safety of
organized society, cannot be-burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such
individual owners for pecuniary losses they may
sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a
noxious use of "145 theirproperty, to inflict **2670
injury upon the: community." Murler v. K L I I I . F
123
~~,
U.S. 623,668-669. 8 S.Ct. 273, 301.31 L.Ed. 205.
Thus, there is no "talung" where a city prohibits the
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operation of a brickyard within a residential area, see
Hadacheck v. Sehastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143,
60 L.Ed. 348 (19151, or forbids excavation for sand
and gravel below the water line, see Goldhlatt 11.
Hem~stead.369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d
130 (1962).
Nor is it relevant, where the
government is merely prohibiting a noxious use of
property, that the government would seem to be
singling out a particular property owner. Haducheck,
supra. at 413.36 S.Ct., at 1 4 6 . ~ ~ '
FN8. Each
-

of the cases cited by the Court
for the proposition that legislation which
severely affects some landowners but not
others does not effect a "taking" involved
noxious uses of property. See Hudachcck;
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct.
246. 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928); Goldblatt. See
ante, at 2660-2661,2664.
The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not
coterminous with the police power itself.
The
question is whether the forbidden use is dangerous to
the safety, health, or welfare of others. Thus, in
Ctrr-tin v. Benson. 222 U.S. 78. 32 S.Ct. 31, 56 L.Ed.
102 (19 1 11, the Court held that the Government, in
prohibiting the owner of property within the
boundaries of Yosemite National Park from grazing
cattle on his property, had taken the owner's property.
The Court assumed that the Government could
constitutionally require the owner to fence his land or
take other action to prevent his cattle from straying
onto others' land without compensating him.
"Such laws might be considered as strictly
regulations of the use of property, of so using it that
no injury could result to others. They would have
the effect of malung the owner of land herd his cattle
on his own land and of making him responsible for a
neglect of it." Id., at 86.32 S.Ct., at 33.
The prohibition in question, however, was "not a
prevention of a misuse or illegal use but the
prevention of a legal and essential use, an attribute of
its ownership." Ibid.
Appellees are not prohibiting a nuisance.
The
record is "146 clear that the proposed addition to the
Grand Central Terminal would be in full compliance
with zoning, height limitations, and other health and
safety requirements. Instead, appellees are seelung
to preserve what they believe to be an outstanding
example of beaux-arts architecture. Penn Central is
prevented from further developing its property
basically because too good a job was done in

designing and building it. The city of New York,
because of its unadorned admiration for the design,
has decided that the owners of the building must
preserve it unchanged for the benefit of sightseeing
New Yorkers and tourists.
Unlike land-use regulations, appellees' actions do not
merely prohibit Penn Central from using its property
in a narrow set of noxious ways. Instead, appellees
have placed an affirmative duty on Penn Central to
maintain the Terminal in its present state and in
"good repair." Appellants are not free to use their
property as they see fit within broad outer boundaries
but must strictly adhere to their past use except where
appellees conclude that alternative uses would not
detract from the landmark. While Penn Central may
continue to use the Terminal as it is presently
designed, appellees otherwise "exercise complete
dominion and control over the surface of the land,"
United Slales v. Causbv, 328 U.S. 256. 262. 66 S.Ct.
1062. 1066. 90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, and must
compensate the owner for his loss. Ibid. "Property is
taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are
made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as
between private parties, a servitude has been
acquired." United States v. Dickinson, 33 1 U.S. 745,
748.67 S.Ct. 1382. 1385. 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1 947). See
also Duparz v. Rank, stmra, 372 U.S.. at 625, 83
S.Ct.. at 1009.':~"
FN9. In
-

Mononwahela N(/l?iwation Co. v.
United Stcrte.~,148 U S . 3 12. 13 S.Ct. 622,
37 L.Ed. 463 (18931, the Monongahela
company had expended large sums of
money in improving the Monongahela River
by means of locks and dams. When the
United States condemned this property for
its own use, the Court held that full
compensation had to be awarded. "Suppose,
in the improvement of a navigable stream, it
was deemed essential to construct a canal
with locks, in order to pass around rapids or
falls. Of the power of Congress to condemn
whatever land may be necessary for such
canal, there can be no question; and of the
equal necessity of paying full compensation
for all private property taken there can be as
little doubt." Id., at 337. 13 S.Ct., at 630.
Under the Court's rationale, however, where
the Government wishes to preserve a preexisting canal system for public use, it need
not condemn the property but need merely
order that it be preserved in its present form
and be kept " ~ ngood repair."
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Even where the government prohibits a noninjurious
use, the Court has ruled that a taking does not take
place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross
section of land and thereby "secure[s] an average
reciprocity of advantage." Pennsvlvania Coul Co. v.
It is
Mahon. 260 U.S.. at 415, 43 S.Ct., at 160.
for this reason that zoning does not constitute a
"talung." While zoning at times reduces individual
property values, the burden is shared relatively
evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the
whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of
the zoning will be benefited by another.

FNIO. Appellants concede that the
preservation of buildings of historical or
aesthetic importance is a permissible
objective of state action.
Brief for
Appellants 12. CJ Berntan v. Parker-, 348
U.S. 26. 75 S.Ct. 98. 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954);
United States v. Gettvsbzlra Electric R. Co.,
160 U.S. 668, 16 S.Ct. 427. 40 L.Ed. 576
(1896).

For the reasons noted in the text, historic zoning, as
has been undertaken by cities, such as New Orleans,
may well not require compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.
Here, however, a multimillion dollar loss has been
imposed on appellants; it is uniquely felt and is not
offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation
of some 400 other "landmarks" in New York City.
Appellees have imposed a substantial cost on less
than one one-tenth of one percent of the buildings in
New York City for the general benefit of all its
people. It is exactly this imposition of general costs
on a few individuals at which the "taking" protection
is directed. The Fifth Amendment
"prevents the public from loading upon one
individual more than his just share of the burdens of
government, *I48 and says that when he surrenders
to the public something more and different from that
which is exacted from other members of the public, a
full and just equivalent shall be returned to him."
Mononpahela Naviaation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312. 325. 13 S.Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463
(1893).
Less than 20 years ago, this Court reiterated that the
"Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from

forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Arnlstrong I). Uilirerl Stales,
364 U.S.. at 49. 80 S.Ct.. at 1569.
Cf. Nasltville. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S.

FNl 1. "It is true that the police power
embraces regulations designed to promote
public convenience or the general welfare,
and not merely those in the interest of public
health, safety and morals. . . . But when
particular individuals are singled out to bear
the cost of advancing the public
convenience, that imposition must bear
some reasonable relation to the evils to be
eradicated or the advantages to be secured. .
. . While moneys raised by general taxation
may constitutionally be applied to purposes
from which the individual taxed may receive
no benefit, and indeed, suffer serious
detriment, . . . so-called assessments for
public improvements laid upon particular
property owners are ordinarily constitutional
only if based on benefits received by them."
294 U.S.. at 429-430. 55 S.Ct.. at 494-495.
As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, "the question at bottom" in an
eminent domain case "is upon whom the loss of the
changes desired should fall." 260 U.S., at 416. 43
S.Ct.. at 160. The benefits that appellees believe
will flow from preservation of the Grand Central
Terminal will accrue to all the citizens of New York
City. There is no **2672 reason to believe that
appellants will enjoy a substantially greater share of
these benefits.
If the cost of preserving Grand
Central Terminal were spread evenly across the entire
population of the city of New York, the burden per
person would be in cents per year-a minor cost
appellees would *I49 surely concede for the benefit
accrued. Instead, however, appellees would impose
the entire cost of several million dollars per year on
Penn Central.
But it is precisely this sort of
discrimination
that
the
Fifth
Amendment
prohibits.w

FN12. The fact that the Landmarks
Preservation Commission may have allowed
additions to a relatively few landmarks is of
no comfort to appellants. Ante, at 2656 n.
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Nor is it of any comfort that the
18.
Commission refuses to allow appellants to
construct any additional stories because of
their belief that such construction would not
be aesthetic. Ante, at 2656.
Appellees in response would argue that a talung only
occurs where a property owner is denied all
reasonable value of his property.w The Court has
frequently held that, even where a destruction of
property rights would not otherwise constitute a
taking, the inability of the owner to make a
reasonable return on his property requires
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.
g., United States v. Lvnuh, 188 U.S., at 470, 23 S.Ct.,
at 357. But the converse is not true. A taking does
not become a noncompensable exercise of police
power simply because the government in its grace
allows the owner to make some "reasonable" use of
his property. "[Ilt is the character of the invasion, not
the amount of damage resulting from it, *I50 so long
as the damage is substantial, that determines the
question whether it is a taking." United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316,328.37 S.Ct. 380.385.61 L.Ed.
746 (1917); United States v. Cazrshv. 328 U.S.. at
See also Goldblntt v.
266, 66 S.Ct.. at 1068.
Hemnstead. 369 U.S., at 594.82 S.Ct., at 990.

FN 13. Difficult conceptual

and legal
problems are posed by a rule that a taking
only occurs where the property owner is
denied all reasonable return on his property.
Not only must the Court define "reasonable
return" for a variety of types of property
(farmlands,
residential
properties,
commercial and industrial areas), but the
Court must define the particular property
unit that should be examined. For example,
in this case, if appellees are viewed as
having restricted Penn Central's use of its
"air rights," all return has been denied. See
Pennsvlvattia Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S.
393. 43 S.Ct. 158. 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922).
The Court does little to resolve these
questions in its opinion. Thus, at one point,
the Court implies that the question is
whether the restrictions have "an unduly
harsh impact upon the owner's use of the
property," ante, at 2661; at another point,
the question is phrased as whether Penn
Central can obtain "a 'reasonable return' on
its investment," ante, at 2666; and, at yet
another point, the cjuestion becomes whether
the landmark is "economically viable," ante,

Appellees, apparently recognizing that the
constraints imposed on a landmark site constitute a
taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, do not leave
the property owner empty-handed.
As the Court
notes, ante, at 2654-2655, the property owner may
theoretically "transfer" his previous right to develop
the landmark property to adjacent properties if they
are under his control. Appellees have coined this
system "Transfer Development Rights," or TDR's.
Of all the terms used in the Taking Clause, "just
compensa'tion" has the strictest meaning. The Fifth
Amendment does not allow simply an approximate
compensation but requires "a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken." Monolz.calzela
Navipation Co. v. United Stutes. 148 U.S., at 326. 13
S.Ct.. at 626.
"[Ilf the adjective 'just' had been omitted, and the
provision was simply that property should not be
taken without compensation, the natural import of the
language would be that the compensation should be
the equivalent of the property. And this is made
emphatic by the adjective 'just.' There can, in view
of the combination of those two words, be no doubt
that the compensation must be a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken." ]bid.

**2673 See also United States v. Lvnuh: supra. 188
U.S., at 465, 23 S.Ct., at 355; United Stutc.s v. P P M J ~ P
Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 117, 71 S.Ct. 670, 671. 95
L.Ed. 809 (195 1). And the determination of whether
a "full and perfect equivalent" has been awarded is a
'Ijudicial function." United Stutes v. Neil) River.
Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-344, 43 S.Ct. 565,
566-567.67 L.Ed. 1014 (1923). The fact "151 that
appellees may believe that TDR's provide full
compensation is irrelevant.
"The legislature may determine what private
property is needed for public purposes-that is a
question of a political and legislative character; but
when the taking has been ordered, then the question
of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the
public, taking the property, through Congress or the
legislature, its representative, to say what
compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be the
rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared
that just compensation shall be paid, and the
ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry."
Mononptr hcla N(rvi.ytrtion Co. v. United Stcrtes, .sunr.u,
148 U.S., at 327, 13 S.Ct., at 626.
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Appellees contend that, even if they have "taken"
appellants' property, TDR's constitute "just
compensation." Appellants, of course, argue that
TDR's are highly imperfect compensation. Because
the lower courts held that there was no "talung," they
did not have to reach the question of whether or not
just compensation has already been awarded. The
New York Court of Appeals' discussion of TDR's
gives some support to appellants:
"The many defects in New York City's program for
development rights transfers have been detailed
elsewhere . . . . The area to which transfer is
permitted is severely limited [and] complex
procedures are required to obtain a transfer permit."
42 N.Y.2d 324.334-335.397 N.Y.S.2d 914,920,366
N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (1977).
And in other cases the Court of Appeals has noted
that TDR's have an "uncertain and contingent market
value" and do "not adequately preserve" the value
lost when a building is declared to be a landmark.
French Inve.~tinaCo. v. Citv of New York. 39 N.Y.2d
587, 591, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 7. 350 N.E.2d 381, 383,
appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 990. 97 S.Ct. 515. 50
L.Ed.2d 602 (1976). On the other hand, there is
evidence in the record that Penn Central has been
*I52 offered substantial amounts for its TDR's.
Because the record on appeal is relatively slim, I
would remand to the Court of Appeals for a
determination of whether TDR's constitute a "full and
perfect equivalent for the property taken."

FN14. The Court suggests, ante, at 2663,
that if appellees are held to have "taken"
property sights of landmark owners, not
only the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Law, but "all comparable
landmark legislation in the Nation" must
fall. This assumes, of course, that TDR's
are not "just compensation" for the property
rights destroyed. It also ignores the fact
that many States and cities in the Nation
have chosen to preserve landmarks by
purchasing or condemning restrictive
easements over the facades of the landmarks
and are apparently
satisfied with the
-. quite
.
results.
See, e. g., 0re.Rev.Stat. 4 4
27 1.710, 27 1.720 ( 1977); Md.Ann.Code,
Art. 41, $ 181A (1978); Va.Code $ $ 10145.1 and 10-138(e) (1978); Richmond,
Va., City Code $ $ 21-23 et seq. (1975).
The British National Trust has effectively

used restrictive easements to preserve
landmarks since 1937. See National Trust
Act, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 and 1 Geo. 6 ch. lvii, $
$ 4 and 8. Other States and cities have
found that tax incentives are also an
effective means of encouraging the private
preservation of landmark sites. See, e. g.,
Conn.Gen.Stat. 6
12-127a (1977);
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 24, $ 11-48.2-6 (1976);
Va.Code 4 10-139 (1978). The New York
City Landmarks Preservation Law departs
drastically from these traditional, and
constitutional,
means
of
preserving
landmarks.

Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for
the Court, warned that the courts were "in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change." Peiznsvlvnniu Coal Co. I>.
Mahon, 260 U.S., at 416, 43 S.Ct., at 160. The
Court's opinion in this case demonstrates **2674 that
the danger thus foreseen has not abated. The city of
New York is in a precarious financial state, and some
may believe that the costs of landmark preservation
will be more easily borne by corporations such as
Penn Central than the overburdened individual
taxpayers*153 of New York. But these concerns do
not allow us to ignore past precedents construing the
Eminent Domain Clause to the end that the desire to
improve the public condition is, indeed, achieved by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change.
U.S.N.Y.,1978.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
Stivers v. PierceC.A.9 (Nev.), 1995.
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.
Martin STIVERS; Mary Chase Emsberger; Chamar,
Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Richard PIERCE; George D. Wendell; Denise
Conrad; Gary T. Robey; Brian McKay; Carol
Widmer-Hanna; Robert J. Rodefer; Bill Bertram;
individually and as members of the Nevada State
Private Investigators Licensing Board; The Nevada
State Private Investigators Licensing Board; and
Does 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.
NOS.93-16756,94-15966.
Argued and Submitted March 16, 1995.
Decided Dec. 1, 1995.
After Nevada State Private Investigators Licensing
Board denied application for licenses as private
investigator, private patrolman, and process server,
applicant brought 5 1983 action against Board and
individual board members. Applicant alleged that
one Board member had pecuniary interest in outcome
and was biased against applicant, and that, influenced
by that member's bias, other Board members and
certain employees prejudged application and acted in
arbitrary and improper manner. After action was
filed, Board granted application for individual
licenses in order to settle plaintiffs' claims for
injunctive relief. The United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, Howard D. McKibben, J.,
thereafter granted summary judgment to defendants
on remaining claims, and rejected plaintiffs motion
for attorney fees for time spent pursuing injunctive
relief. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Reinhardt, J., held that: (1) genuine issues remained
as to whether board member who owned private
security and investigation firm was biased against
plaintiff; (2) bias on part of one single member of
tribunal taints proceedings and violates due process;
(3) plaintiff did not waive his bias objection; (4)
Eleventh Amendment barred action against Board,
but not individual board members; and (5) plaintiff
was "prevailing party" for purposes of his request for
attorney fees under Q 1988.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Noonan, Circuit Judge, issued concurring opinion.
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whether evidence of one board member's pecuniary
interest, and evidence of discriminatory treatment by
Board, was sufficient to show that licensing
proceedings were tainted by actual bias. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14; N.R.S. 648.005 et seq.
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question of whether board violated due process by
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to conclude that board member harbored personal
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rational basis for concluding that he retained bias
against firm itself, particularly since original owner
had sold it to disinterested third party several years
prior to that third party's sale to plaintiffs. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 14; N.R.S. 648.005 et seq.
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Party alleging unconstitutional bias on part of
adjudicator may prove that claim by introducing
adjudicator's extrajudicial statements that are
inconsistent with role of impartial decisionmaker.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
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Fact that Nevada State Private Investigators
Licensing Board denied plaintiffs application for
license despite contrary recommendations of its own
legal counsel was circumstantial evidence of
unconstitutional bias. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14;
N.R.S. 648.005 et seq.
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Const.Amend. 14.
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actually biased, or where circumstances create
appearance that one member is biased, proceedings
violate due process; plaintiff need not demonstrate
that biased member's vote was decisive or that his
views influenced those of other members, even if
vote is unanimous. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. 14.
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I70BIV(A) In General
170Bk264 Suits Against States
170Bk265 k. Eleventh Amendinent in
General; Immunity. Most Cited Cases
Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against state,
1983 does not abrogate this immunity.
and 5
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Eleventh Amendment prohibits damage action
against state officials in their official capacities.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 11; 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.
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1191Federal Courts 170B -269

License applicant's failure to seek recusal of allegedly
biased member of Nevada State Private Investigators
Licensing Board did not, in applicant's 9: 1983 action
against board members, result in waiver of his claim
that denial of his application resulted from bias on
part of board, in violation of due process; statute
governing Board did not provide mechanism for
seeking recusal, and imposed no such requirement.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; N.R.S. 648.005 et seq.

1161Federal Courts 170B -269
170B Federal Courts

Federal Courts
170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
170BIV(A) In General
170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States
170Bk269 k. State Officers or Agencies,
Actions Against. Most Cited Cases
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state
officials for prospective relief.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 11; 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.
Federal Courts 170B -269

170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
170BIV(A) In General
170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States
170Bk269 k. State Officers or Agencies,
Actions Against. Most Cited Cases
Eleventh Amendment immunized Nevada State
Private Investigators Licensing Board from liability
in $ 1983 action by applicant who alleged that denial
of his application resulted from bias on part of board
members, in violation of due process. U.S.C.A.
Const.Alnends. l l , l 4 ; 42U.S.C.A. $ 1983; N.R.S.
648.005 et seq.

1211Federal Courts 170B -269

1171Federal Courts 170B -265

170BFederal Courts

170BFederal Courts

170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
170BIV(A) In General

170BlV Citizenship, Residence or Character of

Federal Courts
170BIV Citizenship, Residence or Character of
Parties, Jurisdiction Dependent on
I70BIV(A) In General
170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States
170Bk269 k. State Officers or Agencies,
Actions Against. Most Cited Cases
Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage actions
against state officials in their personal capacities.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amel~d.1 I; 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983.
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1241Civil Rights 78 -1432

170Bk268 What Are Suits Against States
170Bk269 k. State Officers or Agencies,
Actions Against. Most Cited Cases
Eleventh Amendment did not bar applicant's 4 1983
action against Nevada State Private Investigators
Licensing Board members in their individual
capacities, alleging that denial of application violated
due process in that one Board member had pecuniary
interest in outcome and was biased against applicant,
and that, influenced by that member's bias, other
Board members and Board investigators prejudged
application and acted in arbitrary and improper
manner. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnends. 11, l4; 42
U.S.C.A. 6 1983; N.R.S. 648 et seq.

1251Civil Rights 78 -1376(3)

1221Civil Rights 78 -1376(2)

78 Civil Rights
-

78 Civil Rights
-

78111 Federal Remedies in General
-

78k1425 Questions of Law or Fact
78k1432 k. Defenses; Immunity and Good
Faith. Most Cited Cases
(Former1y 78k244)
Whether law governing government official's conduct
at issue in & 1983 action was clearly established, so
that official would be qualifiedly immune, is question
of law for court to decide. 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1983.

78III Federal Remedies in General

78 Civil Rights
-

78111 Federal Remedies in General
-

78k1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith
and Probable Cause
78k 1 3 76 Government Agencies and
Officers
78k1376(2 k. Good Faith and
Reasonableness; Knowledge and Clarity of Law;
Motive and Intent, in General. Most Cited Cases
(Fonnerly 78k2 14(2))
Qualified immunity doctrine shelds government
officials from liability if reasonable government
official could have believed that his conduct was
lawful, in light of clearly established law and
information he possessed; this standard requires twopart analysis, i.e., whether law prohibiting official
conduct was clearly established, and whether
reasonable official could have believed that hls
conduct complied with law. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.

1231Civil Rights 78 -1376(2)
78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith
and Probable Cause
78k1376 Government Agencies and
Officers
78k1376(2) k. Good Faith and
Reasonableness; Knowledge and Clarity of Law;
Motive and Intent, in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k2 14(2))
If law prohibiting government official's conduct was
clearly established and reasonable official could not
have believed his conduct lawful, official is not
immune from liability. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.

78k1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith
and Probable Cause
78k1376 Government Agencies and
Officers
78k1376(3) k. States and Territories and
Their Officers and Agencies. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k2 14(3))
Nevada State Private Investigators Licensing Board
member was not qualifiedly immune from liability in
f 1983 action by unsuccessful license applicant who
alleged that member's opposition to application was
motivated by member's own personal bias and
pecuniary interest; reasonable official harboring
actual bias against license applicant could not have
believed that his participation in licensing proceeding
was appropriate. 42 U.S.C.A. 4 1983.

1261Federal Civil Procedure 170A -2491.5
Federal Civil Procedure
170AXVII Judgment
170AXVlI(C1Summary Judgment
I70AXVII(C)2 Particular Cases
170Ak2491.5 k. Civil Rights Cases in
General. Most Cited Cases
Genuine issues of material fact, precluding summary
judgment for Nevada State Private Investigators
Licensing Board members on qualified immunity
1983 action against them by
grounds in 4
unsuccessful applicant who alleged that denial of his
license applications violated due process, existed as
to whether defendants prejudged his applications and
acted together to deprive him of licenses he sought.
U.S.C.A. Consl.Amend. 14; 43 U.S.C.A. 4 1983;
N.R.S. 648.005 et seq.

J
2
7
J Federal Courts 170B -754.1
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Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
I 70BVIII(K] Scope, Standards, and Extent
17OBVIII(K)1 In General
170Bk754 Review Dependent on
Whether Questions Are of Law or of Fact
170Bk754.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases

Federal Courts 170B -878
Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
17OBVIII(K Scope, Standards, and Extent
170BVIII(K)5 Questions of Fact, Verdicts
and Findings
170Bk870 Particular
Issues
and
Questions
170Bk878 k. Costs and Attorney's
Fees. Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals reviews factual findings underlying
district court's decision to deny attorney fees for clear
error; however, fee determination will be reversed if
district court applied incorrect legal standard in
arriving at its decision.

1281Civil Rights 78 -1482
78 Civil h g h t s
-

78111 Federal Remedies in General
-

78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
Plaintiff may recover attorney fees under 9 1988 if
he is prevailing party; litigant need not prevail on
every issue, or even on central issue in case, to be
considered "prevailing party," but rather, it is enough
that he succeed on any significant claim affording
some of relief sought, either pendente lite or at
conclusion of litigation. 42 U.S.C.A. Q 1988.

1291Civil Rights 78 -1482
78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
If plaintiff is only partially successful in seeking
relief, and achieves only some benefits sought by
litigation, he is still considered "prevailing party," as

degree of success is irrelevant to question whether
plaintiff is prevailing party. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 1988.

1301Civil Rights 78 m 1 4 8 2
78 Civil Rights
-

78III Federal Remedies in General

78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
Relief afforded plaintiff need not be "judicially
decreed" to justify fee award under 3 1988-voluntary
action, such as change in conduct that addresses
grievance, is sufficient; focus is on substance of
relief granted. 42 U.S.C.A. 6 1988.

1311Civil Rights 78 -1482
78 Civil Rights
-

781JIFederal Remedies in General

78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
Where plaintiff who seeks attorney fees under 3
198R asserts that his lawsuit was "catalyst" for relief
subsequently awarded, court must determine: (1)
whether there is "causal link" between lawsuit and
relief awarded; and (2) whether there was "legal
basis" for plaintiffs claim. 42 U.S.C.A. Q 1988.

I321Civil Rights 78 -1482
78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
Applicant who sued Nevada State Private
Investigators Licensing Board for allegedly
unconstitutional denial of license application was
"prevailing party" who was thus entitled to attorney
fees for time spent pursuing injunctive relief, in light
of fact that, after applicant instituted action, "special
board" awarded him his licenses; lawsuit was
"catalyst" for relief awarded, as defendants conceded
that special board meeting was convened in order to
partially settle suit, and there was legal basis for suit
even though district court granted summary judgment
to defendants on merits, as plaintiff presented
substantial legal and factual questions. 42 U.S.C.A. $
1988.
-
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District of Nevada.

1331Civil Rights 78 -1482
Before: FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and JOHN 7'.
NOONAN. Jr., Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Concurrence by
Judge NOONAN.

78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k 1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)

Litigation;

Civil Rights 78 -1484
78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1484 k. Awards to Defendants;
Frivolous, Vexatious, or Meritless Claims. Mosl
Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k299)
Plaintiff who obtains favorable settlement is not
required to demonstrate that he would have prevailed
on merits in order to be considered "prevailing party"
for purposes of request for attorney fee award;
rather, claim has basis in law so long as it is not
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. 42 U.S.C.A.
3 1988.

1341Civil Rights 78 -1482
78 Civil Rights
Federal Remedies in General
78k1477 Attorney Fees
78k1482 k. Results of Litigation;
Prevailing Parties. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k296)
Supreme Court's decision in Farrar did not alter test
for determining when litigant qualifies as "prevailing
party" for purposes of attorney fee award under 2
1988,as Court explicitly affirmed its prior holding
that degree of success does not affect prevailing party
in court; Farrar did, however, change standard for
determining when prevailing party is entitled to
recover fees, as Farrar held that prevailing party
must be denied fees where he obtains only narrow,
technical victory such as nominal damages. &?
U.S.C.A. 6 1988.

*736 Terri Kevser-Cooper, Reno, Nevada, for the
plaintiffs-appellants.
P. Mark Ghan, Assistant Attorney General, Carson
City, Nevada, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the

OPINION
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
This action arises out of decisions by the Nevada
State Private Investigators Licensing Board ("the
Board"), denying the plaintiffs' applications for
licenses in the fields of private investigation, private
patrol, and process serving. The plaintiffs contend
that one of the Board members had a pecuniary
interest in the outcome and was biased against them.
They also contend that, influenced by that member's
bias, the other Board members and certain employees
prejudged their applications and acted in an arbitrary
and improper manner.
Plaintiffs Martin Stivers, Mary Chase Emsberger,
and Chamar, Inc. brought suit under section 1983 for
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages.
The plaintiffs contend that the denial of their license
applications violated their due process right to a fair
hearing before an impartial tribunal.
After this
action was filed, the Board granted Stivers'
application for individual licenses in order to settle
the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.
The
district court subsequently granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the remaining claims,
and rejected the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees
for time spent pursuing injunctive relief. We affirm
the grant of summary judgment as to Stivers' claim
for damages against the Board, but reverse the grant
of summary judgment as to his claim for damages
against the individual defendants. We also reverse
the denial of attorney's fees.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 1988, the plaintiffs filed license
applications with the Board. Plaintiff Martin Stivers
applied for licenses as a private investigator, private
patrolman, and process server. Stivers, along with
co-plaintiff Mary Chase Ernsberger, also submitted
an application for a corporate license on behalf of
"Chamar Inc.," a newly formed company. Between
June 1988 and December 1989, the Board conducted
five separate hearings to consider the plaintiffs'
license applications.
At the September 1988
meeting, it denied Chamar's application for corporate
licenses because of alleged "unlicensed activity." It
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later denied Stivers' application for "lack of
integrity." The plaintiffs allege that, in denying their
applications, members and employees of the Board
violated their due process rights. In particular, they
contend that *737 defendant Richard Pierce, a
member of the Board, had a pecuniary and personal
interest in ensuring that their applications were
denied, that Pierce was actually biased against the
plaintiffs, and that the Board's actions were
influenced by Pierce's bias.

general public. Nev.Rev.Stat. 6 648.020(21. The
Board is responsible for licensing and regulating
private investigators, private patrolmen, process
servers, polygraph operators, repossessors, dog
handlers, and companies providing these services.
Nev.Rev.Stat. 6 F 648.030, 648.060, 648.070. No
person or company may engage in any such business
unless licensed by the Board. Nev.Rev.Stat. 6
648.060. As a member of the Board, Pierce had
authority to vote on the licensing of companies which
would compete directly with Dick Pierce and
Associates.

A. Pierce's Background
To understand the plaintiffs' allegations regarding
Pierce's bias, it is helpful to step back several
years.FN' In the mid-19701s,Pierce was employed as
a private investigator, polygraph examiner, and
process server for Russ Jones and Associates, a
private security and investigation firm that was at that
time owned by Russ Jones. When Jones refused to
permit Pierce to become a co-owner, Pierce became
angry and resentful.
While Jones was away on
vacation, and had temporarily left Pierce in charge of
Jones' company, Pierce started his own business in
direct competition with Russ Jones and Associates.
Not surprisingly, the two men exchanged angry
words upon Jones' return.
During their heated
exchange, Pierce threatened to run Jones' company
out of business.

FNI. Because this is a motion for summary
judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176
(1 962).
Accordingly, we assume for
purposes of this opinion that the facts
presented by the plaintiffs are true. In any
event, those are the facts on which we base
this opinion.

B. Stivers' Backgrotind
Stivers has a long history in the private investigation
and security business. He has worked as a private
patrolman, private investigator, and process server
for a total of 30 years. He was licensed in North
Dakota in 1980 and, when he left that state in 1986,
his license was still in good standing. Stivers arrived
in Nevada in 1986, intending to start his own
business. That same year, he became the general
manager of the Reno branch office of Great Western
Security, a Carson City based company.
As manager of Great Western's Reno branch, Stivers
aggressively sought new business. Among the more
lucrative opportunities pursued by Stivers was
security for the convention business for Bally's
Casino in Reno. Bally's had previously employed
Dick Pierce and Associates for the vast majority of its
convention security needs. Under Stivers' direction,
however, Great Western was "very successful" in
outbidding Pierce's company and "took away a
substantial amount of business from Mr. Pierce,"
including business at Bally's.
Great Western's
successful bidding cost Pierce approximately $55,000
overall.

C. Formation o f ChamarAfter leaving Russ Jones and Associates, Pierce's
own business prospered. Dick Pierce and Associates
soon becoming the largest private security company
in Northern Nevada. In 1986, Pierce became one of
the five members of the Nevada Private Investigators
Licensing Board. A creature of Nevada Statute, the
Board consists of the Attorney General (or his
designate) and four members appointed by the
Governor. Nev.Rev.Stat. G 648.020( 1). Of the
Governor's appointees, one must be a private
investigator, one a private patrolman, one a
polygraph examiner, and one a representative of the

Upon arriving in Reno, Stivers became friends with
Emsberger, and the two made plans to enter the
private security business together: Ernsberger would
put up the cash to purchase a company; Stivers, with
his long history in the industry, was to run the
business.
While employed with Great Western, Stivers became
acquainted with W.G. "Butch" "738 Tamblyn, who
was then owner of Russ Jones and Associates.
Tamblyn had purchased the company from Russ
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Jones in the early 1980's and, by 1987, was hoping to
sell it. Stivers and Ernsberger reached an agreement
with Tamblyn.
Stivers and Ernsberger formed
Chamar, Inc. for the purpose of purchasing the assets
of Russ Jones and Associates. Under the agreement,
Tamblyn would not sell the corporation itself, at least
immediately. Until licenses could be obtained for
Chamar, they would all do business under the name
of Russ Jones and Associates.
Under Nevada law, corporations providing private
investigation and security services are required to
have a licensed "qualifying agentm-aperson meeting
the individual licensing requirements for the type of
work in which the company engages. Nev.Rev.Stat.
648.110.
Tamblyn agreed to remain the
"qualifying agent" of Russ Jones and Associates until
August 1992. Stivers expected that he would be able
to obtain a license to act as Chamar's qualifying agent
after that date.
Pursuant to the agreement, Chamar purchased the
assets of Russ Jones and Associates in August 1987.
Shortly after the sale, Tamblyn notified Carol
Widmer-Hanna, the Board's executive secretary, of
the change in ownership. Tamblyn explained that
the corporation's assets had been sold to Chamar, but
that the business would temporarily continue to
operate under the name Russ Jones and Associates,
with Tamblyn remaining the corporation's qualifying
agent.
Widmer-Hanna told him that they were
"proceeding fine."
At Widmer-Hanna's request,
Tamblyn sent written notification of the change in
corporate structure. Neither Widmer-Hama nor any
other representative of the Board informed Tamblyn
that there was anythlng improper about the
arrangement to which he, Stivers, and Ernsberger had
agreed.

D. The Application Process
In December 1987, Ernsberger and Stivers began the
process of filing applications for the appropriate
licenses, in accordance with Nev.Rev.Stat. k
648.070.
Ernsberger and Stivers delivered to
Widmer-Hanna a copy of Chamar's certificate of
corporate good standing, along with the purchase
agreement between Chamar and Russ Jones and
Associates.
In March 1988, applications were
submitted for the license of Chamar, and for licenses
for Stivers and Ernsberger as corporate officers of
Chamar, along with their application fee of $750.
Stivers filed an application for qualifying agent status
as a private investigator, private patrolman, and

process server for Chamar, with additional fees of
$1,550.
Problems began to develop in June 1988, when the
plaintiffs appeared before the Board for the first time.
Despite her prior communications with Tamblyn, the
Board's executive secretary, Widmer-Hanna, had
erroneously placed plaintiffs on the agenda as a
"name change." Pierce led the questioning, insisting
that it was inappropriate to consider Chamar's
application as a name change, since Stivers and
Ernsberger were in fact seeking licenses for a new
corporation.
Consideration of the plaintiffs'
applications was for this reason deferred until
September 1988.
Concerned that their business
might not be operating legally, Stivers specifically
asked the Board whether Russ Jones and Associates
could continue to do business until the September
1988 meeting.
Board members Robey, WidmerHanna, and Giordano (the Deputy Attorney General)
each replied that the plaintiffs could continue to do
business "under Russ Jones," as long as Tamblyn
remained the qualifying agent.
Following the
Board's instructions, the plaintiffs' business continued
to operate under the name Russ Jones and Associates
with Tamblyn as qualifying agent.
Despite the Board's assurances at the June 1988
hearing, Pierce opened the next hearing in September
1988 by accusing the plaintiffs of "doing business
without a license." Stivers responded by informing
the Board that he was not aware of any violation of
state law. Although Stivers and his attorney told the
Board that their business was operating under the
name Russ Jones and Associates, that Tamblyn was
the qualifying agent, and that Chamar had never
engaged in the patrol or security business, Pierce
repeatedly accused the plaintiffs of operating
illegally. In addition, the Board members questioned
"739 Stivers extensively about his past experience,
accused him of lying about his credentials, and
rehsed to accept his affidavits regarding his
experience. The Board unanimously voted to deny a
corporate license on the basis of "unlicensed
activity." See Nev.Rev.Stat. t; 648.1 10(3)(f). Upon
Pierce's suggestion that the remaining license
applications were "moot," the Board declined to
consider Stivers' applications for private investigator,
private patrolman, or process server licenses.
On December 7, 1988, the plaintiffs brought suit in
Nevada state court to contest the Board's denials of
their license applications. In January 1989, plaintiffs
and their lawyers met with Board counsel Dana
Sarnmons, who agreed that the plaintiffs had been
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operating legally. Sarnrnons told the plaintiffs that
they would be granted the licenses they sought if they
appeared at the Board's next meeting. Relying on
Sarnmons' representations, plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their state action.

unanimously approved Ernsberger's application for
corporate officer status with respect to Russ Jones
and Associates, with Tamblyn to continue acting as
qualifying agent for the company.

At its March 1989 meeting, Sammons informed the
Board that plaintiffs had been operating legally and
recommended that the licenses be granted. After a
recess, Board members expressed "serious
reservation[s]" about Stivers' qualifications and
In particular, they
doubts about his "integrity."
expressed concern that Stivers lacked the requisite
hours of experience required to obtain the licenses he
sought. Board members based their concerns, at
least in part, on an investigative report prepared by
Robert Rodefer that raised questions about Stivers'
background and experience.
FN2
Despite the
recommendation of the Board's counsel, the Board
refused to grant Stivers' application and postponed
voting on all the applications until the next meeting.

E. District Court Proceedings

FN2.As discussed infra part II.B.5, Rodefer
admitted in his deposition that thls report
contained several serious inaccuracies and
omissions.
Stivers again appeared before the Board in September
1989 with additional documentation of his
experience.
Although Board investigator Bill
Bertram conceded that Stivers had 12,000 hours of
private investigation experience-more than the
required 10,000 hours-the Board remained
unsatisfied on this point.
Several members
continued to accuse him of lying about his
experience. Calling Stivers a "professional victim,"
Board member Denise Conrad moved to deny his
application and Pierce seconded the motion. The
Board voted unanimously to deny Stivers' application
as a qualifying agent based on "untruthfulness or lack
of integrity." See Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 648.100(3)(c).
Pierce then moved that Chamar's application be
denied, for the same reasons. When another board
member suggested that Russ Jones and Associates'
operations be permitted to continue, with Tamblyn
acting as qualifying agent, Pierce vigorously
disagreed.
The Board deferred consideration of
whether Tamblyn could be approved as a qualifying
agent for Chamar until the next meeting.
At the December 1989 meeting, the plaintiffs'
attorney informed ine Board that Tamblyn would
remain the qualifying agent for Russ Jones and
Associates, instead of Stivers.
The Board

Plaintiffs filed this action in federal district court on
September 6, 199 1, alleging that the defendants had
violated their rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses.
Their complaint requested
damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
On January 6, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction and petition for a writ of
.
mandamus in order to secure their licenses.
In an effort to settle the claim for injunctive relief, the
defendants agreed to convene a "special board" to
reconsider Stivers' license applications.
Based on
an application *740 identical to that which Stivers
had earlier submitted, the special board unanimously
voted to grant Stivers individual licenses. Stivers
has since become owner of S and W Protective
Sewice, a Board licensed private patrol, process
sewing, and private investigation company. Chamar
never obtained its license; it remains the parent
company of Russ Jones and Associates, which
continues to do business with Ernsberger as its Board
licensed corporate officer and Tamblyn as its Board
licensed qualifying agent.

FN3. Before

the district court granted their
motion for summary judgment, the
defendants moved for a protective order
prohibiting any mention of the special
board, on the grounds that: (1) it was
irrelevant; (2) it was inadmissible as a
subsequent remedial measure; and (3) it
was an offer of settlement.
The district
court granted the defendants' motion for a
protective order, without stating its reasons
for doing so. Under the terms of this order,
the "special board" was to be referred' to at
trial only for the purpose of limiting
damages by showing the date on which
Stivers was issued a license.
Because
Stivers does not challenge this protective
order, we do not consider the "special
board" meeting in reviewing the district
court's~decisionto grant summary judgment.
This meeting is relevant only to the question
of the plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's
fees.
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After the special board's decision, plaintiffs withdrew
their motion for preliminary injunction and
mandamus, informing the court that there were no
remaining issues pertaining to injunctive relief. The
case proceeded on the plaintiffs' claims for
declaratory relief and damages.
The district court subsequently granted summary
judgment to the defendants. The court concluded
that Chamar's complaint for denial of its license was
barred by the statute of limitations. The court further
concluded that Ernsberger had failed to state a claim
on her own behalf and could not recover damages for
harm done to Chamar. Although the district court
found that Stivers had a protected property interest in
the licenses that had been denied him, it granted
summary judgment to the defendants, on the ground
that Stivers had "not offered competent evidence to
show that the [Board's] actions were irrational,
malicious, capricious, or arbitrary."
The court
further stated that its inquiry was limited to "whether
Defendants acted capriciously." The court did not
address Stivers' allegations that Pierce harbored a
personal bias against him and had a pecuniary
interest in seeing his application denied.
The
plaintiffs appealed.
After Stivers obtained his licenses, but before the
district court granted summary judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees. The
court initially rejected the motion on the ground that
it was premature.
After summary judgment, the
plaintiffs filed another motion for attorney's fees,
asserting that they were entitled to fees for time spent
pursuing injunctive relief, since Stivers had obtained
the licenses he sought. The district court again
denied their motion, reasoning that plaintiffs could
not be considered prevailing parties-even though they
had obtained injunctive relief-because they lost their
damages claim on the merits.
The plaintiffs
appealed this order separately.

11. DUE PROCESS CLAIM
The district court correctly found that the
plaintiffs had a protected property interest in the
licenses that were denied them, and the defendants do
not seriously contest this finding.m The central
question on appeal is whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to Stivers' claim that he was
denied his due process right to a fair hearing before
an impartial tribunaLFNSWe conclude that there is.

FN4.The defendants' brief contains a single
parenthetical statement disagreeing with the
district court's holding on this issue: "The
[district] Court did find the plaintiffs had a
property interest in being licensed by the
[Board] (a conclusion with which the
defendants-appellees disagree on the basis
of Krrlft v. Jacku. 872 F.2d 862, 866 (9th
1
-)
...."
As the district court
recognized, and as Kraft states, the existence
of a protected property interest hinges on
whether state law confers a "reasonable
expectation of entitlement." Id. at 866. In
Kraji, the court determined that the Nevada
Gaming Board had almost absolute
discretion to grant or deny new gaming
licenses. Id. at 868; see also Jacobson 1,.
Hnnnifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980)
(finding no protected property interest,
where gaming statute gave board "full and
absolute power and authority" to grant or
deny gaming licenses).
In contrast, the
Private Investigator Licensing Board's
actions are limited by significant substantive
restrictions. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 S 648.005
et. seq.
The district court properly
concluded that these restrictions create a
protected property interest in the licenses in
question.

FN5. After the special board meeting, at
which Stivers was awarded his individual
license, the plaintiffs informed the court that
there was "no hrther issue of injunctive
relief." Thus, no claim for injunctive relief
is before us on appeal.
In their appellate briefs, the plaintiffs do not
challenge the district court's determination
that the statute of limitations had expired
with respect to Chamar's claim or its
determination that Emsberger could not sue
on behalf of Chamar. They raise only the
issue whether Stivers was denied a fair
hearing before a fair tribunal when he
applied for licenses as a private investigator,
private patrolman, and process server.
Although the plaintiffs at oral argument
asserted that the grant of summary judgment
was also erroneous as to Emsberger's and
Chamar's claims, they waived this issue by
failing to raise it in their briefs. See
Ri~lersitle-Linden Investnzcirt Co.. 945 F.2d
320. 324-25 (9th Cir. 19911. Accordingly,
our inquiry is limited to the question
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whether the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to the defendants on
Stivers' claim for damages and declaratory
relief. (It is not clear what if any declaratory
relief may be available to Stivers but
because the parties do not address that
question, neither do we.)
*741 A. Right to an Unbiased Trihtlnal

It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause
prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a
protected property interest without "a fair trial in a
fair tribunal." In re M~ir.chison.349 U.S. 133, 136,
75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). As Justice
Black wrote in Murchison:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be
a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.

Id. at 136, 75 S.Ct. at 625; see also Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc.. 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610,
1613. 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) ("the Due Process
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal").
This requirement applies
not only to courts, but also to state administrative
agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for
v. Larliin. 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95
licenses. Withr.o~.c~
S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Gibson v.
Berryhill, 41 1 U.S. 564, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689. 169798. 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). In attempting to make
out a claim of unconstitutional bias, a plaintiff must
"overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity"
on the part of decision-makers. Withrow. 42 1 U.S. at
47, 95 S.Ct at 1464.
He must show that the
adjudicator "has prejudged, or reasonably appears to
have prejudged, an issue." Kenneall~~
v. Lurzare~~,
967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.1992 (quoting Par?irznton
1,.
Gedan. 880 F.2d 116, 135 (9th Cir.1989)
(Reinhardt, J, concurring and dissenting)), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d
133 (1993).
There are two ways in which a plaintiff may
establish that he has been denied his constitutional
right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. In
some cases, the proceedings and surrounding
circumstances may demonstrate actual bias on the
part of the adjudicator. See T(ivlor. v. Haves, 41 8
U.S. 488, 501-04. 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704-06, 41
L.Ed.2d 897 ( 1974);
Cinck.t.ell~r Cureer (ind

Finishin~Scllools, Inc. 1,. Federal ;ri.atlc Con1n7'11,
425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C.Cir.1970). In other cases,
the adjudicator's pecuniary or personal interest in the
outcome of the proceedings may create an
appearance of partiality that violates due process,
even without any showing of actual bias. Gibson,
4 11 U.S. at 578, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98; see also E,rx-on
Corn, v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399. 1403 (9th Cir. 19941
("the Constitution is concerned not only with actual
bias but also with 'the appearance of justice.' ").

B. Evidence ofBias on the Part o f Pierce

jX3J As this case demonstrates, the two categories of
bias claims are not hermetically sealed.
Stivers
contends not only that Pierce had a pecuniary interest
in denying his license applications, but also that
Pierce was actually biased against him and that he
acted on this bias during the licensing proceedings.
Thus, he raises both an appearance of partiality claim
and an actual bias claim.
On the present record, Pierce's personal and
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings,
standing alone, would probably be insufficient to
support a claim that the appearance of partiality
violated due process. See Aetna Life In.simnce Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825-26. 106 S.Ct. 1580,
1587-88.89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) (adjudicator's "slight
pecuniary interest" in outcome of proceedings does
not in itself violate due process). Nor would the
Board's repeated unfavorable rulings, standing alone,
be sufficient to support a claim that Pierce or any
other member of "742 the Board was actually biased
against him. See McCulden v. Culifornia Library
Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214. 1224 (9th Cir.1990) ("Adverse
rulings alone are not sufficient to require recusal,
even if the number of such rulings is extraordinarily
high."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957. 112 S.Ct. 2306,
1 19 L.Ed.2d 227 (1992).
However, when the
evidence of Pierce's pecuniary interest is considered
along with the evidence of discriminatory treatment
by the Board, there is a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the licensing proceedings were tainted by
actual bias.
Stivers has introduced sufficient
evidence of bias on the part of Board member
Richard Pierce to overcome the presumption of
integrity.
The evidence that Stivers has introduced can be
divided into the following categories: (1) evidence of
Pierce's pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
licensing proceedings; (2) evidence concerning
Pierce's past association with Russ Jones and
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Associates;
(3) evidence that Pierce made
"extrajudicial" statements reflecting his personal
hostility toward Stivers; (4) evidence that Stivers
received unusually harsh and highly irregular
treatment from the Board during the licensing
hearings; and (5) evidence that the Board, through its
employees, sought to impede and delay the plaintiffs'
efforts to do business.
The first category relates
primarily to the appearance of bias, while the other
categories pertain exclusively to Stivers' allegations
that Pierce was actually biased against him. We
examine each category separately, although we
evaluate them collectively for purposes of
determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists as
to actual bias. As to the appearance of partiality,
only the first category is relevant.

1. Pierce's Pecuniary Interest
Stivers has introduced evidence showing that Pierce
had a pecuniary interest in ensuring that Stivers'
license applications were denied.
A short time
before the licensing proceedings began, Stivers had
entered into direct competition with Dick Pierce and
Associates. Stivers asserts that Pierce's pecuniary
interest in stifling competition rendered his
participation
in
the licensing proceedings
constitutionally objectionable.
Among the cases in which the appearance of bias is
"too high to be constitutionally tolerable" are those in
which the adjudicator has a direct and substantial
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case before
him. Witfirow, 421 U.S. at 47. 95 S.Ct. at 1464. In
such cases, the adjudicator's participation constitutes
a per se violation of due process-the appearance of
partiality in itself renders the proceedings
objectionable, without any showing that the
adjudicator was actually biased. Aetnu Life, 475 U.S.
at 825, 106 S.Ct. at 1587; Utico Puckit12 Co. 11.
Block. 78 1 F.2d 7 1, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1986).

123 The Supreme Court has held that a state licensing
tribunal violates due process when its members have
a direct and substantial competitive interest in the
outcome of the proceedings before them. Gibson,
41 1 U.S. at 578-79, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98. In Gibson,
the Court considered the disciplinary proceedings of
an optometry licensing board. The plaintiffs subject
to license revocation proceedings were optometrists
employed by an optometry company.
All the
members of the licensing board, h~wever,were selfemployed optometrists. 41 1 U.S. at 571, 93 S.Ct, at
1694. The district court found that, if the optometry
-

company were forced to shut down, "the individual
members of the Board, along with other private
practitioners of optometry, would fall heir to this
business." Id. Without requiring any showing that
the board's decision was actually influenced by
impermissible bias, the Court upheld the district
court's conclusion that the board members'
"substantial pecuniary interest" in denying licenses to
competitors constituted a per se violation of the
plaintiffs' right to due process. It/. at 579, 93 S.Ct, at

1698.
The Court's decision in Gibson did not invalidate all
licensing boards that include industry representatives.
After Gibson, the Court upheld a state statute
requiring that a majority of optometry board
members be drawn from an organization of
professional optometrists. Frierln~anv. Rogers. 440
U.S. 1, 18, 99 S.Ct. 887, 898, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979).
More recently, the Court has made clear that due
process is not violated by the participation of
adjudicators who "might conceivably"743 have had
a slight pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the case
before them. Aeti~aLife, 475 U.S. at 825, 106 S.Ct.
at 1587 (1986).
An adjudicator is, however,
precluded from participating in decisions in which he
has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest." 475 U.S. at 822, 106 S.Ct. at 1585.
The fact that Pierce and Stivers have in the past
competed for a few specific contracts is not in itself
sufficient to meet this standard. While under Stivers'
management, Great Western outbid pierce's company
for the convention business at Bally's and other
business totalling $55,000, the contracts constituted a
relatively small portion of Dick Pierce and
Associates' $5 million annual receipts. Nevertheless,
there may be a genuine issue as to whether Pierce had
a sufficient interest in the denial of Stivers'
application to necessitate his recusal. Unlike most
other license applicants before the Board, who sought
to do business in the more populous Southern Nevada
region, Stivers intended to enter into business in the
Reno area, where he would operate in direct
competition with Pierce. See Wilkerson v. Johnson,
699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.1983) (licensing board
member's interest in preventing barber shop from
opening next door to his own created
"unconstitutional risk of bias").
There are other
pertinent facts that do not appear in the record as
developed thus far. We dc not know, for example,
how many similar businesses are currently licensed in
the Reno area, what effect one more business is likely
to have, or even much about the nature of the market
or the particular qualifications or attributes that
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Stivers and Pierce may possess. Such facts may be
critical in determining whether Pierce had a "direct"
and "substantial" pecuniary interest that would
constitute a per se due process violation.
There are undoubtedly cases in which the appearance
of partiality arising from competitive interests is
sufficiently strong to warrant recusal. See Gibson.
41 1 U.S. at 578-79. 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98. A lawyer
in a one-lawyer town, for example, would probably
have a "direct" and "substantial" pecuniary interest in
the licensing of a competitor planning to hang a
shingle across the street. On the other hand, it is
unlikely that any attorney practicing in a city like Los
Angeles would have a competitive interest
sufficiently strong to require that he be disqualified
from considering the licensing of an additional
lawyer.
We note that any per se rule governing the
appearance of partiality must take into account the
fact that the system of industry representation on
governing or licensing bodies is an accepted practice
throughout the nation. As the Supreme Court has
pointed out, the Due Process Clause imposes "only
broad limits ... on the exercise by the State of its
authority to regulate its economic life, and
particularly the conduct of its professions."
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 18 n. 19, 99 S.Ct. at 898 n. 19.
If members of a licensing board were disqualified
whenever they have "some" competitive interest in
the outcome of proceedings before them,
practitioners in the field would as a practical matter
be excluded from becoming members of such boards.
There are, of course, advantages to the involvement
of industry representatives in licensing decisions.
Private investigators, for example, can bring a
particular practical understanding and perspective to
the proceedings. It is presumably for this reason that
the Board, by statute, must include a private
investigator, a private patrolman, and a polygraphic
examiner.
See Nev.Rev.Statute 16 648.020(1).
Were we to hold Pierce's participation impermissible,
based solely on the fact that there may on occasion be
"some" competition for clients, we would call into
question the composition not only of the Board
involved in the case before us but many other boards
throughout the circuit that include industry
representatives among their membership. That we
do not wish to do.
Without more facts, it does not appear that Pierce's
economic interest is such as to warrant a per se
disqualification. Upon remand, however, Stivers is

free to introduce evidence tending to show that
Pierce's pecuniary interest is in fact sufficient to
warrant application of the per se rule.
On this
appeal, we consider the evidence concerning Pierce's
competitive interest for a different purpose.
We
consider it in connection with Stivers' *744 claim that
Pierce was actually biased against him. It is that
claim which we now examine.

2. Pierce's Past Business Association

JXJ Stivers contends that Pierce's relationship with
Russ Jones and Associates during the 1970's rendered
his participation in the decision to deny Stivers'
applications constitutionally objectionable. We take
as true the plaintiffs' charge that, upon Pierce's
tumultuous departure from Russ Jones and
Associates, he threatened to run the company out of
business. Stivers contends that this statement reveals
that Pierce had a bias against Russ Jones and
Associates and that he should have recused himself
from participating in the licensing proceedings for
this reason.
We agree that unconstitutional bias may be shown
through evidence that the adjudicator "had it 'in' for
the party for reasons unrelated to the officer's view of
the. law." McLu~lnhlin v. Union Oil of' CaliL, 869
F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989). However, we do
not believe that the particular inference that plaintiffs
would have us draw is warranted. A number of
years after Pierce's departure from Russ Jones and
Associates, the company was sold to Tamblyn, who
in turn sold the company's assets to Stivers and
Ernsberger years later. While it might be reasonable
to conclude that Pierce harbored a personal grudge
against Jones, there is no rational basis for
concluding that he retained a bias against the
corporation that Jones had previously owned,
particularly since Jones had sold it to a disinterested
third party a number of years earlier. Pierce's past
association with Russ Jones and Associates is wholly
insufficient to overcome the "presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as adjudicators."
Withr-ow,421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1464. Because
the dispute between Pierce and the former owner of
Russ Jones and Associates is so far removed from the
events at issue in this case, we conclude as a matter
of law that they have no relevance to the question
whether the denial of the plaintiffs' license
applications violated due process.

3. Pierce's Statements About Stivers
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JYJIn addition to alleging that Pierce had a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the licensing proceedings,
Stivers has also introduced evidence that Pierce
harbored a personal bias against him.
A party
alleging unconstitutional bias may prove this claim
by introducing extrajudicial statements by the
adjudicator that are inconsistent with the role of
impartial decisionmaker. Jenkins v. Sterl(icci. 849
F.2d 627,634 (D.C.Cir. 1988).

An affidavit from Patty Bavol, the manager of an
apartment complex in Reno, reports derogatory
statements that Pierce made about Stivers during a
business visit in the spring of 1989-while Stivers'
application was pending before the Board. Stivers
had recently been shot in the chest by an unknown
attacker while investigating a burglary. Pierce, who
was providing security services to Bavol's apartment,
laughed about the shooting and remarked that
"everybody knew Marty [Stivers] had shot himself."
From this and other comments Pierce made that day,
Bavol believed it clear that Pierce harbored "an
extremely negative, biased, attitude toward Mr.
Stivers."
Pierce's derogatory statement lends some support to
the view that his opposition to the plaintiffs'
application was the consequence of h s hostility
toward Stivers. See Tavlor. 418 U.S. at 501, 94
S.Ct. at 2704-05 (adjudicator's remarks demonstrated
personal animus toward litigant violative of due
process); Balialis v. Golernheski, 35 F.3d 318, 326
17th Cir.1994) (running controversy between the
plaintiff and the board showed that board had
prejudged issue). The statement tends to support the
allegation that Pierce's opposition to Stivers was the
product of personal animosity, rather than the merits
of his application. See McLuuphlin, 869 F.2d at
1047.
Standing alone, Bavol's affidavit would
clearly be insufficient to demonstrate that Pierce
prejudged Stivers' application. However, we do not
view the hostile statement in isolation; instead, we
examine it in connection with all the other evidence
tending to establish or rebut the charge of bias.

*745 4. The Licensing Hearings
We also consider the treatment accorded to the
plaintiffs by the Board. As the Sixth Circuit noted in
Wilkerson v. Johnson, the "regular and impartial
administration of public rules governing these
interests [in occupational licenses], as required by
due process, prohibits the subtle distortions of

prejudice and bias as well as gross governmental
violations ...." 699 F.2d at 328 (citing Gibson, 41 1
U.S. at 564. 93 S.Ct. at 1690-91 ). In Wilkerson, the
plaintiffs offered evidence that one member of a
barber's licensing board had a competitive interest in
denying their application, that the board had delayed
in acting upon their application, and that the board
had harassed them during the application process. Id.
at 328. In view of this evidence, the Sixth Circuit
upheld the jury's conclusion that the board was
motivated by impermissible bias. Id.

LlOJ

We agree with the Sixth Circuit that it is
appropriate to look to irregularities in the treatment
that a license applicant receives from the Board in
determining whether the decision-malung' process
was affected by impermissible bias on the part of one
of its members. See Sinaloa Lake Owrlers Ass'n 11.
Citv o f Sirni Vullev, 882 F.2d 1398, 1409 (9th
Cir.1989) ( "malicious, irrational and plainly
arbitrary actions are not within the legitimate purview
of the state's power"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016,
1 10 S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990). In addition
to the evidence of Pierce's pecuniary interest and
personal animus, the record contains substantial
evidence showing that the treatment Stivers and
Chamar received from the Board as a whole-and
from Pierce in particular-was unusually harsh. Me1
Tate, an investigator who frequently attended Board
meetings, testified that the Board's consideration of
Stivers' application was very unusual. According to
Tate, the Board appeared to have "made up their
minds" to reject Stivers' application and "seemed to
be harboring a grudge toward him." See Brr1culi.s. 35
F.3d at 326 (evidence tended to show that some
members of board had prejudged case before it). In
particular, Tate recalled the "very negative attitude of
Dick Pierce," who "seemed to be biased against
Stivers."
Tate contrasted the treatment Stivers
received with that received by other applicants.
While the Board ordinarily accepted the statements of
other applicants and requested only general
descriptions of their background, it "kept pushing
Stivers" and refused to accept any of his statements.
Stivers has also introduced evidence that the Board
did not apply its licensing criteria in an evenhanded
manner. See Wilket-sot?,699 F.2d at 328. Minutes
of other Board meetings corroborate Tate's
observation that Stivers was treated markedly
differently from other applicants.
At meetings
between 1985 and 1988, the Board granted licenses
to at least 14 applicants without asking any questions.
The Board has granted licenses to several people with
criminal records, without raising any question as to
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their integrity. Although Stivers has no criminal
record, the Board continually challenged his integrity
during the several Board meetings at which he
appeared. Furthermore, the Board granted licenses
to many individuals and companies despite their
"unlicensed activity," and to others who lacked the
required experience and qualifications.
It is also noteworthy that the Board's members,
including Pierce, disregarded the recommendations
of its own legal counsel in denying Stivers'
application. After the plaintiffs' filed suit in state
court, the Board's counsel Sarnmons informed the
Board that Russ Jones and Associates had been
operating legally and recommended that the licenses
be granted. The Board's decision to deny Stivers'
application, despite counsel's advice, is circumstantial
evidence of unconstitutional bias. See'Cunninphoni
v. City o f Over-land, 804 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th
(3.1986) (board violated due process in denying
license, where city attorney had informed board that
there were no legal grounds for denial); Blrschc v.
Burkee. 649 F.2d 509. 520 (7th Cir.1981) (police
chiefs' disregard of legal counsel's advice established
malicious intent), cert. denied 454 U.S. 897, 102
S.Ct. 396.70 L.Ed.2d 2 12 (198 1).
Transcripts of the Board hearings also corroborate
Tate's observations that Pierce played a prominent
role in opposing Stivers' applications.
Pierce
accused Stivers of lying *746 about his credentials
even after the Board's own investigator
acknowledged that proof existed as to his hours of
service.
After the Board voted to deny Stivers'
applications, Pierce persisted in opposing another
member's suggestion that Russ Jones and Associates
be permitted to continue doing business.
These
actions stand in contrast to the treatment Pierce
accorded other prospective licensees; in most cases,
he asked few if any question. Taken as a whole, the
Board's
proceedings
provide
strong-albeit
circumstantial-support for Stivers' contention that
Pierce was biased against him.

5. Harassment and Delay
J12ll13] Among the factors we take into account, in
determining whether governmental action violated
due process, is "whether the action was taken in good
faith or for the purpose of causing harm." Sinalon
Lake O~vneraAss'n, 882 F.2d at 1409. As the Sixth
Circuit observed in Wilkerson, evidence of
"harassment and delay in allowing plaintiffs to
pursue their occupation" is germane to the question

of whether licensing proceedings violated due
process. 699 F.2d at 328.
Stivers has introduced substantial evidence of
harassment and delay by the Board and its agents. In
rejecting Stivers' application, the Board relied heavily
on a report from its investigator, Robert Rodefer-a
report that, by Rodefer's own admission, contains
several incomplete, inaccurate, and misleading
statements. Rodefer's report raised serious questions
about Stivers' claimed experience and character. In
his deposition, Rodefer testified that proof of Stivers
past employment existed, but that he had failed to
find it before completing his report. Additionally,
Rodefer testified that there was "no problem" with
Stivers' character. After admitting that the report
could be viewed as containing "many inaccuracies,"
Rodefer stated that it was "not one of my greatest
investigations." Rodefer's admissions provide strong
support for Stivers' contention that the Board
intended to prevent him from going into business.
The plaintiffs have also produced evidence that the
Board's investigators attempted to interfere with the
operations of Russ Jones and Associates during the
course of the licensing proceedings. According to
one customer of Russ Jones and Associates, Lynne
Keller of the Gold Dust West Casino, Rodefer falsely
informed her that Russ Jones and Associates was
doing business illegally.
As a result of her
conversation with Rodefer, the Gold Dust West
cancelled the services of Russ Jones and Associates.
Another investigator for the Board, Bill Bertram,
approached Russ Jones and Associates' insurer.
Bertram stated that the company was doing
unlicensed work, prompting the insurance company
to cancel its policy. The Board's executive secretary
Widmer-Hanna then informed the plaintiffs that the
license of Russ Jones and Associates would be
revoked if they did not obtain insurance.
Such evidence of harassment and delay is directly
relevant to the question whether the Board's
proceedings were affected by the impermissible bias
of one of its members. Willierson, 699 F.2d at 328.
Along with the evidence of Pierce's pecuniary
interest, his hostile statements regarding Stivers, and
the evidence of disparate treatment by the Board, the
evidence of harassment and delay creates a triable
issue of fact as to whether Stivers was denied a fair
hearing before an impartial tribunal.

C. Impact of One Member's Bias
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r141 In support of

their argument that the grant of
summary judgment should be upheld, the defendants
argue that the evidence at most demonstrates bias on
the part of one member of the Board, not the denial
of a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. As the
defendants point out, the plaintiffs have produced no
evidence that other members of the Board had a
pecuniary interest in ensuring that Stivers' application
was denied.
Because the five-person Board
unanimously rejected Stivers' application, the
defendants argue that Pierce's. participation was
irrelevant to the outcome.
Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has
addressed whether bias on the part of one member of
a multi-person tribunal violates due process, without
any showing that that member's bias affected the
tribunal's "747 decision. In Aetna Life, the Supreme
Court expressly declined to address this question.
475 U.S. at 827 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1588 n. 4. The
Court first held that one justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court was disqualified, by virtue of his
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case before
him, but that there was no constitutional bar to the
participation of the other eight justices. Id. at 825,
Because the
827. 106 S.Ct at 1587. 1588.
disqualified justice's vote was decisive, and because
he wrote the majority opinion, there was no question
that the Alabama Supreme Court's decision could not
be permitted to stand. Icl. at 828, 106 S.Ct. at 158889. However, the majority expressed no view as to
whether the same result would have been required if
the biased justice's vote had not been decisive.
827 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1588 n. 4 (citing Ashu~anrler-11.
TVA. 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466,483.80 L.Ed.
688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
While concurring in the majority's opinion, Justice
Brennan stated his view that the participation of one
biased member would require that the tribunal's
decision be vacated regardless of whether that
member's vote was decisive.
Referring to the
collective process of deliberation, Justice Brennan
observed that:
[Wlhile the influence of a single participant in this
process can never be measured with precision,
experience teaches us that each member's
involvement plays a part in shaping the court's
ultimate disposition. The participation of a judge
who has a substantial interest in the outcome of a
case of which he knows at the time he participates
necessarily imports a bias into the deliberative
process. This deprives litigants of the impartiality
that is the fundamental requirement of due process.

Id. at 831, 106 S.Ct, at 1 5 9 0 . ~

FN6. Justices

Blackmun, who concurred
only in the judgment, expressed a view
similar to that of Justice Brennan. See
831-33, 106 S.Ct. at 1590-91 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Blackmun's opinion, in which
Justice Marshall joined, states that the
participation of one biased justice "posed an
unacceptable danger of subtly distorting the
decisionmaking process." Id. at 83 1, 106
S.Ct. at 1590. Therefore, the fact that the
biased justice cast the deciding vote was, in
Justice Blackmun's view, "irrelevant" to the
question whether the proceedings violated
due process. Id.
'

Other courts have reached the same conclusion as
Justice Brennan.
In Cinderella Career and
Finishing Schools v. Federal Trade Comm'n, the
District of Columbia Circuit expressed its view that
there is no way of determining the extent to which
one biased member's views affect the deliberations of
a supposedly impartial tribunal. 425 F.2d 583, 592
JD.C.Cir.1970) (citing Berk~hircEmnlovec.~Ass'n of'
Berk~hireKnitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 239
(3d Cir. 1941)). Accordingly, that court vacated the
decision of an administrative tribunal, even though
the biased member's vote was not necessary for a
majority. In H i c h v. Citv o f Watonga. 942 F.2d 737,
748 (10th Cir.19911, the Tenth Circuit likewise
concluded that the plaintiff could make out a due
process claim by showing bias on the part of only one
member of the tribunal.
Relying on Cinderella
Career and Finishing Schools, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the presence of one biased member on
a six-person tribunal would "taint[ ] the tribunal" and
thereby violate due process, regardless of whether
that member cast the deciding vote.
Finally, in
Wilkerson v. Johnson. 699 F.2d 325, 328-29 (6th
Cir.19831, the Sixth Circuit held that barbershop
license applicants were denied due process, although
only one member of the four-person board had a
competitive interest in denying the plaintiffs' license
application.
We find the reasoning of these courts, and of Justice
Brennan in Aetna Life, to be persuasive. Particularly
on a small board like the Board before us, a single
person's bias is likely to have a profound impact on
the decisionmaking process. Cf: Lani 11. Ut~iversiti)
o f Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 (9th Cir.1994)
(evidence of racial and gender bias on the part of one
member of fifteen-person faculty precludes summary
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judgment in Title VII case). As Justice Brennan
observed in Aetna Llfe, it is difficult if not impossible
to measure the impact that one member's views have
Each
on the process of collective deliberation.
member contributes not only his vote but also his
voice to the deliberative process. Thus, the fact that
the tribunal's vote was *748 unanimous does not
mean that the bias of one member had no effect on
the r e s ~ l t . ~
FN7. The
-

defendants cite Arroyo Vista
Purtners v. County o f Santu Brrrbaru, 732
F.Supp. 1046 (C.D.Ca1.19901 and Flicl<inaer
v. School Bd. o f City ofNorfolli. 799 F.Supv.
586 (E.D.Va.1992) in support of their
argument that the evidence of Pierce's bias is
insufficient to require reversal. Neither of
these cases supports their position.
The
question in both Arroyo Vista and Flickinger
was whether the evidence was sufficient to
hold municipal entities liable under Monell
v. De~artnlento f Social Svs.. 436 U.S. 658,
98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 6 1 1 (1978). To
hold municipal entities liable under Monell,
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
unlawful governmental action was part of
the municipality's policy or custom. &
Louis v. Pra~rotnik,485 U.S. 112, 123, 108
S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). In
this case, however, the issue is not the
liability of a municipal entity, but the
liability of the individual members and
Monell's
employees of the Board.
requirement that plaintiffs establish the
existence of a policy or custom is thus
inapplicable here.
We therefore hold that where one member of a
tribunal is actually biased, or where circumstances
create the appearance that one member is biased, the
proceedings violate due process. The plaintiff need
not demonstrate that the biased member's vote was
decisive or that his views influenced those of other
members. Whether actual or apparent, bias on the
part of a single member of a tribunal taints the
proceedings and violates due process.
Of course, we do not decide whether Pierce was
actually biased against Stivers. We hold only that
the evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to
whether Stivers was deprived of the licenses he
sought without due process.
Stivers must still
convince the trier of fact that Pierce was actually
biased against him.FN8 However, while the Board's

conduct may provide evidence favorable to Stivers'
claim, Stivers is not required to show that Pierce's
bias affected the Board's ultimate decision to deny his
applications.
FN8. As discussed supra part 1I.B.1, Stivers
-

may also attempt to develop the record
further to show that Pierce's financial
interest is such as to create an appearance of
bias that would require his recusal.
Although Stivers need not show that other members
of the Board were influenced by Pierce's bias to make
out a due process claim, the impact of Pierce's bias on
the other members is germane to the question
whether they may be held individually liable. We
discuss that question below when we examine the
issue of qualified immunity. See infra part 111.

D. Waiver of Objection
The defendants further contend that, even if a
triable issue exists on the question of bias, Stivers
waived any objection by failing to seek Pierce's
recusal. See Pnrtinrtoi7 v. Gsdan. 880 F.2d 116. 127
19th Cir. 19891 (no denial of impartial tribunal, where
state statute permitted plaintiff to seek recusal),
vacated, 497 U.S. 1020. 110 S.Ct. 3265, 11 1 L.Ed.2d
776 (19901, re a p d , 914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.19901,
rev'd on other grounds, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 199 1)
(en banc); Flanwas v. Stute Bar o f Nevuiia. 655 F.2d
946. 950 (9th Cir.1981) (plaintiffs failure to utilize
statutorily prescribed disqualification procedures
barred court from considering his bias claim).
According to the defendants, Stivers was aware of the
circumstances creating Pierce's alleged bias at the
time of his hearings. The defendants argue that,
because Stivers failed to ask that Pierce recuse
himself, he waived his right to claim that due process
was denied.
We conclude that Stivers' failure to object to Pierce's
participation in the Board proceedings did not
constitute a waiver. Where state law provides a
mechanism for seeking recusal, the litigant may be
required to avail himself of that mechanism.
POI-tinrrton,880 F.2d at 127; Flan.r~rms,655 F.2d at
950. The statute governing the Board, however,
imposes no such requirement.
Nowhere in the
statute is there any discussion of recusal or of the
circumstances in which recusal is appropriate; nor is
any procedure established for the making of recusal
requests.
Under the circumstances, it is easy to
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understand why someone in Stivers' position would
remain silent. To suggest the existence of a conflict
would likely antagonize the Board, and might offer
little if any hope for relief. We hold that, where
there are no procedures specifically governing
recusal, a failure to seek such action does not
constitute a waiver.
*749 111. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The defendants contend that, even if the plaintiffs'
due process rights were violated, the grant of
summary judgment should be upheld on the ground
that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action against
either the Board or the individual defendants. While
it is correct that the Eleventh Amendment shields the
Board itself from liability, the individual defendants
are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

1211 Stivers

has brought suit against the individual
members of the Board, the executive secretary of the
Board, and the Board's investigators in their personal
capacities. Stivers asserts that, while acting under
color of state law, the individual defendants deprived
him of a protected property interest without due
process. This is not an action against the "officials'
office," but an action against the individuals who
allegedly deprived Stivers of his right to due process
by participating in an unfair decisionmaking process.
The fact that the defendants were acting under color
of state office does not shield them from personal
liability under section 1983. Id. at 31, 112 S.Ct. at
365.
Because Stivers' action is against the
defendants in their personal capacities for their own
wrongdoing, and not in their official capacities, the
Eleventh Amendment imposes no bar to his suit.

J 161r 1 71 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits
against a state, and section 1983 does not abrogate
this immunity. Will v. Michipan De~artmento f State
Police. 491 U.S. 58, 62. 109 S.Ct. 2304. 2307-08,
105 L.Ed.2d 45 11989). In this case, the complaint
names the Board as a defendant. As an agency of
the state, the Board itself is shielded from liability
under the Eleventh Amendment. Mitchell v. Los
Anpeles Comn~unityCollepe Dist.. 86 1 F.2d 198, 20 1
/9th Cir. 19882, cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1081, 1 09 S.Ct.
2 102. 104 L.Ed.2d 663 11989). Accordingly, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the
Board.
11811191r201 The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits
damage actions against state officials in their oflcial
capacities. Id. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 23 12. However,
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
state officials for prospective relief. Pennhurst v.
Hulderman. 465 U.S. 89, 104-06, 104 S.Ct. 900, 9101 1 , 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Nor does it bar damage
actions against state officials in their personal
capacities. Hafer. v. Melo, 502 U.S. 2 1.3 1. 1 12 S.Ct.
358. 365, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991).
Personal
capacity suits seek to impose liability on state
officials for acts taken under color of state law.
25-26. 112 S.Ct. at 362. In Hafer, the Court made
clear that the Eleventh Amendment does not shield
state officials from allegations that they violated a
federal right while acting under color of state law.
Id. at 29. 112 S.Ct. at 364. The Amendment only
prohibits damage actions against the "official's
office7'-actions that are in reality suits against the
state itself, rather than its individual officials.
29. 112 S.Ct. at 364; Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct.

IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The defendants further contend that the doctrine of
qualified immunity requires that we uphold the
district court's grant of summary judgment.
We
disagree.
1221[23] The qualified immunity doctrine shields
government officials from liability, if "a reasonable
government official could have believed that his
conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law
and the information he possessed." Tllor.~tedv. Kelly,
858 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1988). This standard
requires a two-part analysis: (I) whether the law
prohibiting the official conduct was clearly
established; and (2) whether a reasonable official
could have believed that his conduct complied with
the law. Act Uu!/Po~.tlundv. Bagle~l.988 F.2d 868,
If the law prohibiting the
871 (9th Cir.1993).
conduct was clearly established and a reasonable
official could not have believed his conduct lawful,
then the official is not immune.

1241 Whether the law governing the conduct at issue
was clearly established is a question of law for the
court to decide. Id. at 873. In this case, Stivers
asserts that the defendants denied him his
constitutional right to a fair hearing by an unbiased
tribunal.
Specifically, he asserts that Pierce
harbored"750 a bias against him and that this bias
influenced the other Board members in their actions.
The law is clearly established that the members of a
licensing tribunal must be impartial and cannot act on
the basis of personal bias. Witlzro~i:42 1 U.S. at 46,
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95 S.Ct. at 1464; Gih,von, 41 1 U.S. at 578-79, 93
S.Ct. at 1697-98.
Thus, the first prong of the
qualified immunity test is satisfied.
The remaining question is whether officials in the
defendants' position could have believed that their
conduct was reasonable. This is an objective and
fact-specific test. Tllorsfed, 858 F.2d at 573. In
order to answer that question at summary judgment,
we must accept the plaintiffs version of the facts. If
there is a dispute about facts that are material to the
qualified immunity question, summary judgment is
988 F.2d at 872.
inappropriate. Act UD!,
We have little difficulty in concluding that
Pierce is not entitled to assert a qualified immunity
defense. If Pierce's opposition to Stivers' application
was motivated by his own personal bias, then Pierce
would clearly be foreclosed from asserting a qualified
immunity defense-a reasonable official harboring
actual bias against a license applicant could not have
believed that his participation in the licensing
proceedings was appropriate. See Hicks v. Citv o f
Watonna. 942 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a
board member's claim of qualified immunity, where
there was evidence tending to show that she was
improperly motivated).

J
X
J Whether the other individual defendants have a
valid qualified immunity defense presents a
somewhat more difficult question.
In Hicks, the
Tenth Circuit considered the circumstances under
which members of a multi-person tribunal are entitled
to qualified immunity, where one member is actually
biased against the party before it.
The court
concluded that the plaintiff had introduced evidence
of bias on the part of one council member, but had
failed to come forward with any evidence of
improper motivation or conduct on the part of the
other defendants, aside from their votes against the
plaintiff. Id. at 748. The court held that the other
members had not violated any duty, saying that a
contrary ruling would "place on all administrative
tribunal members a duty to ferret out possible bias
among their colleagues, or to face civil damages
regardless of their own fairness and integrity." Id.
Although we find the Tenth Circuit's analysis
persuasive, we believe the circumstances of this case
to be distinguishable. Where the evidence shows
actual bias on the part of only one board member, and
no improper conduct on the part of the other
defendants, those other defendants are not liable. In
this case, however, Stivers does not rely simply on
the fact that the other Board members voted against

him. Rather, he alleges that they all acted in an
arbitrary and improper manner. He has introduced
evidence that tends to show that the Board's
members, executive secretary, and investigators
prejudged his applications and acted together to
deprive him of the licenses he sought. The hearing
transcripts contain evidence that supports his claim
that the entire Board, and not just Pierce, accorded
the plaintiffs unusually harsh treatment.
The
transcript shows that, after the plaintiffs were
informed that they could do business under the name
Russ Jones and Associates, several of the Board's
members accused them of operating illegally. Later,
the Board rejected its attorney's advice and
peremptorily refused to grant Stivers' license
applications.
Even after Stivers produced
documentation of his hours of experience, the Board
persisted in its hostility toward the plaintiffs, with
one Board member deriding Stivers as a
"professional victim" and others accused him of
lying. As a witness to the hearings observed, all the
Board's members appeared to have "made up their
mind" ahead of time and "seemed to be harboring a
grudge" toward Stivers. Finally, there is evidence
that the Board's employees attempted to interfere
with the plaintiffs' business by discouraging their
customers.
From this evidence, the trier of fact could conclude
that all the defendants, influenced by Pierce's bias,
prejudged Stivers' application or otherwise acted out
of bias. See Wilker-son. 699 F.2d at 328-29 (even
though only one member of board had pecuniary
interest in denying licensing, evidence supported
jury's finding that all board members were biased);
cf: *751Woodr~miI). Woodward Countj). 866 F.2d
1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989) (plaintiff may show
conspiracy under 9 1983 by showing agreement to
violate constitutional rights).
If the defendants
joined with Pierce in an effort to deny Stivers'
applications, then they would be liable; moreover, in
such circumstances, they would not be entitled to
qualified immunity. No reasonable official in their
position could believe that such conduct was lawful.
Following Hiclcs, we decline to impose upon board
members a duty to "ferret out" bias on the part of
their colleagues. 942 F.2d at 750. We do, however,
hold that they have a duty not to join with the biased
member by acting improperly themselves. While the
mere fact that decisions adverse to the applicants
were rendered ,is not enough to defeat a qualified
immunity defense, evidence of arbitrary and
improper treatment by the Board's members and
employees may be.
Viewed in the light most
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favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence supports the
conclusion that all the defendants joined in Pierce's
efforts to deny Stivers' applications without a fair
hearing.
Given these factual circumstances, we
cannot say as a matter of law that the qualified
immunity doctrine shields them from liability.

V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
After the "special board" awarded Stivers his
licenses, and again after the grant of summary
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. Ei 1988. The plaintiffs asserted
entitlement to fees because they had obtained some
of the relief sought by this action-namely, licenses
permitting Stivers to work as a private investigator,
private patrolman, and process server. The court
rejected the fee application, reasoning that the
plaintiffs could not be considered prevailing parties,
because they lost their damages claim on the merits.
'

We review factual findings underlying the
district court's decision to deny fees for clear error.
Sabfun v. Dent. ofFinance. 856 F.2d 13 17, 1324 (9th
Cir.1988).
However, we will reverse the fee
determination if the district court applied an incorrect
legal standard in arriving at its decision. L u m m i
Indian Tribe v. Oltnlan, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1983). In this case, we conclude that the district
court applied the wrong standard in determining
whether or not there was a "legal basis" for Stivers'
claim. Had the court applied the proper standard, it
would have been compelled to award fees.

11 1-12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573. 12 1 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
The degree of success is irrelevant to the question
whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party.
112-14. 113 S.Ct. at 574. The relief afforded the
plaintiff need not be "judicially decreed" to justify a
fee award under section 1988-voluntary action, such
as a change in conduct that addresses the grievance,
is sufficient. Farrur, 506 U.S. at 1 1 1-12, 113 S.Ct. at
573; Hovitt. 482 U.S. at 760-61. 107 S.Ct. at 267576.
The focus is on the substance o f the relief
granted. Sahlrrn. 856 F.2d at 1324.
The plaintiffs point out that, after this action was
commenced, the defendants agreed to convene a
"special board" meeting. At this meeting, the Board
awarded Stivers some of the relief soughtspecifically, his individual licenses to work as a
private investigator, private patrolman, and process
server. The plaintiffs subsequently dropped their
claim for injunctive relief. They contend that their
federal suit was the "catalyst" "752 for the decision
to convene the special board that granted the licenses
and, consequently, that they qualify as prevailing
parties.
Where the plaintiff asserts that his lawsuit was
the "catalyst" for the relief awarded, the court must
determine: (1) whether there is a "causal link"
between the lawsuit and the relief awarded; and (2)
whether there was a "legal basis" for the plaintiffs
claim. Srrhlan, 856 F.2d at 1325. There can be no
doubt that both criteria are satisfied here.

1. Causal Link
A. Prevailing Party Status
A plaintiff may only recover fees under section
1988
-if he is the "prevailing party." Hervift v. Helnis,
482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675-76. 96
L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). A litigant need not prevail on
every issue, or even on the "central issue" in the case,
to be considered the prevailing party. Texas State
Teachers Ass'n v. Gorland Independent School Dist..
489 U.S. 782, 790, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1492-93, 103
L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). It is enough that he succeed
"on any significant claim affording some of the relief
sought, eitherpendente life or at the conclusion of the
litigation." Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 1493.
[291[301 If the plaintiff is only partially successful in
seeking the relief, and achieves only some of the
benefit sought by the litigation, he is still considered
V. Hohbv, 506 U.S. 103,
the prevailing party. FC~WUI.

[331The "causal link" prong of the catalyst test is an

inquiry into factual causation. Id. In this case, the
district court determined that there was a causal link
between this suit and the relief obtained. We agree.
The Board responded to the plaintiffs' lawsuit by
convening "a special board" which reconsidered the
denial of Stivers' application for "lack of integrity"
and awarded him his licenses.
Although the
defendants
now
argue
that
the
Board's
reconsideration of the license application was
"gratuitous," the evidence of record undermines their
contention.
In fact, during the district court
proceedings, the defendants conceded that the special
board meeting was convened in order to partially
settle this suit. In her deposition, Board member
Conrad admitted that the convening of the special
board was "part and parcel of settlement
negotiations." Furthermore, the defendants' brief in

O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

.,

..

.
I-

. > ,

r

L.

i

Page 22

7 1 F.3d 732, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9034, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,866
(Cite as: 71 F.3d 732)
support of their motion for a protective order
strenuously argued that the special board meeting
was a "settlement overture" aimed at resolving the
injunctive relief portion of the plaintiffs suit.
On appeal, the defendants have reversed their
position; they now contend that the special board
meeting was "gratuitous." We reject this abrupt and
calculated change of position. As the district court
recognized, the plaintiffs' federal action bore a direct
causal connection to the relief obtained.
2. Legal Basis
The second prong of the "catalyst" test requires us to
determine whether there was a "legal basis" for the
plaintiffs' claims. We conclude that the district court
committed an error of law in answering this question.

been a "judicial determination that
defendant's conduct ... is not required by
law." Sahlnn, 856 F.2d at 1327 (quoting
Cnliforniu Ass 'n o f the Plr l~sica1lv
Handicap~ed,lnc. v. FCC, 721 F.2d 667,
671-72 (9th Cir.19831, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 832, 105 S.Ct. 121, 83 L.Ed.2d 63
(1 9841, quoting Nrrdeatr. 58 1 F.2d at 28 1 ).
Here, the plaintiffs have raised substantial legal and
factual questions. Their claims are by no means
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly,
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs have satisfied the
"legal basis" prong.
Because the action brought by plaintiffs was the
catalyst for a settlement that obtained some of the
injunctive relief they sought, and because the
plaintiffs' claims *753 have a basis in law, they
qualify as prevailing parties.

j
3
J The district court reasoned that, because the
plaintiffs lost on the merits of their damages claim,
the "legal basis" prong was not satisfied. That is not,
however, the law in this circuit. A plaintiff who
obtains a favorable settlement is not required to
demonstrate that he would have prevailed on the
merits in order to be considered a prevailing party.
For the purposes of determining entitlement to fees, a
claim has a basis in law so long as it is not "frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless." Sf~blan,856 F.2d at
1327 (quoting Fifzhai.ris v. Wolff 702 F.2d 836. 836
(9th Cir.1983)). EM Thus, even if the district court
had been correct in granting summary judgment to
the defendants on the merits, the plaintiffs would not
necessarily have been foreclosed from obtaining
attorney's fees for time spent pursuing injunctive
relief.
FN9. The
-

defendants' brief, relying on
Nadeau v. Helpemoe. 581 F.2d 275.28 1 (1st
Cir. 19781, contends that a plaintiff may not
be considered the prevailing party unless the
relief obtained was required by law.
Defendants misstate Nadeau. As Sablan
makes clear, this is not the correct legal test
in this circuit. Nor is it the test in the First
Circuit. The rule there, as here, is that even
if the plaintiff would ultimately have been
unsuccessful in obtaining the relief sought,
he is entitled to attorney's fees so long as his
claim is not frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless. On the other hand, a defendant
is deemed to act gratuitously if prior to the
assertion of the plaintiffs claim there has

B. Impact of Farrar v. Hobby

J
3
JRelying on the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Furrat. v. Hohhv. 506 U . S . 103, 1 13 S.Ct. 566, 12 1
L.Ed.2d 494 11992J, the defendants contend that,
even if the action was the catalyst for the relief
provided, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees.
We reject the defendants' contention that Farrar
provides a basis for upholding the denial of fees in
thls case.
Farrar does not alter the test for determining when a
litigant qualifies as a prevailing party. The Court
explicitly affirmed its prior holding that the degree of
success does not affect the prevailing party inquiry.
Id. at 112-14, 113 S.Ct. at 574.w
Farrar does,
however, change the standard for determining when a
prevailing party is entitled to recover fees. F a m r
holds that a prevailing party may be denied fees
where he obtains only a narrow, technical victory
such as nominal damages. Id. at 1 14-16, 113 S.Ct. at
575. In such cases, "the only reasonable fee is
usually no fee at all." Id.; see also Romberz
Nichols, 48 F.3d 453. 455 (9th Cir. 1995) (district
court did not err in denying fees to prevailing party
who originally sought $2 million in damages but
obtained only $1).
IJ.

FNIO. Farrar-

also reaffirms the Court's
prior holding that a plaintiff need not obtain
a judicial decree to be considered the
prevailing party. To qualify as a prevailing
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party, "[tlhe plaintiff must obtain an
enforceable judgment against the defendant
from whom fees are sought, or comparable
relieJ through a consent decree or
settfement." Id. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct, at 573
(citations omitted, emphasis added).
A
settlement that effects a material alteration
in the legal relationship between plaintiff
and defendant is sufficient to confer
prevailing party status. Id. at 1 1 1-12, I 13
S.Ct. at 573 (citing T e x ~ ~State
s
Teacher's
Ass'n, 489 U . S . 782,792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486,
1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1 989)).
Farrar's holding is limited to cases in which the
plaintiff seeks substantial monetary damages but
obtains only a nominal award. This case is clearly
not among those to which the Farrar rule applies.
As the defendants point out, the plaintiffs did not
obtain all the injunctive relief originally sought. The
special board did not grant Chamar a license. Nor,
of course, did it grant Emsberger and Stivers licenses
as corporate officers or qualifying agents of Chamar.
It did, however, grant Stivers individual licenses,
permitting him to work as a private patrolman,
process server, and investigator.
The settlement
obtained was more than a de minimis victory. While
the plaintiffs did not obtain all the relief sought, they
did obtain "tangible results," Wilcox v: Citv ofRetzo,
42 F.3d 550. 555 (9th Cir.19941, and are therefore
entitled to fees.w We remand for the district court
to determine the appropriate amount of fees.w

FNI 1. In fact, the tangible results in this
case were substantial.
For Stivers, they
meant the difference between being able to
work at his profession and having to find a
new and different way of trying to earn a
living-certainly not an easy task these days.

FN 12. Although Ernsberger and Chamar did
not receive the licenses they sought, this
action did result in Stivers' receiving
licenses. Because Stivers' licenses were a
necessary component of the relief the
plaintiffs were collectively seelung, they
may be entitled to fees. However, we leave
it to the district court to determine the
amount that is reasonable.

produced evidence from which the trier of fact could
infer that Pierce's bias affected the Board's
deliberations and the actions of its members, thus
violating Stivers' right to a fair hearing before an
impartial tribunal. While the Eleventh Amendment
shields the Board itself from liability, neither the
Eleventh Amendment nor the qualified immunity
doctrine prevents Stivers from proceeding against the
individual defendants in their personal capacities.
We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment as to
the Board itself, but reverse the grant of summary
judgment with respect to Stivers' claims for damages
and declaratory relief against the individual
defendants and remand these claims for trial.
We also' conclude that the district court erred in
denying the plaintiffs attorney's fees with respect to
their claims for injunctive relief. This action was the
catalyst for the special board meeting through which
the *754 plaintiffs obtained significant relief.
Whether or not the plaintiffs ultimately prevail on the
merits, there can be no question that the plaintiffs'
claims for injunctive relief had a legal basis. Thus,
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover fees for time
spent pursuing injunctive relief.
We remand for
determination of the appropriate amount of fees.
AFFIRMED in part;
REMANDED.

REVERSED in part and

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the opinion and judgment of the court
except that I do not believe it appropriate in Part I1
B1 for the court to speculate as to the existence of a
genuine issue as to the appearance of bias and as to
the facts Stivers might conceivably prove; I do not
believe that Stivers has shown that Rodefer's report
was the result of any decision by the Board to harass
him; in Part IV A2 n. 9, the court has mistakenly
expanded Sablun, 856 F.2d at 1327 by prefacing the
quote from Sablan with the words "if prior to the
assertion of the plaintiffs claim;" and under Farrar.
V . Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, ----,1 13 S.Ct. 566, 575, 121
L.Ed.2d 494 ( 1992) the plaintiffs in the plural are not
entitled to any counsel fees because only Stivers
achieved success.
C.A.9 (Nev.),1995.
Stivers v. Pierce
71 F.3d 732, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9034, 95 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 15,866

VI. CONCLUSION
Briefs and Other Related Documents /Back to tog)
Stivers has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether
his due process rights were violated.
He has
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Briefs and Other Related Documents
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning AgencyU.S.,2002.
Supreme Court of the United States
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL,
' INC., et al., Petitioners,
v.
TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, et al.
NO.00-1167.

Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1.2))
A moratorium on development imposed during the
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan
does not constitute a per se taking of property
requiring compensation under the Takings Clause.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.

121 Eminent Domain 148 -70
148 Eminent Domain
-

Argued Jan. 7,2002.
Decided April 23, 2002.
Association of landowners brought action against
regional planning agency, claiming that agency's
temporary moratoria on development effected
unconstitutional regulatory takmgs of property. The
United States District Court for the District of
Nevada, 34 F.Suuu.2d 1226,Edward C. Reed, Jr., J.,
found that moratoria constituted taking, and agency
appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, 216 F.3d 764, held that moratoria did
not constitute categorical taking. Certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held
that: (1) moratoria did not constitute per se taking,
and (2) question whether Takings Clause requires
compensation when government enacts temporary
regulation denying property owner all viable
economic use of property is to be decided by
applying factors of Penn Centml Transp. Co. v. New
York Citv, not by applying any categorical rule.
Affirmed.
Chief Justice Rehncluist filed dissenting opinion in
which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.
Justice Thoinas filed dissenting opinion in which
Justice Scalia joined.
West Headnotes
JlJ Eminent Domain 148 e=;;32.10(1)
148 Eminent Domain
-

1481Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited

Compensation
1481I(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General
148k70 k. Constitutional Provisions. Most
Cited Cases
The Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause,
prohibiting the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation, applies to the States
as well as the Federal Government. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

Eminent Domain 148 -2.27(2)
148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

348k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.27 Environmental Protection
148k2.27(2) k. Wetlands and Coastal
Protection. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1.2))
Moratoria on development, covering 32-month
period, ordered by environmental planning agency to
maintain status quo while studying impact of
development on lake and designing strategy for
environmentally sound growth, did not constitute per
se taking. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

Federal Courts 170B -461
Federal Courts
I70BVII Supreme Court
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of
Appeals
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari
170Bk461 k. Questions Not Presented
Below or in Pe.tition for Certiorari. Most Cited Cases
Question whether regional plan adopted by
environmental agency constituted taking was not
before Supreme Court, where both district court and
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court of appeals held that it was federal injunction
against implementing plan, rather than plan itself,
that caused landowners' alleged injuries, and those
rulings were not encompassed within Supreme
Court's limited grant of certiorari.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.
Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
1481Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The Talungs Clause analysis of Penn Central Transv.
Co. v. New York Cihl involves a complex of factors
including the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the government
action. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
Eminent Domain 148 6==;32.10(1)
148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
1481<2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
When the government condemns or physically
appropriates property, the fact of a taking is typically
obvious and undisputed, but when the owner
contends a taking has occurred because a law or
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are
tantamount to a .condemnation or appropriation, the
predicate of a talung is not self-evident, and the
analysis is more complex. U.S.C.A. Const.Anlend. 5.

j
4
8
J

Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
-

1481Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
When the government physically takes possession of
an interest in property for some public purpose, it has
a categorical duty under the Talungs Clause to
compensate the former owner, regardless of whether
the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or
merely a part thereof. U.S.C.A. Const.Arnend. 5.
Eminent Domain 148 -85

(Formerly 148k211.2))
The answer to the question whether a temporary
moratorium effects a talung depends upon the
particular circumstances of the case. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

J7J Eminent Domain 148 -70
148 Eminent Domain
-

148 Eminent Domain
-

148IICompensation

148II(B_) Talung or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148k8l Property and Rights Subject of
Compensation
148k85 k. Easements and Other Rights
in Real Property. Most Cited Cases

14811 Compensation
-

148II(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General
148k70 k. Constitutional Provisions. Most
Cited Cases
The plain language of the Fifth Amendment requires
the payment of compensation whenever the
government acquires private property for a public
purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a
condemnation
proceeding
or
a
physical
appropriation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

Eminent Domain 148 -114.1
148 Eminent Domain
Compensation
14811(B) Talung or Injuring Property as
Ground for Compensation
148kl14 Temporary Use
1481<114.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

Compensation is mandated under the Takings Clause
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when a leasehold is taken and the government
occupies the property for its own purposes, even
though that use is temporary.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Ainend. 5.

1111Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations
prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it
inappropriate to treat Takings Clause cases involving
physical takings as controlling precedents for the
evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory
taking, and vice versa. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

148 Eminent Domain
Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2( 1))
If regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. U.S.C. A. Const.Amend. 5.
j
4
t
J

j
4
8
J

Eminent Domain 148 -2.1

1151Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
Neither a physical appropriation nor a public use is a
necessary component of a regulatory taking.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1161Eminent Domain 148 -2.1

148 Eminent Domain
-

148 Eminent Domain
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
For the same reason that the Supreme Court does not
ask whether a physical appropriation advances a
substantial government interest or whether it deprives
the owner of all economically valuable use, the
Supreme Court does not apply its precedent from the
physical takings context to regulatory takings claims.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The Supreme Court resists the temptation to adopt
per se rules in cases involving partial regulatory
takings, preferring to examine a number of factors
rather than a simple mathematically precise formula.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1171Eminent Domain 148 -2.1

1131Eminent Domain 148 -2.1

148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148 Eminent Domain
-

1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
Under Ltica.~v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a
narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory
takings exists for the extraordinary circumstance of a
permanent deprivation of all beneficial use. U.S.C.A.
Const.Ainend. 5.

1141Eminent Domain 148 -2.1

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
Even though multiple factors are relevant in the
analysis of regulatory takings claims, in such cases
the Supreme Court must focus on the parcel as a
whole. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1181Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
1 48 Eminent Domain
-

&
Nature,
.
l
!
J
Extent, and Delegation of Power
148H What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
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Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2( 1))
Tahngs jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated; in deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, the
Supreme Court focuses rather both on the character
of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1191Eminent Domain 148 -2.10(1)
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 148k2( 1.2))
District court applied wrong standard for determining
whether regulatory tahng had occurred when it
disaggregated property in question into temporal
segments corresponding to regulations at issue and
then analyzed whether owners were deprived of all
economically viable use during each period; starting
point for court's analysis should have been to ask
whether there was a total taking of entire parcel, and,
if there was not, it should have applied factors of
Penn Cen~ral Transu. Co, v. New Yorli C ~ I J ) .
U.S.C.A. Const.hnend. 5.

-

(201Estates in Property 154 -1

154 Estates in Property
-

154kl k. Nature and Incidents in General. Most
Cited Cases
An interest in real property is defined by the metes
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions
and the term of years that describes the temporal
aspect of the owner's interest. Restatement of
Pro~ertv8 6 7-9.

1211Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished

348k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
For a court to view an interest in property in its
entirety, as required for consideration of a regulatory
tahngs claim, a court must consider both the metes
and bounds that describe the property's geographic
dimensions and the term of years that describes the
temporal aspect of the owner's interest. U.S.C. A.
Const.Aniend. 5; Restatement of Propertv 4 6 7-9.

1221Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
148k2 What Constitutes a Tahng; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The categorical rule of regulatory tahngs in Lucas v.
South Cnrolinu Consfal Cotlncil was carved out for
the extraordinary case in which a regulation
permanently deprives property of all value; the
default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking
context, a more fact specific inquiry is required.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1231Federal Courts 170B -460.1
Federal Courts
170BVII Supreme Court
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of
Appeals
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Theory that environmental planning agency enacted
"rolling moratoria" that were functional equivalent of
permanent taking was not available to landowners'
association in Takings Clause action, where
association had presented such theory in its petition
for certiorari, but order granting certiorari did not
encompass that issue. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1241Federal Courts 170B -460.1
170B Federal Courts
-

170BVII Supreme Court
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of
Appeals
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Recovery on bad faith theory or theory that state
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interests were insubstantial was foreclosed in Takings
Clause action by district court's unchallenged
findings of fact. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

1251Federal Courts 170B -460.1
170B Federal Courts
-

17OBVII Supreme Court
170BVII(B) Review of Decisions of Courts of
Appeals
170Bk460 Review on Certiorari
170Bk460.1 k. In General. Most Cited

Cases
Recovery by landowners' association under analysis
of Penn Cenlrul trans^. Co. v. New York City was
foreclosed in Tahngs Clause action where
association expressly disavowed that theory and
failed to appeal from district court's conclusion that
the evidence would not support it.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

1261Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The question whether the Takings Clause requires
compensation when the government enacts a
temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a
property owner all viable economic use of her
property is to be decided by applying the factors of
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, not by
applying any categorical rule.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

1271Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
1481Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
A claim that a regulation has effected a temporary
taking requires careful examination and weighing of
all the relevant circumstances.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

1281Eminent Domain 148 6k32.10(1)

148 Eminent Domain
-

148INature, Extent, and Delegation of Power

148k2 What Constitutes a Talung; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.10 Zoning, Planning, or Land Use;
Building Codes
148k2.10(1) k. In General. Most Cited

Cases

(Formerly 148k2(1.2))
The temporary nature of a land-use restriction does
not necessarily preclude a finding that it effects a
taking; rather, it should not be given exclusive
significance one way or the other.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5.

1291 Eminent Domain 148 -2.1
148 Eminent Domain
-

1481 Nature, Extent, and Delegation of Power
-

148k2 What Constitutes a Taking; Police and
Other Powers Distinguished
148k2.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 148k2(1))
The duration of the restriction is one of the important
factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a
regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that
factor as with respect to other factors, the temptation
to .adopt what amount to per se rules in either
direction must be resisted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
5.
**I468 *302 Syllabus FNI

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader.
See Uniled
Slates v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U.S. 321,337.26 S.Ct. 282,50 L.Ed. 499.
Respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) imposed two moratoria, totaling 32 months,
on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while
formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the
area. Petitioners, real estate owners affected by the
moratoria and an association representing such
owners, filed parallel suits, later consolidated,
claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a talung of
their property without just compensation.
The
District Court found that TRPA had not effected a
"partial taking" under the analysis set out in Perm
Cenlral Trunsp. Co. v. New York Citv, 438 U.S. 104,
however, it
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 6 3 1
concluded that the moratoria did constitute a taking
under the categorical rule announced in Ltrctis 11.
).
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Soutlr Crrrolina Coosfal Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 112
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798, because TRPA
temporarily deprived petitioners of all economically
viable use of their land.
On appeal, TRPA
successfully challenged the District Court's takings
determination. Finding that the only question in this
facial challenge was whether Lrrcus' rule applied, the
Ninth Circuit held that because the regulations had
only a temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest,
no categorical taking had occurred; that Lucas
applied to the relatively rare case in which a
regulation permanently denies all productive use of
an entire parcel, whereas the moratoria involved only
a temporal slice of the fee interest; and that F A
Enalish Evannelical Ltr lheran Cl~urcho f Glendale v.
Countv ofLos Anneles. 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378,
96 L.Ed.2d 250, concerned the question whether
compensation is an appropriate remedy for a
temporary taking, not whether or when such a taking
has occurred. The court also concluded that
Central's ad hoc balancing approach was the proper
framework for analyzing whether a taking had
occurred, but that petitioners had not challenged the
District Court's conclusion that they could not make
out a claim under Penn Central's factors.
Held: The moratoria ordered by TRPA are notper se
takings of property requiring compensation under the
Takings Clause. Pp. 1478-1490.
(a) Although this Court's physical takings
jurisprudence, for the most part, involves the
straightforward application of per se rules, its
regulatory takings jurisprudence is characterized by
"essentially ad hoc, *303 factual inquiries," Perm
Centrc~I,438 U.S.. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, designed to
allow "careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances," Prrlazzolo 1,. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
The longstanding
distinction between physical and regulatory takings
makes it inappropriate to treat precedent from one as
controlling on the other. Petitioners rely on
E~tnlishand b - b o t h regulatory takings cases-to
argue for a categorical rule that whenever the
government imposes a deprivation of all
economically viable use of property, no matter how
. d t .U.S.,
brief, it effects a taking. In First E ~ ~ , ~ l i482
at 315. 318,321, 107 S.Ct. 2378, the Court addressed
the separate remedial question of how compensation
is measured once a regulatory taking is established,
but not the different and prior question whether the
temporary regulation was in fact a taking. To the
extent that the Court referenced that ante**1469

cedent question, it recognized that a regulation
temporarily denying an owner all use of her property
might not constitute a taking if the denial was part of
the State's authority to enact safety regulations, or if
it were one of the normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and
the like. Thus, Firsf Enpli.sh did not approve, and
implicitly rejected, petitioners' categorical approach.
Nor is L~rcasdispositive of the question presented.
Its categorical rule-requiring compensation when a
regulation permanently deprives an owner of "aN
economically beneficial uses" of his land, 505 U.S.,
at 1019. 1 12 S.Ct. 2886-does not answer the question
whether a regulation prohibiting any economic use of
land for 32 months must be compensated.
Petitioners attempt to bring this case under the rule in
Lucas by focusing exclusively on the property during
the moratoria is unavailing.
This Court has
consistently rejected such an approach to the
"denominator" question.
See, e.g., Kevsfone
Bituminorrs Coal Assn. v. DeBcnedictis, 480 U.S.
470,497, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472. To sever
a 32-month segment from the remainder of each fee
simple estate and then ask whether that segment has
been taken in its entirety would ignore Penn Ce~ztral's
admonition to focus on "the parcel as a whole," 43R
U.S., at 130-131.98 S.Ct. 2646. Both dimensions of
a real property interest-the metes and bounds
describing its geographic dimensions and the term of
years describing its temporal aspect-must be
considered when viewing the interest in its entirety.
A permanent deprivation of all use is a taking of the
parcel as a whole, but a temporary restriction causing
a diminution in value is not, for the property will
recover value when the prohibition is lifted. Ltlcas
was carved out for the "extraordinary case" in which
a regulation permanently deprives property of all use;
the default rule remains that a fact specific inquiry is
required in the regulatory taking context.
Nevertheless, the Court will consider petitioners'
argument that the interest in protecting property
owners "304 from bearing public burdens "which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole," Arn?stronpv. U~ritedStates.364 U . S . 40,
49. 80 S.Ct. 1563.4 L.Ed.2d 1554, justifies creating a
new categorical rule. Pp. 1478-1484.
(b) "Fairness and justice" will not be better served by
a categorical rule that any deprivation of all
economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a
compensable taking.
That rule would apply to
numerous normal delays in obtaining, e.g., building
permits, and would require changes in practices that
have long been considered permissible exercises of
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the police power. Such an important change in the
law should be the product of legislative rulemaking,
not adjudication. More importantly, for the reasons
set out in Justice O'CONNOR's concurring opinion in
Palazzolo. 533 US., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, the
better approach to a temporary regulatory taking
claim requires careful examination and weighing of
all the relevant circumstances-only one of which is
the length of the delay. A narrower rule excluding
normal delays in processing permits, or covering only
delays of more than a year, would have a less severe
impact on prevailing practices, but would still impose
serious constraints on the planning process.
Moratoria are an essential tool of successful
development.
The interest in informed
decisionmalung counsels against adopting a per se
rule that would treat such interim measures as takings
regardless of the planners' good faith, the landowners'
reasonable expectations, or the moratorium's actual
impact on property values. The financial constraints
of compensating property owners during a
moratorium may force officials to rush through the
planning process or abandon the practice altogether.
And the interest in protecting the decisional process
is even stronger when an agency is developing a
regional plan than when it is considering a permit for
a single parcel. Here, TRPA obtained the benefit of
comments and criticisms**1470 from interested
parties during its deliberations, but a categorical rule
tied to the deliberations' length would likely create
added pressure on decisionmakers to quickly resolve
land-use questions, disadvantaging landowners and
interest groups less organized or familiar with the
planning process.
Moreover, with a temporary
development ban, there is less risk that individual
landowners will be singled out to bear a special
burden that should be shared by the public as a
whole. It may be true that a moratorium lasting
more than one year should be viewed with special
skepticism, but the District Court found that the
instant delay was not unreasonable. The restriction's
duration is one factor for a court to consider in
appraising regulatory takings claims, but with respect
to that factor, the temptation to adopt per se rules in
either direction must be resisted. Pp. 1484-1490.
2 16 F.3d 764, affirmed.
"305 STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTEK,
GINSBURG,
and
BREYER,
JJ.,
joined.
REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., joined, pos~,p.
1490. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in

which SCALIA, J., joined,post, p. 1496.
Micheal M.Berrzer, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioners.
John G. Roberts, Jr., Washington, DC, for
respondents.
Theodore B. Olson, for United States as amicus
curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting
respondents.For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:2001
WL 169201 1 (Pet.BrieQ200 1 WL 1480565
(Resp.BrieQ200 1 WL 1663776 (Reply.BrieQ
"306 Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
111[21[31 The question presented is whether a
moratorium on development imposed during the
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan
constitutes a per se talung of property requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United
States ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . This
~
case actually involves
two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status quo
while studying the impact of development on Lake
Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally
sound growth.
The first, Ordinance 81-5, was
effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26,
1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution
83-21 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April
25, 1984.
As a result of these two directives,
virtually all development on a substantial portion of
the property subject to TRPA's jurisdiction was
prohibited for a period of 32 months. Although the
question we decide relates only to that 32-month
period, a brief description of the events leading up to
the moratoria and a comment on the two
permanent*307 plans that TRPA adopted thereafter
will clarify the narrow scope of our holding.

FNl. Often referred to as the "Just
Compensation Clause," the final Clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides: "... nor shall
private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." It applies to
the States as well as the Federal
Government. Chicano, B. & O.R. Co. v.
Chicapo, 166 U.S. 226. 239, 241, 17 S.Ct.
581.41 L.Ed. 979 (1897); Webb's Fahulo~(.r
Plzarn~acies.Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155,
160, 101 S.Ct. 446. 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980).

P

The relevant facts are undisputed. The Court of
Appeals, while reversing the District Court on a
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question of law, accepted all of its findings of fact,
and no party challenges those findings. All agree
that Lake Tahoe is "uniquely beautiful," 3
F.Suv~.2d1226, 1230 (D.Nev. 19991, that President
Clinton was right to call it a " 'national treasure that
must be protected and preserved,' " ihirl., and that
Mark **I471 Twain aptly described the clarity of its
waters as " 'not merely transparent, but dazzlingly,
brilliantly so,' " ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting M.
Twain, Roughing It 174-175 (1872)).
Lake Tahoe's exceptional clarity is attributed to the
absence of algae that obscures the waters of most
other lakes. Historically, the lack of nitrogen and
phosphorous, which nourish the growth of algae, has
water^.^
ensured the transparency of its
Unfortunately, the lake's pristine state has
deteriorated rapidly over the past 40 years; increased
land development in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Basin)
has threatened the " 'noble sheet of blue water' "
beloved by Twain and countless others.
34
F.Su~v.2d.at 1230. As the District Court found,
"[dlramatic decreases in clarity first began to be
noted in the late 1950'slearly 1960ts, shortly after
development at the lake began in earnest." Id., at
1231. The lake's unsurpassed beauty, it seems, is the
wellspring of its undoing.
FN2. According to a Senate Report:
-

"Only
two other sizable lakes in the world are of
comparable quality-Crater Lake in Oregon,
which is protected as part of the Crater Lake
National Park, and Lake Baikal in the
[former] Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe,
however, is so readily accessible from large
metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to
urban development." S.Rep. No. 91-5 10,
pp. 3-4 (1969).
"308 The upsurge of development in the area has
caused "increased nutrient loading of the lake largely
because of the increase in impervious coverage of
land in the Basin resulting from that development."
Ib
id.
"Impervious coverage-such as asphalt, concrete,
buildings, and even packed dirt-prevents precipitation
from being absorbed by the soil. Instead, the water
is gathered and concentrated by such coverage.
Larger amounts of water flowing off a driveway or a
roof have more erosive force than scattered raindrops
falling over a dispersed area-especially one covered
with indigenous vegetation, which softens the impact
of the raindrops themselves." Ihid.

Given this trend, the District Court predicted that
"unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose its
clarity and its trademark blue color, becoming green
and opaque for eternity."
FN3. The District Court added:
-

"Or at least,
for a very, very long time. Estimates are
that, should the lake turn green, it could take
over 700 years for it to return to its natural
state, if that were ever possible at all." 3
F.Suvp.2d. at 123 1.
Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes
produce more runoff; therefore, they are usually
considered "high hazard" lands. Moreover, certain
areas near streams or wetlands known as "Stream
Environment Zones" (SEZs) are especially
vulnerable to the impact of development because, in
their natural state, they act as filters for much of the
debris that runoff carries.
Because "[tlhe most
obvious response to this problem ... is to restrict
development around the lake-especially in SEZ lands,
as well as in areas already naturally prone to runoff,"
id., at 1232, conservation efforts have focused on
controlling growth in these high hazard areas.
In the 1960ts, when the problems associated with the
burgeoning development began to receive significant
attention,*309 jurisdiction over the Basin, which
occupies 501 square miles, was shared by the States
of California and Nevada, five counties, several
municipalities, and the Forest Service of the Federal
Government. In 1968, the legislatures of the two
States adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact, see 1968 Cal. Stats., no. 998, p. 1900, Ej 1;
1968 Nev. Stats. p. 4, which Congress approved in
1969, Pub.L. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360. The compact set
goals for the protection and preservation of the lake
and created TRPA as the agency assigned "to
coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and
to conserve its natural resources."
**1472&
Counay Eslales, Inc. v. Tuhoe Regional Planninz
Agency. 440 U.S. 391, 394, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59
L.Ed.2d 401 (1979).
Pursuant to the compact, in 1972 TRPA adopted a
Land Use Ordinance that divided the land in the
Basin into seven "land capability districts," based
largely on steepness but also tahng into
consideration other factors affecting runoff. Each
district was assigned a "land coverage coefficient-a
recommended limit on the percentage of such land
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that could be covered by impervious surface."
Those limits ranged from 1% for districts 1 and 2 to
30% for districts 6 and 7. Land in districts 1, 2, and 3
is characterized as "high hazard" or "sensitive,"
while land in districts 4, 5, 6, and 7 is "low hazard"
or "non-sensitive," The SEZ lands, though often
treated as a separate category, were actually a
subcategory of district 1. 34 F.Suvu.2d. at 1232.
Unfortunately, the 1972 ordinance allowed numerous
exceptions and did not significantly limit the
construction of new residential housing. California
became so dissatisfied with TRPA that it withdrew its
financial support and unilaterally imposed stricter
regulations on the part of the Basin located in
California.
Eventually the two States, with the
approval of Congress and the President, adopted an
extensive amendment to the compact that became
effective on December 19, 1980. Pub.L. 96-55 1, 94
Stat. 3233; Cal. *310 Govt. Code Ann. 4 66801
(West Supp.2002); Nev.Rev.Stat. 4 277.200 (1980).
The 1980 Tahoe Regional Planning Compact
(Compact) redefined the structure, functions, and
voting procedures of TRPA, App. 37, 94 Stat. 32353238; 34 F.Suv~.2d,at 1233, and directed it to
develop regional "environmental threshold carrying
capacitiesw-a term that embraced "standards for air
quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation
preservation and noise." 94 Stat. 3235, 3239. The
Compact provided that TRPA "shall adopt" those
standards within 18 months, and that "[wlithin 1 year
after" their adoption (i.e., by June 19, 1983), it
"shall" adopt an amended regional plan that achieves
and maintains those carrying capacities. Id., at 3240.
The Compact also contained a finding by the
legislatures of California and Nevada "that in order to
make effective the regional plan as revised by
[TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of
development in the region which might otherwise
absorb the entire capability of the region for further
development or direct it out of harmony with the
ultimate plan." Id., at 3243. Accordingly, for the
period prior to the adoption of the final plan ("or until
May 1, 1983, whichever is earlier"), the Compact
itself prohibited the development of new
subdivisions,
condominiums, and
apartment
buildings, and also prohibited each city and county in
the Basin from granting any more permits in 1981,
1982, or 1983 than had been granted in 1 9 7 8 . ~
104-107. his moratorium did
not apply to rights that had vested before the

FN4. App.

effective date of the 1980 Compact. Id., at
107-108.
Two months after the 1980
Compact became effective, TRPA adopted
its Ordinance 8 1-1 broadly defining the term
"project" to include the construction of any
new residence and requiring owners of land
in districts 1, 2, or 3, to get a permit from
TRPA before beginning construction of
homes on their property. 34 F.Suvu.2d
1226, 1233 (D.Nev. 1999).
During this period TRPA was also working on the
development of a regional water quality plan to
comply with the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. R 1288
(1994 ed.).
Despite "311 the fact that TRPA
performed these obligations in "good faith and to the
best of its ability," 34 F.Suuu.2d. at 1233, after a few
months it concluded that it could not meet the
deadlines in the Compact. On June 25, 1981, it
therefore enacted Ordinance 8 1-5 imposing the first
of the two moratoria on development that petitioners
challenge in this proceeding.
The ordinance
provided that it would become effective on August
24, 1981, and remain in effect pending the adoption
of the permanent plan required by the Compact.
App. 159, 191.

**I473 The District Court made a detailed analysis
of the ordinance, noting that it might even prohibit
hiking or picnicking on SEZ lands, but construed it as
essentially banning any construction or other activity
that involved the removal of vegetation or the
creation of land coverage on all SEZ lands, as well as
on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in California. 34
F.Suvu.2d. at 1233-1235. Some permits could be
obtained for such construction in Nevada if certain
findings were made. Id., at 1235. It is undisputed,
however, that Ordinance 8 1-5 prohibited the
construction of any new residences on SEZ lands in
either State and on class 1, 2, and 3 lands in
California.
Given the complexity of the task of defining
"environmental threshold carrying capacities" and the
division of opinion within TRPA's governing board,
the District Court found that it was "unsurprising"
that TRPA failed to adopt those thresholds until
August 26, 1982, roughly two months after the
Compact deadline.
Under a liberal reading of
the Compact, TRPA then had until August 26, 1983,
to adopt a new regional plan.
94 Stat. 3240.
"Unfortunately, but again not surprisingly, no
regional plan was in place as of that date."
34
F.Supp.2d. at 1235.
TRPA therefore adopted
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Resolution 83-21, "which completely suspended all
project reviews and approvals, including the
acceptance of new proposals," and which remained in
effect until a new regional plan was adopted on April
26, 1984. Thus, Resolution*312 83-21 imposed an
8-month moratorium prohibiting all construction on
high hazard lands in either State. In combination,
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 effectively
prohibited all construction on sensitive lands in
California and on all SEZ lands in the entire Basin
for 32 months, and on sensitive lands in Nevada
(other than SEZ lands) for eight months. It is these
two moratoria that are at issue in this case.
On the same day that the 1984 plan was adopted, the
State of California filed an action seeking to enjoin
its implementation on the ground that it failed to
establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to
protect the Basin. Id.. at 1236. The District Court
entered an injunction that was upheld by the Court of
Appeals and remained in effect until a completely
revised plan was adopted in 1987. Both the 1984
injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions
that prohibited new construction on sensitive lands in
the Basin. As the case comes to us, however, we
have no occasion to consider the validity of those
provisions.

Approximately two months after the adoption of the
1984 plan, petitioners filed parallel actions against
TRPA and other defendants in federal courts in
Nevada and California that were ultimately
consolidated for trial in the District of Nevada. The
petitioners include the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc., a nonprofit membership corporation
representing about 2,000 owners of both improved
and unimproved parcels of real estate in the Lake
Tahoe Basin, and a class of some 400 individual
owners of vacant lots located either on SEZ lands or
in other parts of districts 1,2, or 3. Those individuals
purchased their properties prior to the effective date
of the 1980 Compact, App. 34, primarily for the
purpose of constructing "at a time of their choosing"
a single-family home "to serve as a permanent,
retirement or "313 vacation residence," id., at 36.
When they made those purchases, they did so with
the understanding that such construction was
authorized provided that "they complied with all
reasonable requirements for building." bid.^

FN5. As explained supra, at
-

1471-1472, the
petitioners who purchased land after the
1972 compact did so amidst a heavily
regulated zoning scheme. Their property
was already classified as part of land
capability districts 1, 2, and 3, or SEZ land.
And each land classification was subject to
regulations as to the degree of artificial
disturbance the land could safely sustain.
**I474 Lffl Petitioners' complaints gave rise to
protracted litigation that has produced four opinions
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
several published District Court opinions.FN" For
present purposes, however, we need only describe
those courts' disposition of the claim that three
actions taken by TRPA-Ordinance 8 1-5, Resolution
83-2 1, and the 1984 regional plan-constituted takings
of petitioners' property without just c ~ m ~ e n s a t i o n . ~
Indeed, the challenge to the 1984 plan is not before
us because both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals held that it was the federal injunction against
implementing that plan, rather than the plan itself,
that caused the post-1984 injuries that petitioners
allegedly suffered, and those rulings are not
encompassed within our limited grant of certiorari.
I:N8
Thus, "314 we limit our discussion to the lower
courts' disposition of the claims based on the 2-year
moratorium (Ordinance 8 1-5) and the ensuing 8month moratorium (Resolution 83-21).

FN7. In

1991, petitioners amended their
complaint to allege that the adoption of the
1987
plan
also
constituted
an
unconstitutional talung. Ultimately both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals held
that this claim was barred by California's 1year statute of limitations and Nevada's 2year statute of limitations, See 216 F.3d, at
785-789. Although the validity of the 1987
plan is not before us, we note that other
litigants have challenged certain applications
of that plan. See Suilun7 v. Tahoe Regional
Plat7ninn Apencv, 520 U.S. 725, 117 S.Ct.
1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997).

FN8. In his dissent, THE CHIEF JUSTICE
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contends that the 1984 plan is before us
because the 1980 Compact is a proximate
cause of petitioners' injuries, post, at 1490149 1.
Petitioners, however, do not
challenge the Court of Appeals' holding on
causation in their briefs on the merits,
presumably because they understood when
we granted certiorari on the question
"[wlhether the Court of Appeals properly
determined that a temporary moratorium on
land development does not constitute a
taking of property requiring compensation
under the Talungs Clause of the United
States Constitution," 533 U.S. 948, 121
S.Ct. 2589, 150 L.Ed.2d 749 (20011, we
were only interested in the narrow question
decided today.
Throughout the District
Court and Court of Appeals decisions the
phrase "temporary moratorium" refers to
two things and two things only: Ordinance
8 1-5 and Resolution 83-21. The dissent's
novel theory of causation was not briefed,
nor was it discussed during oral argument.
'The District Court began its constitutional
analysis by identifying the distinction between a
direct government appropriation of property without
just compensation and a government regulation that
imposes such a severe restriction on the owner's use
of her property that it produces "nearly the same
result as a direct appropriation." 34 F.Suvp.2d. at
1238. The court noted that all of the claims in this
u
case "are of the 'regulatory takings' variety." I
1239. Citing our decision in Aains 1). City o f
Tibltron, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d
106 (19801, it then stated that a "regulation will
constitute a taking when either: (1) it does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or
(2) it denies the owner economically viable use of her
land." 34 F.Sum.2d, at 1239. The District Court
rejected the first alternative based on its finding that
"hrther development on high hazard lands such as
[petitioners'] would lead to significant additional
~ ~ **I475
damage to the lake." Id.. at 1 2 4 0 . ~With
respect "315 to the second alternative, the court first
considered whether the analysis adopted in &
Ccntr.al Transp. Co. 1). New York Cin~,438 U.S. 104,
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (19781, would lead to
the conclusion that TRPA had effected a "partial
taking," and then whether those actions had effected
a "total taking."

FN9.

As the District Court explained:

"There is a direct connection between the
potential development of plaintiffs' lands
and the harm the lake would suffer as a
result thereof. Further, there has been no
suggestion by the plaintiffs that any less
severe response would have adequately
addressed the problems the lake was facing.
Thus it is difficult to see how a more
proportional response could have been
adopted. Given that TRPA's actions had
widespread application, and were not aimed
at an individual landowner, the plaintiffs
would appear to bear the burden of proof on
this point. They have not met this burdennor have they really attempted to do so.
Although unwilling to stipulate to the fact
that TRPA's actions substantially advanced a
legitimate state interest, the plaintiffs did not
seriously contest the matter at trial." 3
F.Supp.2d. at 1240 (citation omitted).
FNIO. The Perzn Central analysis involves
"a complex of factors including the
regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action."
Pahzzolo v. Rhade Island, 533 U.S. 606,
617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
(2001).
Emphasizing the temporary nature of the regulations,
the testimony that the "average holding time of a lot
in the Tahoe area between lot purchase and home
construction is twenty-five years," and the failure of
petitioners to offer specific evidence of harm, the
District Court concluded that "consideration of the
Penn Cmtrull factors clearly leads to the conclusion
that there was no talung." 34 F.Su~v.2d.at 1240. In
the absence of evidence regarding any of the
individual plaintiffs, the court evaluated the
"average" purchasers' intent and found that such
purchasers "did not have reasonable, investmentbacked expectations that they would be able to build
single-family homes on their land within the six-year
period involved in this lawsuit." Id., at 124 1

FN11. The court stated that petitioners "had
plenty, of time to build before the restrictions
went into effect-and almost everyone in the
Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a
crackdown on development was in the
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works." In addition, the court found "the
fact that no evidence was introduced
regarding the specific diminution in value of
any of the plaintiffs' individual properties
clearly weighs against a finding that there
was a partial taking of the plaintiffs'
property." 34 F.Suuu.2d. at 1241.
*316 The District Court had more difficulty with the
"total taking" issue. Although it was satisfied that
petitioners' roperty did retain some value during the
moratoria,& it found that they had been temporarily
deprived of "all economically viable use of their
land." Id., at 1245. The court concluded that those
actions therefore constituted "categorical" tahngs
under our decision in Lucns V . South Cnrolinu
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120
L.Ed.2d 798 (1992. It rejected TRPA's response
that Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 were
"reasonable temporary planning moratoria" that
should be excluded from L ~ ' c a t e g o r i c a 1approach.
The court thought it "fairly clear" that such interim
actions would not have been viewed as tahngs prior
to our decisions in Lucas and First English
Evanpelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Counh~
of'Los Anpeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96
L.Ed.2d 250 (19871, because "[zloning boards, cities,
counties and other agencies used them all the time to
'maintain the status quo pending study and
governmental decision making.' " 34 F.Supv.2d. at
1248-1249 (quoting Williams v. Central, 907 P.2d
70 1, 706 (Colo.Avu. 1995)).
After expressing
uncertainty as to whether those cases required a
holding that moratoria on development automatically
effect takings, the court concluded that TRPA's
actions did so, partly because neither the ordinance
nor the resolution, even though intended to be
temporary **I476 from the beginning, contained an
*317 express termination date. 34 F.Sum.2d. at
1250-125 1.'N13 Accordingly, it ordered TRPA to pay
damages to most petitioners for the 32-month period
from August 24, 1981, to April 25, 1984, and to those
owning class 1, 2, or 3 property in Nevada for the 8month period from August 27, 1983, to April 25,
1984. Id., at 1255.
FN 12. The pretrial order describes purchases
by the United States Forest Service of
private lots in environmentally sensitive
areas during the periods when the two
moratoria were in effect. During the 2-year
period ending on August 26, 1983, it
purchased 215 parcels in California at an

average price of over $19,000 and 45 parcels
in Nevada at an average price of over
$39,000;
during the ensuing 8-month
period, it purchased 167 California parcels
at an average price of over $29,000 and 27
Nevada parcels at an average price of over
$4 1,000. App. 76-77. Moreover, during
those periods some owners sold sewer and
building allocations to owners of higher
capability lots "for between $15,000 and
$30,000." Id., at 77.
FN13. Ordinance 81-5 specified that it
would terminate when the regional plan
became finalized. And Resolution 83-2 1
was limited to 90 days, but was renewed for
an additional term.
Nevertheless, the
District Court distinguished these measures
from true "temporary" moratoria because
there was no fixed date for when they would
terminate. 34 F.Suup.2d. at 1250- 125 1.
Both parties appealed.
TRPA successfully
challenged the District Court's takings determination,
and petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the
dismissal of their claims based on the 1984 and 1987
plans. Petitioners did not, however, challenge the
District Court's findings or conclusions concerning its
application of Penn Centrtrl. With respect to the two
moratoria, the Ninth Circuit noted that petitioners had
expressly disavowed an argument "that the
regulations constitute a taking under the ad hoc
balancing approach described in Penn Central " and
that they did not "dispute that the restrictions
imposed on their properties are appropriate means of
securing the purpose set forth in the Compact."
Accordingly, the only question before the court was
"whether the rule set forth in Lucas applies-that is,
whether a categorical*318 taking occurred because
Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21 denied the
plaintiffs 'all economically beneficial or productive
use of land.' " 216 F.3d 764, 773 (C.A.9 2000).
Moreover, because petitioners brought only a facial
challenge, the narrow inquiry before the Court of
Appeals was whether the mere enactment of the
regulations constituted a taking.
FN14. 216 F.3d. at 773. "Below, the district
court ruled that the regulations did not
constitute a taking under Pain central:^ ad
hoc approach, but that they did constitute a
categorical taking under Lucas Tv. So~cth
Cumlinu Coustal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
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112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) 1.
See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 34
F.Sup~.2dat 1238-1245. The defendants
appealed the district court's latter holding,
but the plaintiffs did not appeal the former.
And even if arguments regarding the Perm
Centrcll test were fairly encompassed by the
defendants' appeal, the plaintiffs have stated
explicitly on this appeal that they do not
argue that the regu1ations.constitute a taking
under the ad hoc balancing approach
described in Penn Central." 216 F.3d, at

773.
Contrary to the District Court, the Court of Appeals
held that because the regulations had only a
temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest in the
properties, no categorical taking had occurred. It
reasoned:
"Property interests may have many different
dimensions.
For example, the dimensions of a
property interest may include a physical dimension
(which describes the size and shape of the property in
question), a functional dimension (which describes
the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of
the property in question), and a temporal dimension
(which describes the duration of the property
interest). At base, the plaintiffs' argument is that we
should conceptually sever each plaintiffs fee interest
into discrete segments in at least one of these
dimensions-the temporal one-and treat each of those
segments as separate and distinct property interests
for purposes of takings analysis. Under this theory,
they argue that there was a categorical talung of one
of those temporal segments." Id., at 774.
Putting to one side "cases of physical invasion or
occupation," ibid., the court read our cases involving
regulatory taking claims to focus on the impact of a
regulation on the parcel as a whole. In its view a
"planning regulation that prevents the development
of a parcel for a temporary period of time is
conceptually no different than a land-use restriction
that permanently denies all use on a discrete portion
of property, or that permanently restricts ""1477 a
type "319 of use across all of the parcel." Id., at
776.
- In each situation, a regulation that affects only
a portion of the parcel-whether limited by time, use,
or space-does not deprive the owner of all
economically beneficial use.w

FN 15. The Court of Appeals added:
"Each of these three types of regulation will

have an impact on the parcel's value,
because each will affect an aspect of the
owner's 'use' of the property-by restricting
when the 'use' may occur, where the 'use'
may occur, or how the 'use' may occur.
Prior to Awins 1v. Citv o f Tihuron. 447 U.S.
255. 100 S.Ct. 2138. 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980)
1, the Court had already rejected takings
challenges to regulations eliminating all
'use' on a portion of the property, and to
regulations restricting the type of 'use'
See
across the breadth of the property.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-3 IT, 98 S.Ct.
26461 ...: Kevstone Bituminous Coal Ass'rz,
480 U.S. at 498-991. 107 S.Ct. 12321 ...;
VilIagr o f E~~clirl
v. Arnbler Realty Co.. 272
U.S. 365. 384, 3971, 47 S.Ct. 114. 71 L.Ed.
3031 ... (19261 (75% diminution in value
caused by zoning law); see also William C.
Haus & Co. v. Citv & Conntv o f Sun
Francisco, 605 F.2d 1 117, 1 120 (9th
Cir. 1979) (value reduced from $2,000,000 to
$100,000).
In those cases, the Court
'uniformly reject[ed] the proposition that
diminution in property value, standing
alone, can establish a "talung.' " &
Central. 438 U.S. at 13 11.98 S.Ct. 26461 ...;
see also Concrete P i ~ and
e Producfs, Ir?c, v.
Construction Laborers Pen.sion Trzut, 508
U.S. 602,6451, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d
5391 ... (1993). There is no plausible basis
on which to distinguish a similar diminution
in value that results from a temporary
suspension of development." Id.. at 776777.
The Court of Appeals distinguished L~rccrs as
applying to the " 'relatively rare' " case in which a
regulation denies all productive use of an entire
parcel, whereas the moratoria involve only a
"temporal 'slice' " of the fee interest and a form of
regulation that is widespread and well established.
216 F.3d. at 773-774. It also rejected petitioners'
argument that our decision in First English was
controlling.
According to the Court of Appeals,
First Enplish concerned the question whether
compensation is an appropriate remedy for a
temporary taking and not whether or when such a
Faced
taking has occurred. 216 F.3d. at 778.
squarely with the question whether a taking had
occurred, the court held that Penn Cenrral was the
appropriate framework for analysis.
Petitioners,
however, had failed to challenge the District "320
Court's conclusion that they could not make out a
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~
taking claim under the Penn Central factors.
Over the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit
denied a petition for rehearing en banc. 228 F.3d 998
fC.A.9 2000). In the dissenters' opinion, the panel's
holding was not faithful to this Court's decisions in
First English and Lzrcrrs, nor to Justice Holmes
admonition in Pennsvlvanirr Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416, 43 S.Ci. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (19221,
that " 'a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of
paying for the change.' " 228 F.3d, at 1003.
Because of the importance of the case, we granted
certiorari limited to the question stated at the
beginning of this opinion. 533 U.S. 948. 12 1 S.Ct.
2589.150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001). We now affirm.

Petitioners make only a facial attack on Ordinance
8 1-5 and Resolution 83-21. They contend that the
mere enactment of a temporary regulation that, while
in effect, denies a property owner all viable economic
use of her property gives rise to an unqualified
constitutional obligation to compensate her for the
value of its use during that period. Hence, they "face
an uphill battle," Kevstonc. Bituminous Coal As.vn. 1).
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470.495, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94
L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), that is made especially steep by
their desire for a categorical rule requiring
compensation whenever the government imposes
such a moratorium on development. Under their
proposed rule, there is no need to evaluate the
landowners' investment-backed expectations, the
actual impact of the regulation on any individual, the
importance of the public interest served by the
regulation, or **I478 the reasons for imposing the
temporary restriction. For petitioners, it is enough
that a regulation imposes a temporary deprivation-no
matter how brief-of all economically viable use to
trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred.
Petitioners assert that our opinions in First Er?plish
and Lucas have "321 already endorsed their view,
and that it is a logical application of the principle that
the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Armstrone v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554
(1960).

support their proposed categorical rule-indeed, fairly
read, they implicitly reject it. Next, we shall explain
why the Armstrong principle requires rejection of that
rule as well as the less extreme position advanced by
petitioners at oral argument. In our view the answer
to the abstract question whether a temporary
moratorium effects a taking is neither "yes, always"
nor "no, never"; the answer depends upon the
particular circumstances of the
Resisting
"[tlhe temptation to adopt what amount to per se
rules in either direction," Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
(2001) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), we conclude
that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed
within the Penn Cerztrwl framework.
FN 16. Despite our clear refusal to hold that
a moratorium never effects a taking, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE accuses us of "allow[ing]
the government to '... take private property
without paying for it,' "post, at 1493. It may
be true that under a Perm Central analysis
petitioners'
land
was
taken
and
compensation would be due.
But
petitioners failed to challenge the District
Court's conclusion that there was no talung
under Penn Central. Supra, at 1476, and n.
14.

The text of the Fifth Amendment itself
provides a basis for drawing a distinction between
physical takings and regulatory talungs. Its plain
language requires the payment of compensation
whenever the government acquires private property
for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the
result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical
appropriation.
But the Constitution contains no
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a
property owner from *322 making certain uses of
FN17
her private property.
Our jurisprudence
involving condemnations and physical talungs is as
old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves
the straightforward application of per- se rules. Our
regulatory takings jurisprudence, in contrast, is of
more recent vintage and is characterized by
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Ccntt.al,
438 U.S.. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, designed to allow
"careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances." Pulazzolo, 533 U.S., at 636, 12 1
S.Ct. 2448 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

We shall first explain why our cases do not
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FN 17. In determining whether govenunent
action
affecting
property
is
an
unconstitutional deprivation of ownership
rights under the Just Compensation Clause,
a court must interpret the word "taken."
When the government condemns or
physically appropriates the property, the fact
of a talung is typically obvious and
undisputed.
When, however, the owner
contends a taking has occurred because a
law or regulation imposes restrictions so
severe that they are tantamount to a
condemnation
or
appropriation,
the
predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and
the analysis is more complex.
1911101 When the government physically takes
possession of an interest in property for some public
purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the
former owner, United States v. Pewee Coal Co.. 341
U.S. 114, 115, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95 L.Ed. 809 (1951),
regardless of whether the interest that is taken
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.
Thus, compensation is mandated when a leasehold is
taken and the government occupies **I479 the
property for its own purposes, even though that use is
temporary. Urzited States I). General Motors Coru.,
323 U.S. 373, 65 S.Ct. 357. 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (19451;
United Stclte.~v. Pet01 Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66
S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946). Similarly, when the
government appropriates part of a rooftop in order to
provide cable TV access for apartment tenants,
Lorelto 1). Teleoron~pterMf~nhattanCATV Gorp., 458
U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164.73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); or
when its planes use private airspace to approach a
government airport, United States 1). Cnusby, 328
U.S. 256. 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (19461, it is
required to pay for that share no matter how small.
But a government regulation that merely prohibits
landlords from evicting *323 tenants unwilling to
pay a higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41
S.Ct. 458, 65 L.Ed. 865 (1921); that bans certain
private uses of a portion of an owner's property,
Villaae ofE11clid 11.Anzbler Reultv Co.. 272 U.S. 365,
47 S.Ct. 114. 71 L.Ed. 303 (19261; Kevstone
Bitvnlinous Coal A.ssn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470. 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); or that
forbids the private use of certain airspace,
Central Transp. Co. v. New York Ciw. 438 U.S. 104,
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (19781, does not
constitute a categorical taking. "The first category of
cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the second
necessarily entails complex factual assessments of

the purposes and economic effects of government
actions." Yee v. Escondido, 503 U . S . 5 19, 523, 112
S.Ct. 1522. 1 18 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992).
See also
Lor-etto. 458 U.S., at 440, 102 S.Ct. 3164; KeysfoneL
480 U.S.. at 489, n. 18, 107 S.Ct. 1232.
Jlllr121r133 This longstanding distinction between
acquisitions of property for public use, on the one
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the
other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving
physical talungs as controlling precedents for the
evaluation of a claim that there has been a
"regulatory taking,"
and vice versa. For the
same reason that we do not ask whether a physical
appropriation advances a substantial government
interest or whether it deprives the owner of all
economically valuable use, we do not apply our
precedent from the physical takings context*324 to
regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values
in some tangential way-often in completely
unanticipated ways.
Treating them all as per se
takings would transform government regulation into
a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast,
physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily
identified, and usually represent a greater affront to
individual property rightsw
**I480 "This case
does not present the 'classi[c] taking' in which the
government directly appropriates private property for
its own use," Eustern Enterl~risesv. Al~fkI,524 U.S.
498. 522. 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998);
instead the interference with property rights "arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic*325
life to promote the
common good," Perm Central, 438 U.S., at 124. 98
S.Ct. 2646.

FN18. To illustrate the importance of the
distinction, the Court in Lorctto, 458 U S . , at
430, 102 S.Ct. 3 164, compared two wartime
talungs cases, United States v. Pewee Coal
Co., 341 U.S. 114, 116, 71 S.Ct. 670, 95
L.Ed. 809 (19511, in which there had been
an "actual taking of possession and control"
of a coal mine, and United States v. Central
Eureli~Mininn Co., 357 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct.
1097. 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (19581, in which, "by
contrast, the Court found no taking where
the Government had issued a wartime order
requiring nonessential gold mines to cease
operations ...." 458 U.S.. at 43 1, 102 S.Ct.
3 164. Loretto then relied on this distinction
-in dismissing the argument that our
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discussion of the physical taking at issue in
the case would affect landlord-tenant laws.
"So long as these regulations do not require
the landlord to suffer the physical
occupation of a portion of his building by a
third party, they will be analyzed under the
multifactor inquiry generally applicable to
nonpossessory governmental activity." Id.,
at 440. 102 S.Ct. 3164 (citing Pent1 Central

1,
FN19. According to THE CHIEF
JUSTICE'S dissent, even a temporary, useprohibiting regulation should be governed
by our physical takings cases because, under
Lircas v. Sozrtll Carolina Coustal Council,
505 U.S. 1003. 1017. 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120
L.Ed.2d 798 (19921, "from the landowner's
point of view," the moratorium is the
functional equivalent of a forced leasehold,
post, at 1493. Of course, from both the
landowner's and the government's standpoint
there are critical differences between a
leasehold
and
a
moratorium.
Condemnation of a leasehold gives the
government possession of the property, the
right to admit and exclude others, and the
right to use it for a public purpose. A
regulatory taking, by contrast, does not give
the government any right to use the
property, nor does it dispossess the owner or
affect her right to exclude others.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE stretches Lucas'
"equivalence" language too far. For even a
regulation that constitutes only a minor
infringement on property may, from the
landowner's perspective, be the functional
L m
equivalent of an appropriation.
carved out a narrow exception to the rules
governing regulatory takings for the
"extraordinary
circumstance"
of
a
permanent deprivation of all beneficial use.
The exception was only partially justified
based on the "equivalence" theory cited by
THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent. It was
also justified on the theory that, in the
"relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all
economically beneficial uses," it is less
realistic to assume that the regulation will
secure an "average reciprocity of
advantage," or that govemment could not go
on if required to pay for every such
restriction. 505 U.S., at 1017-1018, 112

S.Ct. 2886. But as we explain, infiu, at
1487-1489, these assumptions hold true in
the context of a moratorium.
Perhaps recognizing this fundamental distinction,
petitioners wisely do not place all their emphasis on
analogies to physical takings cases. Instead, they
rely principally on our decision in Luctrs v. Solrth
Curnlitiu Coastul Council, 505 U.S. 1003. 1 12 S.Ct.
2886. 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)-a regulatory takings
case that, nevertheless, applied a categorical rule-to
argue that the Penn Cenlml framework is
inapplicable here. A brief review of some of the
cases that led to our decision in Lucas, however, will
help to explain why the holding in that case.does not
answer the question presented here.
J141r151 As we noted in Ltlcas, it was Justice
Holmes' opinion in Pennsvlvunin Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393.43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1 922),""
that gave birth to our regulatory takings
jurisprudence.
"326 In subsequent opinions we
have repeatedly and consistently endorsed Holmes'
observation that "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." Id.. at 415. 43 S.Ct. 158.
Justice Holmes did not provide a standard for
determining when a regulation goes "too far," but he
did reject the view expressed **I481 in Justice
Brandeis' dissent that there could not be a talung
because the property remained in the possession of
the owner and had not been appropriated or used by
the
After Muhotz, neither a physical
appropriation nor a public use has ever been a
necessary component of a "regulatory taking."

FN20. The case involved "a bill in equity
brought by the defendants in error to prevent
the Pennsylvania Coal Company from
mining under their property in such way as
to remove the supports and cause a
subsidence of the surface and of their
house." Mahon, 260 U.S., at 412, 43 S.Ct.
158.
Mahon sought to prevent
Pennsylvania Coal from mining under his
property by relying on a state statute, which
prohibited any mining that could undermine
the foundation of a home. The company
challenged the statute as a talung of its
interest in the coal without compensation.
FN21. In Luca.~, we explained: "Prior to
Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsvh~anicr
Corrl Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 3931, 43 S.Ct.
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158. 67 L.Ed. 3221 (19221, it was generally
thought that the Takings Clause reached
only a 'direct appropriation' of property,
L e d Tender Cases. 12 Wall. 457. 5511. 20
L.Ed. 2871 (1871), or the functional
equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the
owner's] possession,' Trun.snortution Co. v.
Chiccrao. 99 U.S. 635. 6421. 25 L.Ed. 3361
(1879). ... Justice Holmes recognized in
Muhon, however, that if the protection
against physical appropriations of private
property was to be meaningfully enforced,
the govenunent's power to redefine the
range of interests included in the ownership
of property was necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits. 260 U.S., at 414-4151,
43 S.Ct. 1581.
If, instead, the uses of
private property were subject to unbridled,
uncompensated qualification under the
police power, 'the natural tendency of
human nature [would be] to extend the
qualification more and more until at last
private property disappear[ed].' Id., at 4 151,
43 S.Ct. 1581. These considerations gave
birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that,
'while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.'
505
U.S.. at 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (citation
omitted).

u'

FN22. Justice Brandeis argued: "Every
restriction upon the use of property imposed
in the exercise of the police power deprives
the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the
State of rights in ,property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals
from dangers threatened is not a talung.
The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property
so restricted remains in the possession of its
owner. The State does not appropriate it or
make any use of it.
The State merely
prevents the owner from making a use
which interferes with paramount rights of
the public." Mahoiz. 260 U.S., at 417, 43
S.Ct. 158 (dissenting opinion).
1161117111 81 In the decades following that decision,
we have "generally eschewed" any set formula for
determining how far is too far, choosing instead to
engage in " 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.' "

Lucas. 505 U.S.. at 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (quoting
Perm Central, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646).
Indeed, we still resist the temptation to adopt per se
rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings,
preferring to examine "a number of factors" rather
than a simple "mathematically precise" formula.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in * 3 2 7 & g
Centrrrl did, however, make it clear that even though
multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of
regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must
focus on "the parcel as a whole":

FN23.. In her concurring opinion in
Palazzolo, 533 U.S., at 633. 121 S.Ct. 2448,
Justice O'CONNOR reaffirmed
this
approach: "Our polestar instead remains the
principles set forth in Pen11 Central itself
and our other cases that govern partial
regulatory takings.
Under these cases,
interference
with
investment-backed
expectations is one of a number of factors
that a court must examine." Ibid. "Penn
Central does not supply mathematically
precise variables, but instead provides
important guideposts that lead to the
ultimate determination whether just
compensation is required." Id., at 634. 12 1
S.Ct. 2448. "The temptation to adopt what
amount to per se rules in either direction
must be resisted.
The Talungs Clause
requires careful examination and weighing
of all the relevant circumstances in this
context." Id., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448.
" 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated.
In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the
action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax
block designated as the 'landmark site.' " Id.. at 13013 1.98 S.Ct. 2646.
This requirement that "the aggregate must be viewed
in its entirety" explains why, for example, a
regulation that prohibited commercial transactions in
eagle feathers, but did not bar other uses or impose
any physical invasion or restraint upon them, was not
a taking. Andr~isv. Allard 444 U.S. 5 1 , 66, 100
S.Ct. 3 18, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). It also clarifies
why restrictions on the use of only limited portions of
the parcel, such as setback ordinances, Goric~hv. Fox,
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274 U.S. 603.47 S.Ct. 675, 71 L.Ed. 1228 (19271, or
a requirement that coal pillars be left in place to
prevent mine subsidence, Keystone Bituminous Con1
Assn. v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S.. at 498. 107 S.Ct.
1232. were not considered regulatory takings. In
each of these cases, we affirmed that "where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking." Andnrs, 444 U.S.. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 3 18.
*328 While the foregoing cases considered whether
particular regulations had "gone too far" and were
therefore invalid, none **I482 of them addressed the
separate remedial question of how compensation is
measured once a regulatory talung is established. In
his dissenting opinion in Sun Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Sun Diego. 450 U.S. 621, 636, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 67
L.Ed.2d 55 1 (198 11, Justice Brennan identified that
question and explained how he would answer it:
"The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once
a court finds that a police power regulation has
effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay
just compensation for the period commencing on the
date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and
ending on the date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation."
658, 1-01S.Ct. 1287.
Justice Brennan's proposed rule was subsequently
endorsed by the Court in First Enalish, 482 U.S., at
315. 318, 321. 107 S.Ct. 2378. First English was
certainly a significant decision, and nothing that we
say today qualifies its holding. Nonetheless, it is
important to recognize that we did not address in that
case the quite different and logically prior question
whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact
constituted a taking.
In First English, the Court unambiguously and
repeatedly characterized the issue to be decided as a
"compensation question" or a "remedial question."
Id., at 31 1. 107 S.Ct. 2378 ("The disposition of the
case on these grounds isolates the remedial question
for our consideration"); see also id.. at 313,3 18, 107
S.Ct. 2378. And the Court's statement of its holding
was equally unambiguous: "We merely hold that
where the government's activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the
talung was effective." M.,at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(emphasis added). In fact, First English expressly
disavowed any ruling on the *329 merits of the
talungs issue because the California courts had

decided the remedial question on the assumption that
a taking had been alleged. I d , at 3 12-3 13. 107 S.Ct.
2378 ("We reject appellee's suggestion that ... we
must independently evaluate the adequacy of the
complaint and resolve the talungs claim on the merits
before we can reach the remedial question"). After
our remand, the California courts concluded that
there had not been a taking, First Enalish Evanr.elicu1
Church o f Glendule v. Cot~ntvo f Los Ange/e.s. 2 1 0
Cal.Avp.3d 1353, 258 Cal.Rvtr. 893 (19891, and we
declined review of that decision, 493 U.S. 1056, 1 10
S.Ct. 866. 107 L.Ed.2d 950 (19901.
To the extent that the Court in First Encrlish
referenced the antecedent takings question, we
identified two reasons why a regulation temporarily
denying an owner all use of her property might not
constitute a taking. First, we recognized that "the
county might avoid the conclusion that a
compensable taking had occurred by establishing that
the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the
State's authority to enact safety regulations." 482
U.S., at 3 13. 107 S.Ct. 2378. Second, we limited our
holding "to the facts presented" and recognized "the
quite different questions that would arise in the case
of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like
which [were] not before us." Id., at 321, 107 S.Ct.
2378. Thus, our decision in First English surely did
not approve, and implicitly rejected, the categorical
submission that petitioners are now advocating.
Similarly, our decision in Lucas is not dispositive of
the question presented. Although LEICUS
endorsed
and applied a categorical rule, it was not the one that
petitioners propose. Lucas purchased two residential
lots in 1988 for $975,000. These lots were rendered
"valueless" by a statute enacted two years later. The
trial court found that a taking had occurred and
ordered compensation of $1,232,387.50, representing
the value of the fee simple estate, plus interest. As
the statute read **I483 at the time of the trial, it
effected a talung that "was unconditional and
permanent." "330505 US.,
at 1012. 112 S.Ct.
2886. While the State's appeal was pending, the
statute was amended to authorize exceptions that
might have allowed Lucas to obtain a building
permit. Despite the fact that the amendment gave
the State Supreme Court the opportunity to dispose of
the appeal on ripeness grounds, it resolved the merits
of the permanent takings claim and reversed. Since
"Lucas had no reason to proceed on a 'temporary
taking' theory at trial," we decided the case on the
permanent talung theory that both the trial court and
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the State Supreme Court had addressed.

Ihid.

The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states
that compensation is required when a regulation
deprives an owner of "aN economically beneficial
uses" of his land. Id.. at 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886.
Under that rule, a statute that "wholly eliminated the
value" of Lucas' fee simple title clearly qualified as a
taking.
But our holding was limited to "the
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted."
Id., at 1017. 1 12 S.Ct. 2886. The emphasis on the
word "no" in the text of the opinion was, in effect,
reiterated in a footnote explaining that the categorical
rule would not apply if the diminution in value were
95% instead of 100%. Id.. at 1019, n. 8. 112 S.Ct.
2886.FN24
Anything less than a "complete elimination
of value," or a "total loss," the Court acknowledged,
would require the lund of analysis applied in Penrl
Central. Lucas, 505U.S.. at 1019-1020. n. 8, 112
S.Ct. 2886.FN25
FN24. Justice KENNEDY concurred in the
judgment on the basis of the regulation's
impact on "reasonable, investment-backed
expectations." 505 U.S., at 1034, 112 S.Ct.

2886.
FN25. It is worth noting that -L
underscores the difference between physical
and regulatory talungs. See supra, at 14781480. For under our physical takings cases
it would be irrelevant whether a property
owner maintained 5% of the value of her
property so long as there was a physical
appropriation of any of the parcel.
Certainly, our holding that the permanent
"obliteration of the value" of a fee simple estate
constitutes a categorical taking does not answer the
question whether a regulation "331 prohibiting any
economic use of land for a 32-month period has the
same legal effect. Petitioners seek to bring this case
under the rule announced in Lzicas by arguing that we
can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the
remainder of each landowner's fee simple estate, and
then ask whether that segment has been taken in its
entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining the
property interest taken in terms of the very regulation
being challenged is circular.
With property so
divided, every delay would become a total ban; the
moratorium and the normal permit process alike
would constitute categorical takings.
Petitioners'

''conceptual severance" argument is unavailing
because it ignores Penn Centrull.s admonition that in
regulatory takings cases we must focus on "the parcel
as a whole." 438 U.S., at 130-131. 98 S.Ct. 2646.
We have consistently rejected such an approach to
the "denominator" question.
See Kc>vstone, 480
U.S., at 497. 107 S.Ct. 1232. See also Concrete Pipe
& Pt.odticts o f Crll., Inc. v. Construction Lnhorcrs
Pension Trilsf fbr Soiithern C(r1.. 508 U.S. 602, 644,
113 S.Ct. 2264. 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (19931 ("To the
extent that any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant
question, however, is whether the property taken is
all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question").
Thus, the District Court erred when it disaggregated
petitioners' property into temporal segments
corresponding to the regulations at issue and then
analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all
economically viable use during each period. 34
F.Suvp.2d. at 1242-1245. The starting point for the
court's analysis should have been to ask whether
there was a total taking of the ""1484 entire parcel;
if not, then Pcizn Ccntl-a1 was the proper
framew~rk.~
FN26. THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent
makes the same mistake by carving out a 6year interest in the property, rather than
considering the parcel as a whole, and
treating the regulations covering that
segment as analogous to a total taking under
L~rcrts,post, at 1494.
[201[21] An interest in real property is defined by the
metes and bounds that describe its geographic
dimensions and the *332 term of years that describes
the temporal aspect of the owner's interest.
See
Restatement of Provertv 6 6 7 9 1 9 3 6 Both
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be
viewed in its entirety.
Hence, a permanent
deprivation of the owner's use of the entire area is a
taking of "the parcel as a whole," whereas a
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution
in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot
be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on
economic use, because the property will recover
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted. Cf.* A
v. City of' T i b u ~ m 447
.
U.S.. at 263. n. 9, I00 S.Ct.
2138 ("Even if the appellants' ability to sell their
property was limited during the pendency of the
condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to
sell or develop their property when the proceedings
ended. Mere fluctuations in value during the process
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of
governmental
decisionmaking,
absent
extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership.
They cannot be considered as a "talung" in the
constitutional sense' " (quoting Darzforth v. United
States. 308 U.S. 27 1.285.60 S.Ct. 23 1.84 L.Ed. 240

(1939))).
Neither Lucus, nor First English, nor any of our
other regulatory takings cases compels us to accept
petitioners' categorical submission.
In fact, these
cases make clear that the categorical rule in Lucus
was cawed out for the "extraordinary case" in which
a regulation permanently deprives property of all
value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory
taking context, we require a more fact specific
inquiry. Nevertheless, we will consider whether the
interest in protecting individual property owners from
bearing public burdens "which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.. at 49, 80 S.Ct.
1563, justifies creating a new rule for these

circumstance^.^
FN27. Arn~.rtmnrr,like Lucas, was a case
that involved the "total destruction by the
Government of all value" in a specific
property interest. 364 U.S., at 48-49. 80
S.Ct. 1563. It is nevertheless perfectly clear
that Justice Black's oft-quoted comment
about the underlying purpose of the
guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just
compensation applies to partial talungs as
well as total takings.

Considerations of "fairness and justice" arguably
could support the conclusion that TRPA's moratoria
were takings of petitioners' property based on any of
seven different theories. First, even though we have
not previously done so, we might now announce a
categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and
justice, compensation is required whenever
government temporarily deprives an owner of all
economically viable use of her property. Second, we
could craft a narrower rule that would cover all
temporary land-use restrictions except those "normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" which
were put to one side in our opinion in First English,
482 U.S., at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378. Third, we could
adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus

supporting petitioners that would "allow a short fixed
period for deliberations to take place without
compensation-say maximum one year-after which the
just compensation requirements" would "kick in."
Fourth, **I485 with the benefit of hindsight, we
might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as
a "series of rolling moratoria" that were the
functional equivalent of a permanent taking.
Fifth, were it not for the findings of the District Court
that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we
might have concluded that the agency was stalling in
order to avoid promulgating the environmental
threshold carrying capacities and regional plan
mandated by the 1980 Compact. Cf. *334Monterev
1). Del Monte Dunes nt
Monterev. Ltd.. 526 U.S.
687, 698. 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999).
Sixth, apart from the District Court's finding that
TRPA's actions represented a proportional response
to a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might
have argued that the moratoria did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, see Apins and
Monterev. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the
application of the moratoria to their individual
parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of
them might have prevailed under a Penn Central
analysis.
FN28. Brief for the Institute for Justice as
Amicus Curiae 30.
Although anlicus
describes the 1-year cutoff proposal as the
"better approach by far," ibid., its primary
argument is that Penn Centrzll should be
overruled, id., at 20 ("AN partial takings by
way of land use restriction should be subject
to the same prima facie rules for
compensation as a physical occupation for a
limited period of time").
FN29. Brief for Petitioners 44.
Pet. for Cert. i.

See also

1231[241[251 As the case comes to us, however, none
of the last four theories is available. The "rolling
moratoria" theory was presented in the petition for
certiorari, but our order granting review did not
encompass that issue, 533 U.S. 948, 121 S.Ct. 2589,
150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001); the case was tried in the
District Court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals
on the theory that each of the two moratoria was a
separate taking, one for a 2-year period and the other
for an 8-month period. 2 16 F.3d. at 769. And, as we
have already noted, recovery on either a bad faith
theory or a theory that the state interests were
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insubstantial is foreclosed by the District Court's
unchallenged findings of fact. Recovery under a
Penn Central analysis is also foreclosed both because
petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and
because they did not appeal from the District Court's
conclusion that the evidence would not support it.
Nonetheless, each of the three per se theories is fairly
encompassed within the question that we decided to
answer.
With respect to these theories, the ultimate
constitutional question is whether the concepts of
"fairness and justice" that underlie the Takings
Clause will be better served by one of these
categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all
of the relevant circumstances in particular cases.
From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule
that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter
how brief, constitutes a compensable taking surely
cannot be sustained. Petitioners' broad submission
would apply to numerous *335 "normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, variances, and the like," 482 U.S., at 321,
107 'S.Ct. 2378, as well as to orders temporarily
prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that
violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other
areas that we cannot now foresee. Such a rule would
undoubtedly require changes in numerous practices
that have long been considered permissible exercises
of the police power. As Justice Holmes warned in
Muhon, "[g]ovemment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law." 260 U.S.. at 41 3, 43 S.Ct. 158. A
rule that required compensation for every delay in the
use of property would render routine government
processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decisionmaking. Such an important change in the
law should be the product of legislative rulemaking
rather than a d j u d i c a t i ~ n . ~
FN30. In addition, we recognize the
anomaly that would be created if we were to
apply Penn Central when a landowner is
permanently deprived of 95% of the use of
her property, Luca,~,505 U.S., at 10 19, n. 8,
112 S.Ct. 2886, and yet find a per- se taking
anytime the same property owner is
deprived of all use for only five days. Such
a scheme would present an odd inversion of
Justice Holmes' adage: "A limit in time, to
tide over a passing trouble, well may justify
a law that could not be upheld as a

permanent change." Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 157. 41 S.Ct. 458. 65 L.Ed. 865
(1921).
**I486 12711281 More importantly, for reasons set
out at some length by Justice O'CONNOR in her
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 533
U.S.. at 636. 121 S.Ct. 2448, we are persuaded that
the better approach to claims that a regulation has
effected a temporary taking "requires careful
examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances." In that opinion, Justice O'CONNOR
specifically considered the role that the "temporal
relationship between regulatory enactment and title
acquisition" should play in the analysis of a takings
claim. Id,, at 632, 121 S.Ct. 2448. We have no
occasion to address that particular issue in this case,
because it involves a different*336
temporal
relationship-the distinction between a temporary
restriction and one that is permanent. Her comments
on the "fairness and justice" inquiry are, nevertheless,
instructive:
"Today's holding does not mean that the timing of the
regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of
title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis.
Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this
consideration from the talungs inquiry as it would be
to accord it exclusive significance.
Our polestar
instead remains the principles set forth in -P
Central itself and our other cases that govern partial
regulatory talungs. Under these cases, interference
with investment-backed expectations is one of a
number of factors that a court must examine. ...
"The Fifth Amendment forbids the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
We have recognized that this constitutional guarantee
is ' "designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole." ' Penn Centr.al, I438 U.S.1, at 123-1241,
98 S.Ct. 26461 (quoting Aianzstrong v. United Slataq
364 U.S. 40, 49[, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 15541
(1960)). The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that
underlie the Takings Clause, of course, are less than
fully determinate. Accordingly, we have eschewed
'any "set formula" for determining when "justice and
fairness" require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on
a few persons.7 P a m Centr-al, s ~ ~ p r nat, 124[, 98
S.Ct. 26461 (quoting Goldhlntt 1,. Henz~stead. 369
U.S. 590, 594r. 82 S.Ct. 987. 8 L.Ed.2d 1301 (1 962)).
The outcome instead 'depends largely "upon the
particular circumstances [in that] case.' " Pc.nn
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Cet~tr.aI,supro. at 124[, 98 S.Ct. 26461 (quoting
United States v. Central Etuoka Mining Co.. 357 U.S.
155. 168r. 78 S.Ct. 1097. 2 L.Ed.2d 12281 (1958))."
Id., at 633. 12 1 S.Ct. 2448.

*337 In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not
hold that the temporary nature of a land-use
restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking;
we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other.
A narrower rule that excluded the normal delays
associated with processing permits, or that covered
only delays of more than a year, would certainly have
a less severe impact on prevailing practices, but it
would still impose serious financial constraints on the
planning process.m
Unlike **I487 the
"extraordinary circumstance" in which the
government deprives a property owner of all
economic use, Oicas, 505 U.S., at 1017, 112 S.Ct.
2886, moratoria like Ordinance 8 1-5 and Resolution
83-21 are used widely among land-use planners to
preserve the status quo while formulating a more
permanent development strategy.w
In fact, the
consensus in the planning communityk338 appears
to be that moratoria, or "interim development
controls" as they are often called, are an essential tool
of successful d e v e ~ o ~ m e n Yet
t . ~ even the weak
version of petitioners' categorical rule would treat
these interim measures as talungs regardless of the
good faith of the planners, the reasonable
expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact
of the moratorium on property value^.^
FN3 1. Petitioners fail to offer a persuasive
explanation for why moratoria should be
treated differently from ordinary permit
delays.
They contend that a permit
applicant need only comply with certain
specific requirements in order to receive one
and can expect to develop at the end of the
process, whereas there is nothing the
landowner subject to a moratorium can do
but wait, with no guarantee that a permit
will be granted at the end of the process.
Brief for Petitioners 28. Setting aside the
obvious problem with basing the distinction
on a course of events we can only know
after the fact-in the context of a facial
challenge-petitioners' argument breaks down
under closer examination because there is no
guarantee that a permit will be granted, or
that a decision will be made within a year.

See, e.g., Dufbu v. United Stoles. 22 CI.Ct.
156 (1990) (holding that 16-month delay in
granting a permit did not constitute a
temporary taking).
Moreover, under
petitioners' modified categorical rule, there
would be no per se taking if TRPA simply
delayed action on all permits pending a
regional plan. Fairness and justice do not
require that TRPA be penalized for
achieving the same result, but with full
disclosure.
FN32. See, e.g., S u n t ~Fe Vill(~peVentitre v.
Albtiuuer~uue, 914 F.Suvv. 478, 483
(D.N.M. 1995) (30-month moratorium on
development of lands within the Petroglyph
National Monument was not a taking);
Williams v. Central, 907 P.2d 70 1. 703-706
JColo.Avu.1995) (I 0-month moratorium on
development in gaming district while
studying city's ability to absorb growth was
not a compensable tahng); Woodburv Place
Partners v. Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258
JMinn.At>o.19921 (moratorium pending
review of plan for land adjacent to interstate
highway was not a taking even though it
deprived property owner of all economically
viable use of its property for two years);
Zilher v. Town o f Mor-anu, 692 F.Supp. 1195
/N.D.Cal. l98Q (18-month development
moratorium during completion of a
comprehensive scheme for open space did
not require compensation).
See also
Wayman, Leaders Consider Options for
Town Growth, Charlotte Observer, Feb. 3,
2002, p. 15M (describing 10-month building
moratorium imposed "to give town leaders
time to plan for development"); Wallman,
City May Put Reins on Beach Projects, SunSentinel, May 16, 2000, p. 1B (2-year
building moratorium on beachfront property
in Fort Lauderdale pending new height,
width, and dispersal regulations); Foderaro,
In Suburbs, They're Cracking Down on the
Joneses, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2001, p. A1
(describing moratorium
imposed
in
Eastchester, New York, during a review of
the town's zoning code to address the
problem of oversized homes); Dawson,
Commissioners
recommend
Aboite
construction ban be lifted, Fort Wayne News
Sentinel, May 4, 2001, p. 1A (3-year
moratorium to allow improvements in the
water and sewage treatment systems).
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FN33. See J. Juergensmeyer & T. Roberts,
Land Use Planning and Control Law tj tj
5.28(G) and 9.6 (1998); Garvin & Leitner,
Drafting Interim Development Ordinances:
Creating Time to Plan, 48 Land Use Law &
Zoning Digest 3 (June 1996) ("With the
planning so protected, there is no need for
hasty adoption of permanent controls in
order to avoid the establishment of
nonconforming uses, or to respond in an ad
hoc fashion to specific problems. Instead,
the planning and implementation process
may be permitted to run its full and natural
course with widespread citizen input and
involvement, public debate, and full
consideration of all issues and points of
view");
Freilich, Interim Development
Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing
Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. Urb. L.
65 (1971).
FN34. THE CHIEF JUSTICE offers another
alternative, suggesting that delays of six
years or more should be treated as per se
talungs.
However, his dissent offers no
explanation for why 6 years should be the
cutoff point rather than 10 days, 10 months,
or 10 years. It is worth emphasizing that
we do not reject a categorical rule in this
case because a 32-month moratorium is just
not that harsh.
Instead, we reject a
categorical rule because we conclude that
the Penn Centrrrl framework adequately
directs the inquiry to the proper
considerations-only one of which is the
length of the delay.
*339 The interest in facilitating informed
decisionmaking by regulatory agencies counsels
against adopting a per se rule that would impose such
severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the
financialx*1488
constraints of compensating
property owners during a moratorium may force
officials to rush through the planning process or to
abandon the practice altogether. To the extent that
communities are forced to abandon using moratoria,
landowners will have incentives to develop their
property quickly before a comprehensive plan can be
enacted, thereby fostering inefficient and illconceived growth. A finding in the 1980 Compact
itself, which presumably was endorsed by all three
legislative bodies that participated in its enactment,
attests to the importance of that concern. 94 Stat.

3243 ("The legislatures of the States of California
and Nevada find that in order to make effective the
regional plan as revised by the agency, it is necessary
to halt temporarily works of development in the
region which might otherwise absorb the entire
capability of the region for further development or
direct it out of harmony with the ultimate plan").
As Justice KENNEDY explained in his opinion for
the Court in Palazzolo, it is the interest in informed
decisionmaking that underlies our decisions imposing
a strict ripeness requirement on landowners asserting
regulatory talungs claims:
"These cases stand for the important principle that a
landowner may not establish a taking before a landuse authority has the opportunity, using its own
reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the
reach of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness
rules a talungs claim based on a law or regulation
which is alleged to go too far in burdening property
depends upon the landowner's first having followed
reasonable *340 and necessary steps to allow
regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in
considering development plans for the property,
including the opportunity to grant any variances or
waivers allowed by law. As a general rule, until
these ordinary processes have been followed the
extent of the restriction on property is not known and
a regulatory talung has not yet been established. See
Suitl~ni Ill. Tahoe Regional Planninp Apencv. 520
U.S. 725, 736, and n. 10, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137
L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) ] (noting difficulty of
demonstrating that 'mere enactment' of regulations
restricting land use effects a taking)." 533 U.S.. at
620-62 1, 121 S.Ct. 2448.
We would create a perverse system of incentives
were we to hold that landowners must wait for a
takings claim to ripen so that planners can make wellreasoned decisions while, at the same time, holding
that those planners must compensate landowners for
the delay.
Indeed, the interest in protecting the decisional
process is even stronger when an agency is
developing a regional plan than when it is
considering a permit for a single parcel.
In the
proceedings involving the Lake Tahoe Basin, for
example, the moratoria enabled TRPA to obtain the
benefit of comments and criticisms from interested
parties, such as the petitioners, during its
deliberation^.^ Since a categorical rule tied to the
length of deliberations would likely create added
pressure on decisionmakers to reach a quick
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resolution of land-use questions, it would only serve
to disadvantage those landowners and interest groups
who are not as organizedx341 or familiar wit'h the
planning process. Moreover, with a temporary ban
on development there is a lesser risk that individual
landowners will be "singled out" to bear a special
burden that should be shared by the public as a
**1489Nollun v. Culifornia Coastal
whole.
Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 835. 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97
L.Ed.2d 677 (1987i At least with a moratorium
there is a clear "reciprocity of advantage," Malton,
260 U.S., at 415.43 S.Ct. 158, because it protects the
interests of all affected landowners against immediate
construction that might be inconsistent with the
provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted.
"While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others." Kevstonc, 480
U.S.. at 491, 107 S.Ct. 1232. In fact, there is reason
to believe property values often will continue to
increase despite a moratorium. See, e.g., Gro~~tlz
Proaerties, Inc. v, Klinabeil Holding Co., 4 19
F.SUUR.212. 218 (D.Md.19761 (noting that land
values could be expected to increase 20% during a 5year moratorium on development).
Cf. Fat-e.~t
Prqperties. h c . v. United States. 177 F.3d 1360,
1367 rC.A.Fed. 1999) (record showed that market
value of the entire parcel increased despite denial of
permit to fill and develop lake-bottom property).
Such an increase makes sense in this context because
property values throughout the Basin can be expected
to reflect the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will
remain in its pristine state. Since in some cases a 1year moratorium may not impose a burden at all, we
should not adopt a rule that assumes moratoria
always force individuals to bear a special burden that
should be shared by the public as a whole.

FN35. Petitioner Preservation Council,
"through its authorized representatives,
actively participated in the entire TRPA
regional planning process leading to the
adoption of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue
in this action, and attended and expressed its
views and concerns, orally and in writing, at
each public hearing held by the Defendant
TRPA in connection with the consideration
of the 1984 Regional Plan at issue herein, as
well as in connection with the adoption of
Ordinance 81-5 and the Revised 1987
Regional Plan addressed herein." App. 24.
It may well be true that any moratorium that

lasts for more than one year should be viewed with
special skepticism.
But given the fact that the
District Court found that the 32 months required by
TRPA to formulate the 1984 Regional Plan was not
unreasonable, we could not possibly conclude that
every delay of over one year is constitutionally *342
u n a c ~ e ~ t a b l eFormulating
.~
a general rule of this
kind is a suitable task for state legislatures.m In our
view, the duration of the restriction is one of the
important factors that a court must consider in the
appraisal of a regulatory talungs claim, but with
respect to that factor as with respect to other factors,
the "temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules
in either direction must be resisted." P~zlozzolo,533
U.S., at 636, 121 S.Ct. 2448 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring). There may be moratoria that last longer
than one year which interfere with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, but as the District
Court's opinion illustrates, petitioners' proposed rule
is simply "too blunt an instrument" for identifying
those cases. Id., at 628. 121 S.Ct. 2448.
We
conclude, therefore, that the interest in "fairness and
justice" will be best served by relying on the familiar
Penn Centrnl approach when deciding cases like this,
rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical
rule.

FN36. We note that the temporary
restriction that was ultimately upheld in the
First Enalish case lasted for more than six
years before it was replaced by a permanent
First Englisl~ Evclnpelicnl
regulation.
Lzltheron Ch~it-cho f Glendale v. C o t l t l ~of'
Los An.yeles, 210 Cal.Aup.3d 1353, 258
Cal.R~tr.893 (1989).
FN37. Several States already have statutes
authorizing interim zoning ordinances with
specific time limits. See Cal. Govt.Code
Ann.
65858 (West Supp.2002)
(authorizing interim ordinance of up to two
years); Colo.Rev.Stat. 4 30-28-1 21 (200 1)
(six months); Kv.Rev.Stat. Ann. 6 100.201
(2001) (one year); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
125.215 (West 2001) (three years);
Minn.Stat. d 394.34 (2000) (two years);
N.H.Rev.Stat. AM. 6 674:23 (West 2001)
(one year); 0re.Rev.Stat. AM. 6 197.520
(1997) (10 months); S.D. Codified Laws P
11-2- 10 (2001 ) (two years); Utah Code
Ann. 6 17-27-404 (1995) (18 months);
Wash. Rev.Code 6 35.63.200 12001); Wis.
Stat. 6 62.23(7)(d) (2001) (two years).
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Other States, although without specific
statutory authority, have recognized that
reasonable interim zoning ordinances may
be enacted.
See, e.g., S.E. W. Friel v.
Triangle Oil Co., 76 Md.App. 96, 543 A.2d
863 (1 988); New Jetsev Shorc) Builders
Assn. v. Dover TWD.Comnz.. 19 1 N.J.S uper.
627. 468 A.2d 742 (1983); SCA Chemical
Wustc~ Sotvs.. Inc. v. kilni~.shem. 636
S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1982);
Sturges v.
Chihark, 380 Mass. 246. 402 N.E.2d 1346
(1980); Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182,
215 A.2d 112 (1965).

**I490 "343 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice REHNOUIST, with whom Justice
SCALIA and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.
For over half a decade petitioners were prohibited
from building homes, or any other structures, on their
land.
Because the Talungs Clause requires the
government to pay compensation when it deprives
owners of all economically viable use of their land,
see Luca.r v. Sotith Carolina Coastal Cotincil. 505
U.S. 1003. 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (19921,
and because a ban on all development lasting almost
six years does not resemble any traditional land-use
planning device, I dissent.

"A court cannot determine whether a regulation has
gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation
goes." MucDonald, Sommer & Frutes v. Yolo
Cottntv. 477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91
L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (citing Pennsvlvanicr Coal Co. 1,.
Mahorz. 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed.
322 ( 1 9 2 2 ' l ) . ~In failing to undertake this inquiry,
the Court *344 ignores much of the impact of
respondent's conduct on petitioners. Instead, it relies
on the flawed determination of the Court of Appeals
that the relevant time period lasted only from August
1981 until April 1984. Ante, at 1473, 1474. During
that period, Ordinance 81-5 and Regulation 83-21
prohibited development pending the adoption of a
new regional land-use plan. The adoption of the
1984 Regional Plan (hereinafter Plan or 1984 Plan)
did not, however, change anything from petitioners'
standpoint. After the adoption of the 1984 Plan,
petitioners still could make no use of their land.

FNI. We are not bound by the Court of
Appeals' determination that petitioners'
claim under 42 U.S. C B 1983 (1 994 ed.,
SUPU. V) permitted only challenges to
Ordinance 8 1-5 and Regulation 83-2 1.
Petitioners sought certiorari on the Court of
Appeals' ruling that respondent Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (hereinafter
respondent) did not cause petitioners' injury
from 1984 to 1987. Pet. for Cert. 27-30.
We did not grant certiorari on any of the
petition's specific questions presented, but
formulated
the
following
question:
"Whether the Court of Appeals properly
determined that a temporary moratorium on
land development does not constitute a
taking of property requiring compensation
under the Talungs Clause of the United
States Constitution?" 533 U.S. 948, 949,
121 S.Ct. 2589. 150 L.Ed.2d 749 (2001).
This Court's Rule 14(l)(a) provides that a
"question presented is deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included
therein." The question of how long the
moratorium on land development lasted is
necessarily subsumed within the question
whether the moratorium constituted a taking.
Petitioners did not assume otherwise. Their
brief on the merits argues that respondent
"effectively blocked all construction for the
past two decades." Brief for Petitioners 7.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this post-April
1984 deprivation on the ground that respondent did
not "cause" it. In a 42 U.S.C. 4 1983 action, "the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed
injury." 216 F.3d 764, 783 (C.A.9 2000). Applying
this principle, the Court of Appeals held that the 1984
Plan did not amount to a taking because the Plan
actually allowed permits to issue for the construction
of single-family residences.
Those permits were
never issued because the District Court immediately
issued a temporary restraining order, and later a
permanent injunction that lasted until 1987,
prohibiting the approval of any building projects
under the 1984 Plan. Thus, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the "1984 Plan itself could not have
constituted a taking," because it was the injunction,
not the Plan, that prohibited development during this
period. Id., at 784. The Court of Appeals is correct
that the 1984 Plan did not cause petitioners' injury.
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But that is the right answer to the wrong question.
The causation question is not limited to whether the
1984 Plan caused petitioners' **I491 injury; the
question is whether respondent caused petitioners'
injury.
We have never addressed the 5 1983 causation
requirement in the context of a regulatory takings
claim, though language in Penn Central Truns~.Co.
V . New Yorli Citv, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646. 57
L.Ed.2d 63 1 ( 1978h suggests that ordinary principles
of proximate cause *345 govern the causation
inquiry for takings claims. Id., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646.
The causation standard does not require much
elaboration in this case, because respondent was
undoubtedly the "moving force" behind petitioners'
inability to build on their land from August 1984
through 1987. Monell v. New York Citv D e ~ t .o f
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 56
L.Ed.2d 61 1 (1978) (j 1983 causation established
when government action is the "moving force"
behind the alleged constitutional violation).
The
injunction in this case issued because the 1984 Plan
did not comply with the 1980 Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact (Compact) and regulations issued
pursuant to the Compact.
And, of course,
respondent is responsible for the Compact and its
regulations.
'

On August 26, 1982, respondent adopted Resolution
82-1 1. That resolution established "environmental
thresholds for water quality, soil conservation, air
quality, vegetation preservation, wildlife, fisheries,
noise, recreation, and scenic resources." Ccilifiv-nio
v. Tuhoe Rezional P1annin.g Agency, 766 F.2d 1308,
13 11 (C.A.9 1985). The District Court enjoined the
1984 Plan in part because the Plan would have
allowed 42,000 metric tons of soil per year to erode
from some of the single-family residences, in excess
of the Resolution 82-1 1 threshold for soil
conservation. Id., at 1315; see also id., at 1312.
Another reason the District Court enjoined the 1984
Plan was that it did not comply with article V(g) of
the Compact, which requires a finding, "with respect
to each project, that the project will not cause the
established [environmental] thresholds to be
exceeded." Ihid. Thus, the District Court enjoined
the 1984 Plan because the Plan did not comply with
the environmental requirements of respondent's
regulations and of the Compact itself.
Respondent is surely responsible for its own
regulations, and it is also responsible for the Compact
as it is the governmental agency charged with

administering the Compact. Compact, Art. I(c), 94
Stat 3234.
It follows that respondent was the
"moving force" behind petitioners' inability to
develop*346 their land from April 1984 through the
enactment of the 1987 plan.
Without the
environmental thresholds established by the Compact
and Resolution 82-11, the 1984 Plan would have
gone into effect and petitioners would have been able
to build single-family residences.
And it was
certainly foreseeable that development projects
exceeding the environmental thresholds would be
prohibited; indeed, that was the very purpose of
enacting the thresholds.
Because respondent caused petitioners' inability to
use their land from 198 1 through 1987, that is the
appropriate period of time from which to consider
their takings claim.

I now turn to determining whether a ban on all
economic development lasting almost six years is a
taking. L m reaffirmed our "frequently expressed"
view that "when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial
uses in the name of the common good, that is, to
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered
ataking." 505U.S..at 1019, 112S.Ct. 2886. See
also Agins v. Cihj of'Tihumn. 447 U.S. 255, 258-259,
100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). The District
Court in this case held that the ordinances and
resolutions in effect between August 24, 1981, and
April 25, 1984, "did in fact deny the plaintiffs all
economically viable use of their land." 34 F.Suvp.2d
1226,1245 (D.Nev. 1999). The Court of Appeals did
not overturn this ""1492 finding.
And the 1984
injunction, issued because the environmental
thresholds issued by respondent did not permit the
development of single-family residences, forced
petitioners to leave their land economically idle for at
least another three years. The Court does not dispute
that petitioners were forced to leave their land
economically idle during this period. See ante, at
1473. But the Court refuses to apply L ~ ~ c aons the
ground that the deprivation was "temporary."
Neither the Talungs Clause nor our case law supports
such a distinction.
For one thing, a distinction
between
*347 "temporary" and "permanent"
prohibitions is tenuous,
The "temporary"
prohibition in this case that the Court finds is not a
taking lasted almost six years.E The "permanent"
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prohibition that the Court held to be a talung in Lucas
lasted less than two years. See 505 U.S.. at 101 110 12. 112 S.Ct. 2886. The "permanent" prohibition
in -L
lasted less than two years because the law,
as it often does, changed.
The South Carolina
Legislature in 1990 decided to amend the 1988
Beachfront Management Act to allow the issuance of
" 'special permits' for the construction or
reconstruction of habitable structures seaward of the,
baseline." Id., at 101 1-1012. 112 S.Ct 2886. Landuse regulations are not irrevocable.
And the
government can even abandon condemned land. See
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26, 78 S.Ct 1039,
2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958). Under the Court's decision
today, the talungs question turns entirely on the initial
label given a regulation, a label that is often without
much meaning.
There is every incentive for
government to simply label any prohibition on
development "temporary," or to fix a set number of
years. As in this case, this initial designation does
not preclude the government from repeatedly
extending the "temporary" prohibition into a longterm ban on all development. The Court now holds
that such a designation by the government is
conclusive even though in fact the moratorium
greatly exceeds the time initially specified.
Apparently, the Court would not view even a 10-year
moratorium as a taking under Luca.r because the
moratorium is not "permanent."
FN2. Even under the Court's mistaken view
that the ban on development lasted only 32
months, the ban in this case exceeded the
ban in Lucus.
Our opinion in First English Evanaelical Lutheran
Church o f Glendale v. Cortntv o f Los Anaeles. 482
U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987),
rejects any distinction between temporary and
permanent takings when a landowner is deprived of
all economically beneficial use of his land. Fir,d
En~lishstated that "temporary takings which, as here,
deny a landowner all use of his property, are not
different in kind from permanent *348 takings, for
which
the
Constitution
clearly
requires
compensation."
Id.. at 318. 107 S.Ct. 2378.
Because of First Enplish's rule that "temporary
deprivations of use are compensable under the
Takings Clause," the Court in L x found nothing
problematic about the later developments that
potentially made the ban on development temporary.
505 U.S.. at 1011-1012. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (citing First
Englislz, srruru 1; see also 505 U.S., at 1033, 112

S.Ct. 2886 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment)
("It is well established that temporary takings are as
protected by the Constitution as are permanent ones"
(citing First Enrrlisk. sti~l'a,at 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378)).
More fundamentally, even if a practical distinction
between temporary and permanent deprivations were
plausible, to treat the two differently in terms of
talungs law would be at odds with the justification for
the Lztcu.s rule. The Lzicas rule is derived from the
fact that a "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from
the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a
physical approp~jation." 505 U.S.. at 1017, 112 S.Ct.
2886. The regulation in Lticos was the "practical
equivalence" of a long-term physical appropriation,
i.e., a condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment
required **I493 compensation.
The "practical
equivalence," from the landowner's point of view, of
a "temporary" ban on all economic use is a forced
leasehold.
For example, assume the following
situation: Respondent is contemplating the creation
of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to preserve its
scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year
leasehold over petitioners' property, during which any
human activity on the land would be prohibited, in
order to prevent any further destruction to the area
while it was deciding whether to request that the area
be designated a National Park.
.Surely that leasehold would require compensation.
In a series of World War 11-era cases in which the
Government had condemned leasehold interests in
order to support the war effort, the Government
conceded that it was required
*349 to pay
compensation for the leasehold i n t e r e ~ t . ~See
United States v. Petty Motor Co.,327 U.S. 372. 66
S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946); United States v.
Generul Motors Corn, 323 U.S. 373. 376, 65 S.Ct.
357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945).
From petitioners'
standpoint, what happened in this case is no different
than if the government had taken a 6-year lease of
their property. The Court ignores this "practical
equivalence" between respondent's deprivation and
the deprivation resulting from a leasehold. In so
doing, the Court allows the government to "do by
regulation what it cannot do through eminent
domain-i.e., take private property without paying for
it." 228 F.3d 998, 999 (C.A.9 2000) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

FN3. There was no dispute that just
compensation was required in those cases.
The disagreement involved how to calculate
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that compensation.
In United Statea v.
Gencr*al Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 65
S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 31 1 (19451, for example,
the issues before the Court were how to
value the leasehold interest (i.e., whether the
"long-term rental value [should be] the sole
measure of the value of such short-term
occupancy," id., at 380, 65 S.Ct. 357).
whether the Government had to pay for the
respondent's removal of personal property
from the condemned warehouse, and
whether the Government had to pay for the
reduction in value of the respondent's
equipment and fixtures left in the
warehouse. Id., at 380-38 1. 65 S.Ct. 357.
Instead of acknowledging the "practical equivalence"
of this case and a condemned leasehold, the Court
analogizes to other areas of takings law in which we
have distinguished between regulations and physical
appropriations, see ante, at 1478-1479.
But
whatever basis there is for such distinctions in those
contexts does not apply when a regulation deprives a
landowner of all economically beneficial use of his
land. In addition to the "practical equivalence" from
the landowner's perspective of such a regulation and
a physical appropriation, we have held that a
regulation denying all productive use of land does not
implicate
the
traditional
justification
for
differentiating between regulations and physical
appropriations. In "the extraordinary circumstance
when no productive or economically beneficial use of
land is permitted," it is less likely that "the legislature
is simply *350 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life' ... in a manner that secures an
'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone
concerned," Lucas, strpra. at 10 17-1018, 112 S.Ct.
2886 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. 11. New York
Cit,~. 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, and
Pennsyhjania Coul Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 415,
43 S.Ct. 1582 and more likely that the property "is
being pressed into some form of public service under
the guise of mitigating serious public harm," Lllcas,
strpra, at 1018. 112 S.Ct. 2886.
The Court also reads L a as being fundamentally
concerned with value, ante, at 1482-1484, rather than
with the denial of "all economically beneficial or
productive use of land," 505 U.S., at 1015, 112 S.Ct.
2886. But L m repeatedly discusses its holding as
applying where "no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted." Id.,at 1017, 1 12
S.Ct 2886; see also ihid. ("[Tlotal deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner's **I494 point

-

of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation");
id.. at 1016. 112 S.Ct. 2886 ("[Tlhe Fifth
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation ...
denies an owner economically viable use of his
land'y;
id., at 1018, 112 S.Ct. 2886 ("[Tlhe
functional basis for permitting the government, by
regulation, to affect property values without
compensation ... does not apply to the relatively rare
situations where the government has deprived a
landowner of all economically beneficial uses");
ibid. ("[Tlhe fact that regulations that leave the
owner of land without economically beneficial or
productive options for its use ... carry with them a
heightened risk that private property is being pressed
into some form of public service"); id.. at 1019. 112
S.Ct. 2886 ("[Wlhen the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that
is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a talung"). Moreover, the Court's position
that value is the sine qua non of the Lucas rule proves
too much. Surely, the land at issue in Lucas retained
some market value based on the contingency, which
soon came to fruition (see supra, at 1492), that the
development ban would be amended.

*351 Liicas is implicated when the government
deprives a landowner of "all economically beneficial
or productive use of land." 505 U.S., at 10 15. 112
S.Ct. 2886. The District Court found, and the Court
agrees, that the moratorium "temporarily" deprived
petitioners of " 'all economically viable use of their
land.' "Ante, at 1475. Because the rationale for the
L a rule applies just as strongly in this case, the
"temporary" denial of all viable use of land for six
years is a talung.

The Court worries that applying Lucas here compels
finding that an array of traditional, short-term, landuse planning devices are takings. Ante, at 1485,
1486-1487.
But since the beginning of our
regulatory takings jurisprudence, we have recognized
that property rights "are enjoyed under an implied
limitation." Mahon, .supra, at 413, 43 S.Ct. 158.
Thus, in Lucas, after holding that the regulation
prohibiting all economically beneficial use of the
coastal land came within our categorical takings rule,
we nonetheless inquired into whether such a result
"inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership."

O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

N

-- 'j

>"J

i

122 S.Ct. 1465
Page 29
535 U.S. 302,122 S.Ct: 1465,54 ERC 1129, 152 L.Ed.2d 5 17,70 USLW 4260,32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,627,02 Cal.
Daily Op. Serv. 3495,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4399,lO A.L.R. Fed. 2d 681
(Cite as: 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465)
505 U.S.. at 1029. 112 S.Ct. 2886. Because the
regulation at issue in Llrcas purported to be
permanent, or at least long term, we concluded that
the only implied limitation of state property law that
could achieve a similar long-term deprivation of all
economic use would be something "achieved in the
courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely
affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise." &
I
When a regulation merely delays a final land-use
decision, we have recognized that there are other
background principles of state property law that
prevent the delay from being deemed a taking. We
thus noted in First English that our discussion of
temporary takings did not apply "in the case *352 of
normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like." 482
U.S.. at 321, 107 S.Ct. 2378. We reiterated this last
Term: "The right to improve property, of course, is
subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority,
including the enforcement of valid zoning and landuse restrictions." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 627. 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592
(2001). Zoning regulations existed as far back as
colonial Boston, see Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takin~s Clause and the
Political Process, 95 Colum.
L.Rev. 782. 789
(19951, and New York City enacted the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916, see 1
**I495 Anderson's American Law of Zoning $ 3.07,
p. 92 (K. Young rev. 4th ed.1995). Thus, the shortterm delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes
are a longstanding feature of state property law and
part of a landowner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations. See Lucus. srrarcl, at 1034. 112 S.Ct.
2886
-(KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment).
But a moratorium prohibiting all economic use for a
period of six years is not one of the longstanding,
implied limitations of state property
Moratoria are "interim controls on the use of land
that seek to maintain the status quo with respect to
land development in an area by either 'fi-eezing'
existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of
building permits for only certain land uses that would
not be inconsistent with a contemplated zoning plan
or zoning change." 1 E. Ziegler, Rathkopfs The
Law of Zoning and *353 Planning 3 13:3, p. 13-6
(4th ed.2001). Typical moratoria' thus prohibit only
certain categories of development, such as fast-food
restaurants, see Schufer I). New 01-leclns,743 F.2d

1086 (C.A.5 19841, or adult businesses, see Renfon v.
Plavtinzc Theafres,Inc.. 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925,
89 L.Ed.2d 29 (19861, or all commercial
development, see Arnold Bernhard & Co. 1).
Planninp & Zoninp Comm'n, 194 Conn. 152, 479
A.2d 801 (19841. Such moratoria do not implicate
Lltccls because they do not deprive landowners of all
economically beneficial use of their land. As for
moratoria that prohibit all development, these do not
have the lineage of permit and zoning requirements
and thus it is less certain that property is acquired
under the "implied limitation" of a moratorium
prohibiting all development.
Moreover, unlike a
permit system in which it is expected that a project
will be approved so long as certain conditions are
satisfied, a moratorium that prohibits all uses is by
definition contemplating a new land-use plan that
would prohibit all uses.

FN4. Six years is not a "cutoff point," ante,
at 1487, n. 34; it is the length involved in
this case. And the "explanation" for the
conclusion that there is a taking in this case
is the fact that a 6-year moratorium far
exceeds any moratorium authorized under
background principles of state property law.
See inji-a, 1495, 1496. This case does not
require us to undertake a more exacting
study of state property law and discern
exactly how long a moratorium must last
before it no longer can be considered an
implied limitation of property ownership
(assuming, that is, that a moratorium on all
development is a background principle of
state property law, see infra, this page).
But this case does not require us to decide as a
categorical matter whether moratoria prohibiting all
economic use are an implied limitation of state
property law, because the duration of this
"moratorium" far exceeds that of ordinary moratoria.
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 1489, n. 37, state
statutes authorizing the issuance of moratoria often
limit the moratoria's duration.
California, where
much of the land at issue in this case is located,
provides that a moratorium "shall be of no further
force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption,"
and caps extension of the moratorium so that the total
duration cannot exceed two years. Cal. Govt.Code
Ann. 3 65858(a) (West Supp.2002); see also
Mini~Stat. 5 462.355, subd. 4 (2000) (limiting
moratoria to 18 months, with one permissible
extension, for a total of two years). Another State
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limits moratoria to 120 days, with the possibility of a
single 6-month extension. 0re.Rev.Stat. Ann. tj
197.520(4) (19971. Others limit moratoria to six
"354 months without any possibility of an extension.
See Colo.Rev.Stat. 6 30-28-12 1 (2001); N.J. Stat.
Ann. 6 40:55D-90(b) /1991).m Indeed, it has long
been understood that moratoria on development
exceeding these short time periods are not **I496 a
legitimate planning device. See, e.g., Hold.s~vorthv.
Huzue. 9 N.J.Misc. 715, 155 A. 892 (1931).

FN5. These are just

some examples of the
state laws limiting the duration of moratoria.
There are others. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
\ .
17-27-404(3)(b)(i)-(ii) (1995)
(temporary prohibitions on development
"may not exceed six months in duration,"
with the possibility of extensions for no
more than "two additional six-month
periods"). See also ante, at 1486-1487, n.
31.
Resolution 83-2 1 reflected this understanding of the
limited duration of moratoria in initially limiting the
moratorium in this case to 90 days.
But what
resulted-a "moratorium" lasting nearly six yearsbears no resemblance to the short-term nature of
traditional moratoria as understood from these
background examples of state property law.
Because the prohibition on development of nearly six
years in this case cannot be said to resemble any
"implied limitation" of state property law, it is a
taking that requires compensation.

Lake Tahoe is a national treasure, and I do not doubt
that respondent's efforts at preventing further
degradation of the lake were made in good faith in
furtherance of the public interest. But, as is the case
with most governmental action that furthers the
public interest, the Constitution requires that the costs
and burdens be borne by the public at large, not by a
few targeted citizens. Justice Holmes' admonition of
80 years ago again rings true: "We are in danger of
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change." Muhon. 260 U.S., at 416,
43 S.Ct. 158.

"355 Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice SCALIA
joins, dissenting.
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent.
I write
separately to address the majority's conclusion that
the temporary moratorium at issue here was not a
taking because it was not a "taking of 'the parcel as a
whole.' " Ante, at 1484. While this questionable
rule FNI has been applied to various alleged regulatory
takings, it was, in my view, rejected in the context of
temporal deprivations of property by First Enzlish
Evunac~liculLutheran Cl~urcho f Glc.nd(rl~v. County
a f l o s Anaeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318. 107 S.Ct. 2378,
96 L.Ed.2d 250 (19871, which held that temporary
and permanent takings "are not different in kind"
when a landowner is deprived of all beneficial use of
his land. I had thought that F i m English put to rest
the notion that the "relevant denominator" is land's
infinite life. Consequently, a regulation effecting a
total deprivation of the use of a so-called "temporal
slice" of property is cornpensable under the Talungs
Clause unless background principles of state property
law prevent it from being deemed a talung; "total
deprivation of use is, from the landowner's point of
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation."
Lucas v. Solith Carolino Coa.sla1 Council, 505 U.S.
1003. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992).

FN* The majority's decision to embrace the
"parcel as a whole" doctrine as settled is
puzzling.
See, e.g., P[~luzzolov. Rhorle
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 63 1, 121 S.Ct. 2448,
150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001j (noting that the
Court has "at times expressed discomfort
with the logic of [the parcel as a whole]
rule"); Lucas v. Solith Corolinu Coustul
Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1017, n. 7, 112
S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)
(recognizing that "uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator in [the
Court's] 'deprivation' fraction has produced
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court,"
and that the relevant calculus is a "difficult
question").
A taking is exactly what occurred in this case. No
one seriously doubts that the land-use regulations at
issue rendered petitioners' land unsusceptible of any
economically beneficial use. This was true at the
inception of the moratorium,*356 and it remains true
today. These individuals and families were deprived
of the opportunity to build single-family homes as
permanent, retirement, or vacation residences on land
upon which such construction was authorized when
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purchased.
The Court assures them that "a
temporary prohibition on economic use" cannot be a
taking because **I497 "[l]ogically ... the property
will recover value as soon as the prohibition is
lifted." Anfe, at 1484. But the "logical" assurance
that a "temporary restriction ... merely causes a
diminution in value," ibzd., is cold comfort to the
property owners in this case or any other. After all,
"[Gn the long run we are all dead." J. Keynes,
Monetary Reform 88 (1924).
I would hold that regulations prohibiting all
productive uses of property are subject to Lucas ' per
se rule, regardless of whether the property so
burdened retains theoretical useful life and value if,
and when, the "temporary" moratorium is lifted. To
my mind, such potential future value bears on the
amount of compensation due and has nothing to do
with the question whether there was a taking in the
first place. It is regrettable that the Court has charted
a markedly different path today.
u.s.,2002.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency
535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 54 ERC 1129, 152
L.Ed.2d 517, 70 USLW 4260, 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
20,627, 02 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3495, 2002 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 4399,lO A.L.R. Fed. 2d 68 1
Briefs and Other Related Documents /Back to top)
2002 WL 43288. 70 USLW 3462 (Oral Argument)
Oral Argument (Jan. 07,2002)
2001 WL 1663776 (Appellate Brief) REPLY
BRIEF (Dec. 13,2001)
2001 WL 1488022 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR
THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS (Nov. 15,200 1)
2001 WL 1548682 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF
AMICI CURIAE SCIENTISTS IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS (Nov. 15,200 1)
2001 WL 1480565 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR
RESPONDENTS (Nov. 14,2001)
2001 WL 1597737 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE OF NATIONAL AUDUBON
SOCIETY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL,
NATIONAL
WILDLIFE
FEDERATION AND SIERRA CLUB IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENTS (Nov. 13,2001)
2001 WL 1597741 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF
THE STATES OF VERMONT, ALASKA,
ARIZONA, CONNECTICUT, FLORIDA, HAWAII,
IOWA,
LOUISIANA,
MARYLAND,

MASSACHUSETTS, MONTANA, NEW JERSEY,
NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, OKLAHOMA,
OREGON, RHODE ISLAND, SOUTH DAKOTA,
TENNESSEE, TEXAS, AND WASHINGTON AND
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
(Nov. 13,2001)
2001 WL 1480560 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES,
NATIONAL
GOVERNORS
ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL
CITY-COUNTY
MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION,
INTERNATIONAL MUNICIP AL LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, AND U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS (Nov. 07,2001)
200 1 WL 1 13 1644 (Appellate Brief) Brief Amicus
Curiae of American Association of Small Property
Owners, et al. in Support of Petitioner (Sep. 19,
2001)
2001 WL 1077926 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF AMICI
CURIAE OF THE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU
FEDERATION, CALIFORNIA FARM BUREAU
FEDERATION AND THE NEVADA FARM
BUREAU FEDERATION IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER (Sep. 12,2001)
2001 WL 1077932 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF
AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF HOME BUILDERS IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS (Sep. 12,2001)
2001 WL 1077936 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF OF
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AS
AMICUS
CURIAE
IN
SUPPORT
OF
PETITIONERS (Sep. 12,2001)
2001 WL 1082462 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE OF DEFENDERS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS
SUPPORT
OF
PETITIONER (Sep. 12,2001)
2001 WL 1082466 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR
JUSTICE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS (Sep.
12,2001)
200 1 WL 1082473 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF AMICI
CURIAE OF PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION
AND
CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION
OF
REALTORS(R) IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL, ET
AL. (Sep. 12,200 1 )
2001 WL 169201 1 (Appellate Brief) BRIEF FOR
PETITIONERS (Sep. 12,2001)
2001 WL 34093956 (Joint Appendix) (Sep. 12,

-

O 2006 ThornsodWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
r

'-

,

J

7f

"f'

122 S.Ct. 1465
Page 32
535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 54 ERC 1129, 152 L.Ed.2d 5 17, 70 USLW 4260,32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,627,02 Cal.
Daily Op. Serv. 3495,2002 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4399, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 68 1
(Cite as: 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465)
2001)
00-1 167 (Docket) (Jan. 19,200 1)

END OF DOCUMENT

O 2006 ThomsonIWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

200.00
CLINICAL
Protocol #201
Authority for Scene & Patient Management "Thank You
For Your Offer of Assistance" letter

200.00
CLINICAL
Protocol #201
Authority for Scene & Patient Management "Thank You
For Your Offer of Assistance" letter

200.00
CLINICAL
Protocol #2Ol
Authority for Scene & Patient Management "Thank You
For Your Offer of Assistance" letter

Protocol #202
Cancellation or Reduction of Code Responses

Protocol #202
Cancellation or Reduction of Code Responses

Protocol #202
Cancellation or Reduction of Code Responses

Protocol #203
Minimum Patient Run Reports Criteria

Protocol #203
Minimum Patient Run Reports Criteria

Protocol #203
Minimum Patient Run Reports Criteria

Protocol #204
Consent and Refusal for Treatment and / or Transport

Protocol #204
Consent and Refusal for Treatment and 1 or Transport

Protocol #204
Consent and Refusal for Treatment and / or Transport

Protocol #2OS
Discontinuing / Withholding Resuscitation in the
Pre-Hospital Setting

Protocol #2OS
Discontinuing I Withholding Resuscitation in the
Pre-Hospital Setting

Protocol #2OS
Discontinuing / Withholding Resuscitation in the
Pre-Hospital Setting

Protocol #206
KCEMSS Approved Abbreviations

Protocol #206
KCEMSS Approved Abbreviations

Protocol #206
KCEMSS Approved Abbreviations

Protocol #207
Medical Direction 1 Communication Resource

Protocol #207
Medical Direction 1 Communication Resource

Protocol #207
Medical Direction / Communication Resource

Protocol #2O8
Patient Assessment

Protocol #208
Patient Assessment

Protocol #208
Patient Assessment

Protocol #209
Patient Restraint i Dangerous Situations

Protocol #209
Patient Restraint / Dangerous Situations

Protocol #209
Patient Restraint / Dangerous Situations

Protocol #2lO
Treatment of the Patient with Do Not Resuscitate Orders
"Comfort One" form

Protocol #2lO
Treatment of the Patient with Do Not Resuscitate Orders
"Cornfort One" form

Protocol #2lO
Treatment of the Patient with Do Not Resuscitate Orders
"Comfort One" form

Protocol # 2 l l
Non Critical Care / Critical Care Transports

Protocol # 2 l l
Non Critical Care / Critical Care Transports

Protocol #2ll
Non Critical Care / Critical Care Transports

0

(-

'd

